By James Glanz
The New York Times
October 25, 2009
Maisoncelle, France — The heavy clay-laced mud behind the cattle pen on Antoine Renault’s farm looks as treacherous as it must have been nearly 600 years ago, when King Henry V rode from a spot near here to lead a sodden and exhausted English Army against a French force that was said to outnumber his by as much as five to one.
No one can ever take away the shocking victory by Henry and his “band of brothers,” as Shakespeare would famously call them, on St. Crispin’s Day, Oct. 25, 1415. They devastated a force of heavily armored French nobles who had gotten bogged down in the region’s sucking mud, riddled by thousands of arrows from English longbowmen and outmaneuvered by common soldiers with much lighter gear. It would become known as the Battle of Agincourt.
But Agincourt’s status as perhaps the greatest victory against overwhelming odds in military history — and a keystone of the English self-image — has been called into doubt by a group of historians in Britain and France who have painstakingly combed an array of military and tax records from that time and now take a skeptical view of the figures handed down by medieval chroniclers.
The historians have concluded that the English could not have been outnumbered by more than about two to one. And depending on how the math is carried out, Henry may well have faced something closer to an even fight, said Anne Curry, a professor at the University of Southampton who is leading the study.
Those cold figures threaten an image of the battle that even professional researchers and academics have been reluctant to challenge in the face of Shakespearean prose and centuries of English pride, Ms. Curry said.
“It’s just a myth, but it’s a myth that’s part of the British psyche,” Ms. Curry said.
The work, which has received both glowing praise and sharp criticism from other historians in the United States and Europe, is the most striking of the revisionist accounts to emerge from a new science of military history. The new accounts tend to be not only more quantitative but also more attuned to political, cultural and technological factors, and focus more on the experience of the common soldier than on grand strategies and heroic deeds.
The approach has drastically changed views on everything from Roman battles with Germanic tribes, to Napoleon’s disastrous occupation of Spain, to the Tet offensive in the Vietnam War. But the most telling gauge of the respect being given to the new historians and their penchant for tearing down established wisdom is that it has now become almost routine for American commanders to call on them for advice on strategy and tactics in Afghanistan, Iraq and other present-day conflicts.
The most influential example is the “Counterinsurgency Field Manual” adopted in 2006 by the United States Army and Marines and smack in the middle of the debate over whether to increase troop levels in Afghanistan.
Gen. David H. Petraeus, who oversees the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as the head of the United States Central Command, drew on dozens of academic historians and other experts to create the manual. And he named Conrad Crane, director of the United States Army Military History Institute at the Army War College, as the lead writer.
Drawing on dozens of historical conflicts, the manual’s prime conclusion is the assertion that insurgencies cannot be defeated without protecting and winning over the general population, regardless of how effective direct strikes on enemy fighters may be.
Mr. Crane said that some of his own early historical research involved a comparison of strategic bombing campaigns with attacks on civilians by rampaging armies during the Hundred Years’ War, when England tried and ultimately failed to assert control over continental France. Agincourt was perhaps the most stirring victory the English would ever achieve on French soil during the conflict.
The Hundred Years’ War never made it into the field manual — the name itself may have served as a deterrent — but after sounding numerous cautions on the vast differences in time, technology and political aims, historians working in the area say that there are some uncanny parallels with contemporary foreign conflicts.
For one thing, by the time Henry landed near the mouth of the Seine on Aug. 14, 1415, and began a rather uninspiring siege of a town called Harfleur, France was on the verge of a civil war, with factions called the Burgundians and the Armagnacs at loggerheads. Henry would eventually forge an alliance with the Burgundians, who in today’s terms would become his “local security forces” in Normandy, and he cultivated the support of local merchants and clerics, all practices that would have been heartily endorsed by the counterinsurgency manual.
“I’m not one who sees history repeating itself, but I think a lot of attitudes do,” said Kelly DeVries, a professor of history at Loyola College in Maryland who has written extensively on medieval warfare. Mr. DeVries said that fighters from across the region began filtering toward the Armagnac camp as soon as Henry became allied with their enemies. “Very much like Al Qaeda in Iraq, there were very diverse forces coming from very, very different places to fight,” Mr. DeVries said.
But first Henry would have his chance at Agincourt. After taking Harfleur, he marched rapidly north and crossed the Somme River, his army depleted by dysentery and battle losses and growing hungry and fatigued.
At the same time, the fractious French forces hastily gathered to meet him.
It is here that historians themselves begin fighting, and several take exception to the new scholarship by Ms. Curry’s team.
Based on chronicles that he considers to be broadly accurate, Clifford J. Rogers, a professor of history at the United States Military Academy at West Point, argues that Henry was in fact vastly outnumbered. For the English, there were about 1,000 so-called men-at-arms in heavy steel armor from head to toe and 5,000 lightly armored men with longbows. The French assembled roughly 10,000 men-at-arms, each with an attendant called a gros valet who could also fight, and around 4,000 men with crossbows and other fighters.
Although Mr. Rogers writes in a recent paper that the French crossbowmen were “completely outclassed” by the English archers, who could send deadly volleys farther and more frequently, the grand totals would result in a ratio of four to one, close to the traditional figures. Mr. Rogers said in an interview that he regarded the archival records as too incomplete to substantially change those estimates.
Still, several French historians said in interviews this month that they seriously doubted that France, riven by factional strife and drawing from a populace severely depleted by the plague, could have raised an army that large in so short a time. The French king, Charles VI, was also suffering from bouts of insanity.
“It was not the complete French power at Agincourt,” said Bertrand Schnerb, a professor of medieval history at the University of Lille, who estimated that there were 12,000 to 15,000 French soldiers.
Ms. Curry, the Southampton historian, said she was comfortable with something close to that lower figure, based on her reading of historical archives, including military pay records, muster rolls, ships’ logs, published rosters of the wounded and dead, wartime tax levies and other surviving documents.
On the English side, Ms. Curry calculates that Henry probably had at least 8,680 soldiers with him on his march to Agincourt. She names thousands of the likely troopers, from Adam Adrya, a man-at-arms, to Philip Zevan, an archer.
And an extraordinary online database listing around a quarter-million names of men who served in the Hundred Years’ War, compiled by Ms. Curry and her collaborators at the universities in Southampton and Reading, shows that whatever the numbers, Henry’s army really was a band of brothers: many of the soldiers were veterans who had served on multiple campaigns together.
“You see tremendous continuity with people who knew and trusted each other,” Ms. Curry said.
That trust must have come in handy after Henry, through a series of brilliant tactical moves, provoked the French cavalry — mounted men-at-arms — into charging the masses of longbowmen positioned on the English flanks in a relatively narrow field between two sets of woods that still exist not far from Mr. Renault’s farm in Maisoncelle.
The series of events that followed as the French men-at-arms slogged through the muddy, tilled fields behind the cavalry were quick and murderous.
Volley after volley of English arrow fire maddened the horses, killed many of the riders and forced the advancing men-at-arms into a mass so dense that many of them could not even lift their arms.
When the heavily armored French men-at-arms fell wounded, many could not get up and simply drowned in the mud as other men stumbled over them. And as order on the French lines broke down completely and panic set in, the much nimbler archers ran forward, killing thousands by stabbing them in the neck, eyes, armpits and groin through gaps in the armor, or simply ganged up and bludgeoned the Frenchmen to death.
“The situation was beyond grisly; it was horrific in the extreme,” Mr. Rogers wrote in his paper.
King Henry V had emerged victorious, and as some historians see it, the English crown then mounted a public relations effort to magnify the victory by exaggerating the disparity in numbers.
Whatever the magnitude of the victory, it would not last. The French populace gradually soured on the English occupation as the fighting continued and the civil war remained unresolved in the decades after Henry’s death in 1422, Mr. Schnerb said.
“They came into France saying, ‘You Frenchmen have civil war, and now our king is coming to give you peace,’ ” Mr. Schnerb said. “It was a failure.”
Unwilling to blame a failed counterinsurgency strategy, Shakespeare pinned the loss on poor Henry VI:
“Whose state so many had the managing, That they lost France and made his England bleed.”
Sunday, October 25, 2009
Thursday, October 22, 2009
No way home: The tragedy of the Palestinian diaspora
You might think Palestinian refugees would be welcomed by their Arab neighbours, yet they are denied basic rights and citizenship
A special report by Judith Miller and David Samuels
The Independent (United Kingdom)
22 October 2009
It is a cynical but time-honoured practice in Middle Eastern politics: the statesmen who decry the political and humanitarian crisis of the approximately 3.9 million Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and in Gaza ignore the plight of an estimated 4.6 million Palestinians who live in Arab countries. For decades, Arab governments have justified their decision to maintain millions of stateless Palestinians as refugees in squalid camps as a means of applying pressure to Israel. The refugee problem will be solved, they say, when Israel agrees to let the Palestinians have their own state.
Yet in the two decades since the end of the Cold War, after two Gulf wars, and the rise and fall of the Oslo peace process, not a single Palestinian refugee has returned to Israel — and only a handful of ageing political functionaries have returned from neighbouring Arab countries to the West Bank and Gaza. Instead, failed peace plans and shifting political priorities have resulted in a second Palestinian "Nakba", or catastrophe — this one at hands of the Arab governments. "Marginalised, deprived of basic political and economic rights, trapped in the camps, bereft of realistic prospects, heavily armed and standing atop multiple fault lines," a report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) in Lebanon recently observed, "the refugee population constitutes a time bomb."
The fact that the divided Palestinian political leadership is silent about the mistreatment of the refugees by Arab states does not make such behaviour any less reprehensible — or less dangerous. Some 250,000 Palestinians were chased out of Kuwait and other Gulf States to punish the Palestinian political leadership for supporting Saddam Hussein. Tens of thousands of Palestinian residents of Iraq were similarly dispossessed after the second Gulf war.
In 2001, Palestinians in Lebanon were stripped of the right to own property, or to pass on the property that they already owned to their children — and banned from working as doctors, lawyers, pharmacists or in 20 other professions. Even the Palestinian refugee community in Jordan, historically the most welcoming Arab state, has reason to feel insecure in the face of official threats to revoke their citizenship. The systematic refusal of Arab governments to grant basic human rights to Palestinians who are born and die in their countries — combined with periodic mass expulsions of entire Palestinian communities — recalls the treatment of Jews in medieval Europe. Along with dispossession and marginalisation has come a new and frightening turn away from the traditional forms of nationalism that once dominated the refugee camps towards the radical pan-Islamic ideology of al-Qa'ida.
Daniel C Kurtzer, who has served as US ambassador to both Israel and Egypt and now advises the Obama administration, says that all American governments have resisted dealing with what he calls the most sensitive issue in the conflict — the normalisation of the status of the Palestinians — through a right of return to Palestine, or citizenship in other countries. "The refugees hold the key to this conflict's settlement," he says, "and nobody knows what to do with them."
In the unlikely event that President Obama's vision of a swift and final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict materialises, millions of Palestinians would still live in decaying refugee camps whose inhabitants are forbidden from owning land or participating in normal economic life. The only governing authority that Palestinians living in the camps have ever known is UNRWA — the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. Established by the UN on 8 December 1949 to assist 650,000 impoverished Palestinian refugees from the 1948 war, UNRWA has been battling budget cuts and strikes among its employees as it struggles to provide subsidies and services to Palestinian refugees, who are defined as "persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948".
•••
The inclusion of the descendants of Palestinian refugees as refugees in UNRWA's mandate has no parallel in international humanitarian law and is responsible for the growth of the official numbers of Palestinian refugees in foreign countries from 711,000 to 4.6 million during decades when the number of ageing refugees from the 1948 Israeli war of independence in was in fact declining. UNRWA's grant of refugee status to the children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the original Palestinian refugees according to the principle of patrilineal descent, with no limit on the generations that can obtain refugee status, has made it easy for host countries to flout their obligations under international law. According to Article 34 of the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, "The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalisation of refugees," and must "make every effort to expedite naturalisation proceedings" — the opposite of what happened to the Palestinians in every Arab country in which they settled, save Jordan. For all the easy criticism that can be levelled at UNRWA, it is hard to see how many Palestinian refugees would have survived without the agency's help.
The responsibility for the legal dimensions of their fate lies elsewhere, as UNRWA Commissioner-General Karen AbuZayd made clear at UNRWA's anniversary ceremony in New York on 24 September, before an audience that included Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Queen Rania of Jordan — herself a Palestinian. "The protracted exile of Palestine refugees and the dire conditions they endure, particularly in the occupied Palestinian territory, cannot be reconciled with state obligations under the UN Charter," AbuZayd said. The result for the refugees, AbuZayd said at a forum the previous afternoon at the Princeton Club, is a "suspended state of existence" for which no one seems willing to accept political responsibility. The rest of the discussion, moderated by Ambassador Kurtner, made clear that anticipated solutions to the Palestinian refugee problem had failed to emerge — leaving a community in crisis.
"You can't ignore an entire people because it's awkward or inconvenient," says Dr Karma Nabulsi, a lecturer at Oxford and a former Palestinian representative at the UN. In the period immediately after Oslo, she added, Palestinian refugees in Arab countries hoped to be repatriated to areas governed by the Palestinian Authority. Today, despair has replaced that initial optimism. "What young Palestinian would want to resettle in Gaza or in the West Bank?" she asks.
Sharing a panel with Dr Nabulsi, the doveish former Israeli foreign minister Shlomo Ben Ami, who negotiated directly with Yasser Arafat at the failed Camp David meetings in 2000, asserted that Israel has suppressed narratives that would make clear its responsibility for the Palestinian refugee crisis of 1948. Indifference to the refugees' plight, he added, was shared by Israel's negotiating partner in the Oslo years — Yasser Arafat. "He was not a refugee man," Ben Ami said flatly. "He was much more centred on the question of Jerusalem. I heard him say to [Mahmood Abbas] in my presence, 'leave me alone with your refugees'."
It is no secret that certain Arab regimes saw the Palestinians under Arafat's leadership as an unwelcome occupation that stripped Jordan bare and destroyed Lebanon. Similarly, Arafat often used the threat of destabilisation and assassination to get Arab regimes to fund the Palestinian cause. Still, the record of Arafat's Palestinian Authority in its territories during the 1990s attests to the truth of Ben Ami's observation, which applies both to Arafat's Fatah and to Hamas. Despite $10bn in foreign aid, not one refugee camp in the West Bank or Gaza has been replaced by modern housing. On the West Bank, chances for normal Palestinian communal life have been shattered by Israeli settlements, arrests, checkpoints and roadblocks, and by 15 years of abuses by Fatah. Even under the best of circumstances, an influx of refugees would further destabilise a Palestinian economy that is kept afloat by the world's highest per capita receipts of foreign aid.
Daniel Kurtzer agrees no one is likely to make a deal that includes a substantial return of the Palestinian diaspora. "Most Palestinian refugees know it, as do the settlers," he says. So rather than wait for American mediators or Arab states to impose solutions on them, the Palestinians themselves should begin to tackle the diabolically difficult issues inherent in the resolution of their political and economic future. "What we need is a refugee summit," he says. "I'm looking for a real conversation that must start internally and soon."
After 60 years of failed wars, and failed peace, it is time to put politics aside and to insist that the basic rights of the Palestinian refugees in Arab countries be respected — whether or not their children's children return to Haifa anytime soon. While Saudi Arabia may not wish to host Israeli tourists, it can easily afford to integrate the estimated 240,000 Palestinian refugees who already live in the kingdom — just as Egypt, which has received close to $60bn in US aid, and has a population of 81 million, can grant legal rights to an estimated 70,000 Palestinian refugees and their descendants. One can only imagine the outrage that the world community would rightly visit upon Israel if Israeli Arabs were subject to the vile discriminatory laws applied to Palestinians living in Arab countries. Surely, Palestinian Arabs can keep their own national dream alive in the countries where they were born, while also enjoying the freedom to work, vote and own property?
A practical solution to the crisis of the Palestinian refugees in Arab countries will focus on Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, which together play host to approximately 3 million of the estimated 4.6 million Palestinian refugees living outside the West Bank and Gaza. While each of these countries has chosen different legal and political approaches to the 1948 refugees and their descendants, they share a political desire to sublimate the rights of Palestinian residents, treating them as unwanted guests or as tools to be used in pursuing wider political interests — but rarely as fully-fledged members of society. Lebanon, where Palestinians led by Yasser Arafat are widely blamed for having sparked the 1975 civil war, is the worst offender against international norms. Yet even in Jordan, which is in many ways a model for the humane treatment of a large refugee population, Palestinians today feel markedly less secure than they did two decades ago, or even five years ago.
•••
Outside of Iraq, whose Palestinian population fled en masse after the fall of Saddam, nowhere has the situation of the Palestinian refugees worsened so dramatically as in Lebanon. Since the early Sixties, Palestinians there have been barred from working in medicine, dentistry and the law. In 2001, the Lebanese parliament adopted an amendment to the country's property laws that prohibited the acquisition of real estate by "any person not a citizen of a recognised state" — meaning the estimated 250,000 to 400,000 Palestinians living in Lebanon. Palestinians who had acquired real estate prior to 2001 were barred from bequeathing property to their children.
Right-wing Christians and Shi'ite radicals alike support discriminatory legislation that further impoverishes Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, with the stated goal of preventing them from beginning the process of naturalisation, known as tawtin. In his inaugural speech in May, 2008, Lebanese President Michel Suleiman, a Christian and former head of the country's armed forces, reaffirmed "Lebanon's categorical refusal of naturalisation", a statement echoed by the former Lebanese ambassador to the US, Nassib Lahoud, who told us recently in Beirut: "The confessional balance does not allow these things to happen ... at the moment the Palestinians are citizens of a state that does not exist." His sentiments were echoed by Hizbollah's spokesman on the Palestinian question, Hassan Hodroj. "The threat of tawtin is genuine," Hodroj explained. "It is one of the ways in which Israel, backed by the US, is endangering the region."
The fact that the living standard of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon has been deemed "catastrophic" by both UNRWA and by the Lebanese government can therefore be understood as a deliberate result of official state policy that is supported by all parties across Lebanon's divided confessional spectrum. As a member of the Lebanese parliament, Ghassan Moukheiber, explained in an interview with the ICG, "our official policy is to maintain Palestinians in a vulnerable, precarious situation to diminish prospects for their naturalisation or permanent settlement".
Yet the results of this horrifying policy may not be confined to Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. In his book Everyday Jihad, about the experience of refugees in the Ain al-Hilweh camp, home to an estimated 70,000 Palestinians, the French scholar Bernard Rougier describes the results of decades of exclusion and marginalisation which have severed the refugees from any connection to a lost homeland — or the country in which they were born. As a result, he says, many Palestinians have abandoned a failed nationalism for the radical millenarian ideas associated with al-Qa'ida. "Palestinian salafist militants have devoted themselves to defending the imaginary borders of identity," Rougier writes, "declaring themselves the protectors and guardians of the cause of Sunni Islam worldwide."
Visitors to the Ain al-Hilweh camp are immediately made aware that they have entered another world. While Lebanese army checkpoints ring the camp, the Lebanese state has no presence inside. Food, water and other basic services are provided by UNRWA, while armed factions openly display weapons in muddy alleyways and recruit generations to serve under their banners. It is easy to see why the secular promise of Palestinian nationalism has faded and why the promise of a Muslim paradise without borders might take its place. One of the 9/11 hijackers dedicated a poem to Ain al-Hilweh's most prominent jihadist in his videotaped will, and dozens of Palestinian fighters from the camp joined al-Qa'ida in Iraq.
"The situation is the camp is deteriorating," Rougier told us, when we asked about whether things were getting better or worse for the Palestinians of Lebanon. Bound by their absolute opposition to tawtin, he says, Lebanese leaders are creating a radicalised Palestinian population that will eventually have to be absorbed into Lebanon, despite having little or no allegiance to the state.
Sahar Atrache, lead author of the ICG report on the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, agrees. "Palestinians refugees in Lebanon lack means of socio-economic advancement and are bereft of hope," he says. "They are vulnerable on all counts — politically, legally and above all physically. The status quo is good neither for the refugees nor for Lebanon itself."
•••
While Palestinian refugees and their descendants inside Syria are not allowed to vote or hold Syrian passports, they are free from the overt discrimination that has turned Lebanon into a recruiting ground for al-Qa'ida. The legal status of Palestinians inside Syria is defined by a 1956 law that states that grants them "the right to employment, commerce, and national service, while preserving their original nationality". More than 100,000 of the estimated 450,000 Palestinians in Syria live in or around the Yarmouk refugee camp, which long ago became a neighbourhood of Damascus.
While Palestinians are reasonably well integrated into the Syrian socio-economic structure, according to the scholar Laurie Brand they do not have the right to vote, nor can they stand for parliament or other political offices. Palestinians are barred from buying farmland and prohibited from owning more than one house. The female descendant of a Palestinian refugee can become a Syrian citizen by marrying a Syrian man. The male descendants of Palestinian men and their children are barred from acquiring Syrian citizenship, even if they marry Syrian women.
The major focus of Syrian interest in the Palestinian refugees has long been as an extension of the Assad regime's policy towards its neighbours — Israel and Lebanon. Damascus has long hosted a variety of Palestinian terror groups that rejected the Oslo process, including Ahmad Jibril's Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). More significantly, Damascus is also the political and logistical centre for Hamas. "Syria's support for armed Palestinian groups is key to pressuring Damascus' neighbours, most notably Israel and Lebanon," says Andrew Tabler, author of the Syria-watching blog Eighth Gate.
Syria increases its leverage inside Israel by weakening Fatah and strengthening Hamas. In Lebanon, Syrian military and political interference has turned the refugee camps into "security-free islands" (juzur amniya) where bombers can be recruited, bombs manufactured, and plots can be directed beyond the reach of the Lebanese army and police. "Life for the Palestinians was deliberately frozen for political manipulation," concludes Lebanese analyst Tony Badran. "Syria has no interest in normalising that situation."
While Syria imposes a measure of security on its Palestinian neighbourhoods, it foments insecurity and violence in Lebanon and Gaza, splitting the Palestinian polity and fuelling the misery of Palestinians throughout the region.
•••
Jordan is the only Arab nation that has integrated large numbers of Palestinians as full-fledged citizens. This is due not only to the unification of the East Bank and West Bank of the Jordan River valley under Hashemite rule between the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 until Israel's occupation of West Bank in 1967, but also to the luck of having had an enlightened monarch committed to the compassionate treatment of the estimated 100,000 refugees who crossed the Jordan River during the nakba in 1948. Israel's occupation of the West Bank following the 1967 war triggered a second exodus of 140,000 refugees into Jordan.
Today, almost 2 million of Jordan's 6 million people are registered Palestinian refugees, the largest concentration of current and former refugees in the Palestinian diaspora — and increasingly, tensions have deepened between the Palestinians and the "East Bank" establishment. This summer in Amman, ambiguous declarations by the recently appointed minister of the interior, Nayef al-Kadi, who is widely perceived to be anti-Palestinian, led many Jordanians of Palestinian origin to fear they would be stripped of Jordanian identity numbers. Speaking to the London-based Arabic-language newspaper Al Hayat, al-Kadi confirmed that some Palestinians would be stripped of citizenship, ostensibly to counter Israeli plans to turn Jordan into Palestine. "We should be thanked for taking this measure," he said. "We are fulfilling our national duty because Israel wants to expel the Palestinians from their homeland." Panic about their status spread quickly among the Palestinian community.
In interviews this month, senior Jordanian officials sought to quell such fears, while also suggesting there was at least some substance to al-Kadi's explosive suggestion. Faisal Bakr Qadi, the director of the Interior Ministry's office of Inspections, said Palestinians in Jordan were not being systematically stripped of citizenship. Rather, he explained that the government's current review of Palestinian national status dated back to 1988, when King Hussein, in response to demands by Palestinian and Arab leaders, disengaged administratively from the West Bank. Palestinian refugees, he said, meaning those who came to Jordan in the 1948 exodus, were to remain "full Jordanian citizens". "Displaced" Palestinians, or those who had come in 1967 and afterwards, would be able to maintain their yellow identity cards and numbers and de facto citizenship, provided they returned to the West Bank to renew the Israeli passes that permit them to go back and forth between Jordan and the West Bank.
Since 1983, he said, Jordan had given the coveted yellow cards — which enable Palestinians to work without special permits, pay local tuition rates in school, and enjoy full government services — to 280,000 Palestinians, whereas it had "frozen" the cards — or downgraded their status — of only 15,856 people. So far this year, he said, 9,956 cards were upgraded, 291 downgraded.
While many diplomats doubt these numbers, Jordanians insist there is no plot or plan to expel or deny citizenship to Palestinians who have lived virtually their entire lives in Jordan. "We want to ensure that when and if the peace process succeeds in establishing an independent Palestinian state, Palestinians living in Jordan will be in a position to choose their citizenship by having their status in order in both Jordan and Palestine," said an official close to King Abdullah.
Yet the distinctions that seem meaningful in Amman are not clear to some of the almost 94,000 Palestinian residents of Baqa'a, the largest of the 10 official refugee camps run by the UN. Some Palestinians in Baqa'a complain about the "new regulations" and the lack of identity cards that enable them to work without special permits and educate their children in public schools. Anxiety about the future pervades this ramshackle suburb at the northern edge of Amman, which began as an emergency relief centre after the 1967 war and is now a sprawling mini-city with its own basic shops, shawarma (sandwich) stands, and services. Many of the people we spoke to claimed that they knew someone, or had a relative, neighbour and friend whose identity card had been revoked, or whose status had inexplicably been changed.
For many of these refugees at the bottom of Jordan's social and economic pecking order, life without papers means hiding from the police who constantly patrol their camp's streets, being too poor to send any of your eight to 10 children to college, a lifetime of menial labour, and only a threadbare dream of returning to a homeland that most of them have never seen. There is strong suspicion of the state, but also of their neighbours, who are divided into "'48 people" and "'67 people". "Some of the newcomers would give away Al Aqsa for a Jordanian identity card," says Heba, a mother of eight, mentioning Islam's celebrated mosque in Jerusalem, one of its holiest shrines.
"We're Jordanians," says her son, Mustapha, a slender, 20-year-old in a bright orange T-shirt emblazoned with meaningless words in unknown languages. "This is the best place in the world," he says, pointing around the bare living room whose worn rugs and threadbare pillows cover the floor on which he and all his siblings sleep. "We would never leave here. But I'm loyal to my country, and I would like to visit it one day."
He seems perplexed when asked which is his country — Jordan or Palestine. "We have no security here, but we are Jordanians," replies Mustapha, who lounges on a mattress in a two-storey cement house down the road while one of his five daughters offers tiny glasses of steaming herbal tea and cardamom-scented coffee. "Everything I have is here. This house. My car. My job. What would I have in Nablus or Be'ersheba?" he declares. "My children know nothing but Jordan. And we will stay here."
That determination, echoed repeatedly through the dilapidated cement homes that line Baqa'a's gravelly streets and dust-filled shops, is precisely what terrifies Jordan's East Bank establishment. Jordanians have reason to fear their Palestinian guests. Many Jordanians have not forgotten "Black September", the civil war launched by Arafat's Fatah organisation in 1970 which nearly toppled King Hussein's kingdom.
Moreover, having grown accustomed to their near monopoly on jobs provided by the government, Jordan's largest employer, Jordanians fear demands for political equality from Palestinians, most of whom would probably choose to remain in Jordan, relinquishing their "right of return' in favour of compensation. An end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would surely threaten Jordan's informal division of power: East Bankers dominate the army, the security services and most civil-service posts, while Palestinians are disproportionately represented in business. Palestinians may advise the king in the royal court, but there has been only one Palestinian prime minister, who served for eight months. Palestinians now comprise only 23 of Jordan's 110 MPs.
"The closer we get to a solution," says Adnan Abu Odeh, a Palestinian who was one of King Hussein's royal court chiefs and also held other important government posts, "the more anxious society becomes. We are approaching a moment of truth."
A special report by Judith Miller and David Samuels
The Independent (United Kingdom)
22 October 2009
It is a cynical but time-honoured practice in Middle Eastern politics: the statesmen who decry the political and humanitarian crisis of the approximately 3.9 million Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and in Gaza ignore the plight of an estimated 4.6 million Palestinians who live in Arab countries. For decades, Arab governments have justified their decision to maintain millions of stateless Palestinians as refugees in squalid camps as a means of applying pressure to Israel. The refugee problem will be solved, they say, when Israel agrees to let the Palestinians have their own state.
Yet in the two decades since the end of the Cold War, after two Gulf wars, and the rise and fall of the Oslo peace process, not a single Palestinian refugee has returned to Israel — and only a handful of ageing political functionaries have returned from neighbouring Arab countries to the West Bank and Gaza. Instead, failed peace plans and shifting political priorities have resulted in a second Palestinian "Nakba", or catastrophe — this one at hands of the Arab governments. "Marginalised, deprived of basic political and economic rights, trapped in the camps, bereft of realistic prospects, heavily armed and standing atop multiple fault lines," a report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) in Lebanon recently observed, "the refugee population constitutes a time bomb."
The fact that the divided Palestinian political leadership is silent about the mistreatment of the refugees by Arab states does not make such behaviour any less reprehensible — or less dangerous. Some 250,000 Palestinians were chased out of Kuwait and other Gulf States to punish the Palestinian political leadership for supporting Saddam Hussein. Tens of thousands of Palestinian residents of Iraq were similarly dispossessed after the second Gulf war.
In 2001, Palestinians in Lebanon were stripped of the right to own property, or to pass on the property that they already owned to their children — and banned from working as doctors, lawyers, pharmacists or in 20 other professions. Even the Palestinian refugee community in Jordan, historically the most welcoming Arab state, has reason to feel insecure in the face of official threats to revoke their citizenship. The systematic refusal of Arab governments to grant basic human rights to Palestinians who are born and die in their countries — combined with periodic mass expulsions of entire Palestinian communities — recalls the treatment of Jews in medieval Europe. Along with dispossession and marginalisation has come a new and frightening turn away from the traditional forms of nationalism that once dominated the refugee camps towards the radical pan-Islamic ideology of al-Qa'ida.
Daniel C Kurtzer, who has served as US ambassador to both Israel and Egypt and now advises the Obama administration, says that all American governments have resisted dealing with what he calls the most sensitive issue in the conflict — the normalisation of the status of the Palestinians — through a right of return to Palestine, or citizenship in other countries. "The refugees hold the key to this conflict's settlement," he says, "and nobody knows what to do with them."
In the unlikely event that President Obama's vision of a swift and final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict materialises, millions of Palestinians would still live in decaying refugee camps whose inhabitants are forbidden from owning land or participating in normal economic life. The only governing authority that Palestinians living in the camps have ever known is UNRWA — the United Nations Relief and Works Agency. Established by the UN on 8 December 1949 to assist 650,000 impoverished Palestinian refugees from the 1948 war, UNRWA has been battling budget cuts and strikes among its employees as it struggles to provide subsidies and services to Palestinian refugees, who are defined as "persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948".
•••
The inclusion of the descendants of Palestinian refugees as refugees in UNRWA's mandate has no parallel in international humanitarian law and is responsible for the growth of the official numbers of Palestinian refugees in foreign countries from 711,000 to 4.6 million during decades when the number of ageing refugees from the 1948 Israeli war of independence in was in fact declining. UNRWA's grant of refugee status to the children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the original Palestinian refugees according to the principle of patrilineal descent, with no limit on the generations that can obtain refugee status, has made it easy for host countries to flout their obligations under international law. According to Article 34 of the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, "The Contracting States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and naturalisation of refugees," and must "make every effort to expedite naturalisation proceedings" — the opposite of what happened to the Palestinians in every Arab country in which they settled, save Jordan. For all the easy criticism that can be levelled at UNRWA, it is hard to see how many Palestinian refugees would have survived without the agency's help.
The responsibility for the legal dimensions of their fate lies elsewhere, as UNRWA Commissioner-General Karen AbuZayd made clear at UNRWA's anniversary ceremony in New York on 24 September, before an audience that included Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Queen Rania of Jordan — herself a Palestinian. "The protracted exile of Palestine refugees and the dire conditions they endure, particularly in the occupied Palestinian territory, cannot be reconciled with state obligations under the UN Charter," AbuZayd said. The result for the refugees, AbuZayd said at a forum the previous afternoon at the Princeton Club, is a "suspended state of existence" for which no one seems willing to accept political responsibility. The rest of the discussion, moderated by Ambassador Kurtner, made clear that anticipated solutions to the Palestinian refugee problem had failed to emerge — leaving a community in crisis.
"You can't ignore an entire people because it's awkward or inconvenient," says Dr Karma Nabulsi, a lecturer at Oxford and a former Palestinian representative at the UN. In the period immediately after Oslo, she added, Palestinian refugees in Arab countries hoped to be repatriated to areas governed by the Palestinian Authority. Today, despair has replaced that initial optimism. "What young Palestinian would want to resettle in Gaza or in the West Bank?" she asks.
Sharing a panel with Dr Nabulsi, the doveish former Israeli foreign minister Shlomo Ben Ami, who negotiated directly with Yasser Arafat at the failed Camp David meetings in 2000, asserted that Israel has suppressed narratives that would make clear its responsibility for the Palestinian refugee crisis of 1948. Indifference to the refugees' plight, he added, was shared by Israel's negotiating partner in the Oslo years — Yasser Arafat. "He was not a refugee man," Ben Ami said flatly. "He was much more centred on the question of Jerusalem. I heard him say to [Mahmood Abbas] in my presence, 'leave me alone with your refugees'."
It is no secret that certain Arab regimes saw the Palestinians under Arafat's leadership as an unwelcome occupation that stripped Jordan bare and destroyed Lebanon. Similarly, Arafat often used the threat of destabilisation and assassination to get Arab regimes to fund the Palestinian cause. Still, the record of Arafat's Palestinian Authority in its territories during the 1990s attests to the truth of Ben Ami's observation, which applies both to Arafat's Fatah and to Hamas. Despite $10bn in foreign aid, not one refugee camp in the West Bank or Gaza has been replaced by modern housing. On the West Bank, chances for normal Palestinian communal life have been shattered by Israeli settlements, arrests, checkpoints and roadblocks, and by 15 years of abuses by Fatah. Even under the best of circumstances, an influx of refugees would further destabilise a Palestinian economy that is kept afloat by the world's highest per capita receipts of foreign aid.
Daniel Kurtzer agrees no one is likely to make a deal that includes a substantial return of the Palestinian diaspora. "Most Palestinian refugees know it, as do the settlers," he says. So rather than wait for American mediators or Arab states to impose solutions on them, the Palestinians themselves should begin to tackle the diabolically difficult issues inherent in the resolution of their political and economic future. "What we need is a refugee summit," he says. "I'm looking for a real conversation that must start internally and soon."
After 60 years of failed wars, and failed peace, it is time to put politics aside and to insist that the basic rights of the Palestinian refugees in Arab countries be respected — whether or not their children's children return to Haifa anytime soon. While Saudi Arabia may not wish to host Israeli tourists, it can easily afford to integrate the estimated 240,000 Palestinian refugees who already live in the kingdom — just as Egypt, which has received close to $60bn in US aid, and has a population of 81 million, can grant legal rights to an estimated 70,000 Palestinian refugees and their descendants. One can only imagine the outrage that the world community would rightly visit upon Israel if Israeli Arabs were subject to the vile discriminatory laws applied to Palestinians living in Arab countries. Surely, Palestinian Arabs can keep their own national dream alive in the countries where they were born, while also enjoying the freedom to work, vote and own property?
A practical solution to the crisis of the Palestinian refugees in Arab countries will focus on Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, which together play host to approximately 3 million of the estimated 4.6 million Palestinian refugees living outside the West Bank and Gaza. While each of these countries has chosen different legal and political approaches to the 1948 refugees and their descendants, they share a political desire to sublimate the rights of Palestinian residents, treating them as unwanted guests or as tools to be used in pursuing wider political interests — but rarely as fully-fledged members of society. Lebanon, where Palestinians led by Yasser Arafat are widely blamed for having sparked the 1975 civil war, is the worst offender against international norms. Yet even in Jordan, which is in many ways a model for the humane treatment of a large refugee population, Palestinians today feel markedly less secure than they did two decades ago, or even five years ago.
•••
Outside of Iraq, whose Palestinian population fled en masse after the fall of Saddam, nowhere has the situation of the Palestinian refugees worsened so dramatically as in Lebanon. Since the early Sixties, Palestinians there have been barred from working in medicine, dentistry and the law. In 2001, the Lebanese parliament adopted an amendment to the country's property laws that prohibited the acquisition of real estate by "any person not a citizen of a recognised state" — meaning the estimated 250,000 to 400,000 Palestinians living in Lebanon. Palestinians who had acquired real estate prior to 2001 were barred from bequeathing property to their children.
Right-wing Christians and Shi'ite radicals alike support discriminatory legislation that further impoverishes Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, with the stated goal of preventing them from beginning the process of naturalisation, known as tawtin. In his inaugural speech in May, 2008, Lebanese President Michel Suleiman, a Christian and former head of the country's armed forces, reaffirmed "Lebanon's categorical refusal of naturalisation", a statement echoed by the former Lebanese ambassador to the US, Nassib Lahoud, who told us recently in Beirut: "The confessional balance does not allow these things to happen ... at the moment the Palestinians are citizens of a state that does not exist." His sentiments were echoed by Hizbollah's spokesman on the Palestinian question, Hassan Hodroj. "The threat of tawtin is genuine," Hodroj explained. "It is one of the ways in which Israel, backed by the US, is endangering the region."
The fact that the living standard of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon has been deemed "catastrophic" by both UNRWA and by the Lebanese government can therefore be understood as a deliberate result of official state policy that is supported by all parties across Lebanon's divided confessional spectrum. As a member of the Lebanese parliament, Ghassan Moukheiber, explained in an interview with the ICG, "our official policy is to maintain Palestinians in a vulnerable, precarious situation to diminish prospects for their naturalisation or permanent settlement".
Yet the results of this horrifying policy may not be confined to Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. In his book Everyday Jihad, about the experience of refugees in the Ain al-Hilweh camp, home to an estimated 70,000 Palestinians, the French scholar Bernard Rougier describes the results of decades of exclusion and marginalisation which have severed the refugees from any connection to a lost homeland — or the country in which they were born. As a result, he says, many Palestinians have abandoned a failed nationalism for the radical millenarian ideas associated with al-Qa'ida. "Palestinian salafist militants have devoted themselves to defending the imaginary borders of identity," Rougier writes, "declaring themselves the protectors and guardians of the cause of Sunni Islam worldwide."
Visitors to the Ain al-Hilweh camp are immediately made aware that they have entered another world. While Lebanese army checkpoints ring the camp, the Lebanese state has no presence inside. Food, water and other basic services are provided by UNRWA, while armed factions openly display weapons in muddy alleyways and recruit generations to serve under their banners. It is easy to see why the secular promise of Palestinian nationalism has faded and why the promise of a Muslim paradise without borders might take its place. One of the 9/11 hijackers dedicated a poem to Ain al-Hilweh's most prominent jihadist in his videotaped will, and dozens of Palestinian fighters from the camp joined al-Qa'ida in Iraq.
"The situation is the camp is deteriorating," Rougier told us, when we asked about whether things were getting better or worse for the Palestinians of Lebanon. Bound by their absolute opposition to tawtin, he says, Lebanese leaders are creating a radicalised Palestinian population that will eventually have to be absorbed into Lebanon, despite having little or no allegiance to the state.
Sahar Atrache, lead author of the ICG report on the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, agrees. "Palestinians refugees in Lebanon lack means of socio-economic advancement and are bereft of hope," he says. "They are vulnerable on all counts — politically, legally and above all physically. The status quo is good neither for the refugees nor for Lebanon itself."
•••
While Palestinian refugees and their descendants inside Syria are not allowed to vote or hold Syrian passports, they are free from the overt discrimination that has turned Lebanon into a recruiting ground for al-Qa'ida. The legal status of Palestinians inside Syria is defined by a 1956 law that states that grants them "the right to employment, commerce, and national service, while preserving their original nationality". More than 100,000 of the estimated 450,000 Palestinians in Syria live in or around the Yarmouk refugee camp, which long ago became a neighbourhood of Damascus.
While Palestinians are reasonably well integrated into the Syrian socio-economic structure, according to the scholar Laurie Brand they do not have the right to vote, nor can they stand for parliament or other political offices. Palestinians are barred from buying farmland and prohibited from owning more than one house. The female descendant of a Palestinian refugee can become a Syrian citizen by marrying a Syrian man. The male descendants of Palestinian men and their children are barred from acquiring Syrian citizenship, even if they marry Syrian women.
The major focus of Syrian interest in the Palestinian refugees has long been as an extension of the Assad regime's policy towards its neighbours — Israel and Lebanon. Damascus has long hosted a variety of Palestinian terror groups that rejected the Oslo process, including Ahmad Jibril's Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). More significantly, Damascus is also the political and logistical centre for Hamas. "Syria's support for armed Palestinian groups is key to pressuring Damascus' neighbours, most notably Israel and Lebanon," says Andrew Tabler, author of the Syria-watching blog Eighth Gate.
Syria increases its leverage inside Israel by weakening Fatah and strengthening Hamas. In Lebanon, Syrian military and political interference has turned the refugee camps into "security-free islands" (juzur amniya) where bombers can be recruited, bombs manufactured, and plots can be directed beyond the reach of the Lebanese army and police. "Life for the Palestinians was deliberately frozen for political manipulation," concludes Lebanese analyst Tony Badran. "Syria has no interest in normalising that situation."
While Syria imposes a measure of security on its Palestinian neighbourhoods, it foments insecurity and violence in Lebanon and Gaza, splitting the Palestinian polity and fuelling the misery of Palestinians throughout the region.
•••
Jordan is the only Arab nation that has integrated large numbers of Palestinians as full-fledged citizens. This is due not only to the unification of the East Bank and West Bank of the Jordan River valley under Hashemite rule between the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 until Israel's occupation of West Bank in 1967, but also to the luck of having had an enlightened monarch committed to the compassionate treatment of the estimated 100,000 refugees who crossed the Jordan River during the nakba in 1948. Israel's occupation of the West Bank following the 1967 war triggered a second exodus of 140,000 refugees into Jordan.
Today, almost 2 million of Jordan's 6 million people are registered Palestinian refugees, the largest concentration of current and former refugees in the Palestinian diaspora — and increasingly, tensions have deepened between the Palestinians and the "East Bank" establishment. This summer in Amman, ambiguous declarations by the recently appointed minister of the interior, Nayef al-Kadi, who is widely perceived to be anti-Palestinian, led many Jordanians of Palestinian origin to fear they would be stripped of Jordanian identity numbers. Speaking to the London-based Arabic-language newspaper Al Hayat, al-Kadi confirmed that some Palestinians would be stripped of citizenship, ostensibly to counter Israeli plans to turn Jordan into Palestine. "We should be thanked for taking this measure," he said. "We are fulfilling our national duty because Israel wants to expel the Palestinians from their homeland." Panic about their status spread quickly among the Palestinian community.
In interviews this month, senior Jordanian officials sought to quell such fears, while also suggesting there was at least some substance to al-Kadi's explosive suggestion. Faisal Bakr Qadi, the director of the Interior Ministry's office of Inspections, said Palestinians in Jordan were not being systematically stripped of citizenship. Rather, he explained that the government's current review of Palestinian national status dated back to 1988, when King Hussein, in response to demands by Palestinian and Arab leaders, disengaged administratively from the West Bank. Palestinian refugees, he said, meaning those who came to Jordan in the 1948 exodus, were to remain "full Jordanian citizens". "Displaced" Palestinians, or those who had come in 1967 and afterwards, would be able to maintain their yellow identity cards and numbers and de facto citizenship, provided they returned to the West Bank to renew the Israeli passes that permit them to go back and forth between Jordan and the West Bank.
Since 1983, he said, Jordan had given the coveted yellow cards — which enable Palestinians to work without special permits, pay local tuition rates in school, and enjoy full government services — to 280,000 Palestinians, whereas it had "frozen" the cards — or downgraded their status — of only 15,856 people. So far this year, he said, 9,956 cards were upgraded, 291 downgraded.
While many diplomats doubt these numbers, Jordanians insist there is no plot or plan to expel or deny citizenship to Palestinians who have lived virtually their entire lives in Jordan. "We want to ensure that when and if the peace process succeeds in establishing an independent Palestinian state, Palestinians living in Jordan will be in a position to choose their citizenship by having their status in order in both Jordan and Palestine," said an official close to King Abdullah.
Yet the distinctions that seem meaningful in Amman are not clear to some of the almost 94,000 Palestinian residents of Baqa'a, the largest of the 10 official refugee camps run by the UN. Some Palestinians in Baqa'a complain about the "new regulations" and the lack of identity cards that enable them to work without special permits and educate their children in public schools. Anxiety about the future pervades this ramshackle suburb at the northern edge of Amman, which began as an emergency relief centre after the 1967 war and is now a sprawling mini-city with its own basic shops, shawarma (sandwich) stands, and services. Many of the people we spoke to claimed that they knew someone, or had a relative, neighbour and friend whose identity card had been revoked, or whose status had inexplicably been changed.
For many of these refugees at the bottom of Jordan's social and economic pecking order, life without papers means hiding from the police who constantly patrol their camp's streets, being too poor to send any of your eight to 10 children to college, a lifetime of menial labour, and only a threadbare dream of returning to a homeland that most of them have never seen. There is strong suspicion of the state, but also of their neighbours, who are divided into "'48 people" and "'67 people". "Some of the newcomers would give away Al Aqsa for a Jordanian identity card," says Heba, a mother of eight, mentioning Islam's celebrated mosque in Jerusalem, one of its holiest shrines.
"We're Jordanians," says her son, Mustapha, a slender, 20-year-old in a bright orange T-shirt emblazoned with meaningless words in unknown languages. "This is the best place in the world," he says, pointing around the bare living room whose worn rugs and threadbare pillows cover the floor on which he and all his siblings sleep. "We would never leave here. But I'm loyal to my country, and I would like to visit it one day."
He seems perplexed when asked which is his country — Jordan or Palestine. "We have no security here, but we are Jordanians," replies Mustapha, who lounges on a mattress in a two-storey cement house down the road while one of his five daughters offers tiny glasses of steaming herbal tea and cardamom-scented coffee. "Everything I have is here. This house. My car. My job. What would I have in Nablus or Be'ersheba?" he declares. "My children know nothing but Jordan. And we will stay here."
That determination, echoed repeatedly through the dilapidated cement homes that line Baqa'a's gravelly streets and dust-filled shops, is precisely what terrifies Jordan's East Bank establishment. Jordanians have reason to fear their Palestinian guests. Many Jordanians have not forgotten "Black September", the civil war launched by Arafat's Fatah organisation in 1970 which nearly toppled King Hussein's kingdom.
Moreover, having grown accustomed to their near monopoly on jobs provided by the government, Jordan's largest employer, Jordanians fear demands for political equality from Palestinians, most of whom would probably choose to remain in Jordan, relinquishing their "right of return' in favour of compensation. An end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would surely threaten Jordan's informal division of power: East Bankers dominate the army, the security services and most civil-service posts, while Palestinians are disproportionately represented in business. Palestinians may advise the king in the royal court, but there has been only one Palestinian prime minister, who served for eight months. Palestinians now comprise only 23 of Jordan's 110 MPs.
"The closer we get to a solution," says Adnan Abu Odeh, a Palestinian who was one of King Hussein's royal court chiefs and also held other important government posts, "the more anxious society becomes. We are approaching a moment of truth."
Monday, October 19, 2009
The Truth, Not Antiques, is Buried in Nahr al Bared
By Rima Merhi
Asharq Al-Awsat (London)
October 17, 2009
When I worked with the Lebanese government two years ago, we launched a media campaign that made three promises to the Palestinians: “The reconstruction of Nahr al Bared camp is definite, displacement is temporary and return is guaranteed.”
Lebanon must deliver these promises. To every politician in my country, I say if the team of officials you sent a few years ago to the camps left in tears, what have you left for the victims of Nahr al Bared who have been shoved in prefabricated steel containers for two years?
Buried in the rubble of Nahr al Bared is the truth, not antiques. Only this truth will protect the lives of Lebanese soldiers, the victims of Nahr al Bared, and the security of Lebanon.
More than forty interviews with major stakeholders this summer left me in no doubt that there had been no real investigative reporting by the media on Nahr al Bared, especially that the Lebanese army had denied access to journalists during the crisis.
People in Lebanon still wonder who is behind Fatah al Islam. How did Shaker al Abssi, the leader of this group, escape when the Lebanese army was besieging the camp for over 100 days? Why are the testimonies of Fatah al Islam detainees still withheld from the public? Why was military commander of Nahr al Bared operations assassinated? What happened to the army spy linked to Nahr al Bared? Who was responsible for the looting of Palestinian homes and the racist graffiti written on their walls? Are there antiques in Nahr al Bared or is it another excuse to delay reconstruction?
Lawyer Nizar Saghieh believes the Lebanese government should call for a national investigation into Nahr al Bared. “At the very least, it would be an admission by the government that many questions remain unanswered,” he said.
These unanswered questions lie at the heart of deteriorating Lebanese-Palestinian relations post Nahr al Bared.
Until this day, no one can enter or leave Nahr al Bared — including over 15,000 inhabitants who live amidst the ruins — without a permit. The army continues to control all four main entry and exit points.
When I obtained a permit from the Lebanese army to visit the camp this summer, it became very clear to me why the army wanted a DVD copy of everything I recorded before publication.
I found thousands of Palestinians literally shoved in door-to-door type steel containers — initially used as emergency housing in 2007. They freeze in the winter and burn in the summer. Up to six human beings, including children, sleep on the floor, eat, and live in the same space. The tiny “bathroom” consists of a hole in the ground with no shower or bath. Beside the bathroom is a kitchenette where streams of cockroaches, ants and flies enjoy leftover food.
This is not the point where we point a finger at the UNRWA. It’s unfair to blame the organization for all the ailments of Palestinian society in Lebanon, especially that some UNRWA staff died on the job attending to the needs of Palestinians in the crisis. The refugees remain the primary responsibility of the international community at large. In collaboration with the Lebanese government, UNRWA remains accountable and committed to improving living standards, but the needs of refugees are many times beyond available resources.
At a time when swine flu cases have been reported in Lebanon and winter is approaching, this situation also poses a potential health hazard, especially given the number of Lebanese and foreign social workers who walk in and out of the camp everyday.
Alarmed, I went searching for a hospital and came across a 24-hour emergency unit — the Palestinian Red Crescent. I walked past it four times before I realized the roof made of zinc and covered with stones was it! I found two beds, frequently used by the doctors due to housing shortages, and a small “lab.” I stood motionless as thirsty flies from the window nearby took a dive in the blood samples being tested.
I was petrified of catching a virus or disease that I would bring back home to my family and friends. But I had to have deep respect for the doctor who risked his life everyday and burned in the heat without AC, consoled by the mere fact that he could drive critical patients to neighboring hospitals around the clock.
Clearly, the reconstruction of hospitals and clinics, access to healthcare, education and proper personal hygiene is critical in Nahr al Bared.
With the help of the international community, many shops in Nahr al Bared have opened including bakeries, grocery stores, pharmacies, and even a place offering internet access and a mobile phone shop among others.
But army checkpoints are killing economic revival at a time when Nahr al Bared was known to have excellent trade and social relations with its surrounding area. The emotional damage is also so severe that some Palestinians have referred to Nahr al Bared as another “Nakba”.
Surely, we owe these Palestinians an explanation for what really happened in Nahr al Bared. And we owe an explanation to the families of almost 200 soldiers who were killed in this battle.
The quest for the truth must not die, and Nahr al Bared shall rise again. You can put a price on an antique, but the hopes and dreams of thousands of refugees living in despair are priceless. The truth, which will foster transparency and accountability so we can build Lebanon, is priceless.
Rima Merhi is the first Lebanese to win the Gebran Tueni fellowship at Harvard. Rima participated in the media and relief committees presided by Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora to manage the Nahr al Bared crisis in 2007.
Asharq Al-Awsat (London)
October 17, 2009
When I worked with the Lebanese government two years ago, we launched a media campaign that made three promises to the Palestinians: “The reconstruction of Nahr al Bared camp is definite, displacement is temporary and return is guaranteed.”
Lebanon must deliver these promises. To every politician in my country, I say if the team of officials you sent a few years ago to the camps left in tears, what have you left for the victims of Nahr al Bared who have been shoved in prefabricated steel containers for two years?
Buried in the rubble of Nahr al Bared is the truth, not antiques. Only this truth will protect the lives of Lebanese soldiers, the victims of Nahr al Bared, and the security of Lebanon.
More than forty interviews with major stakeholders this summer left me in no doubt that there had been no real investigative reporting by the media on Nahr al Bared, especially that the Lebanese army had denied access to journalists during the crisis.
People in Lebanon still wonder who is behind Fatah al Islam. How did Shaker al Abssi, the leader of this group, escape when the Lebanese army was besieging the camp for over 100 days? Why are the testimonies of Fatah al Islam detainees still withheld from the public? Why was military commander of Nahr al Bared operations assassinated? What happened to the army spy linked to Nahr al Bared? Who was responsible for the looting of Palestinian homes and the racist graffiti written on their walls? Are there antiques in Nahr al Bared or is it another excuse to delay reconstruction?
Lawyer Nizar Saghieh believes the Lebanese government should call for a national investigation into Nahr al Bared. “At the very least, it would be an admission by the government that many questions remain unanswered,” he said.
These unanswered questions lie at the heart of deteriorating Lebanese-Palestinian relations post Nahr al Bared.
Until this day, no one can enter or leave Nahr al Bared — including over 15,000 inhabitants who live amidst the ruins — without a permit. The army continues to control all four main entry and exit points.
When I obtained a permit from the Lebanese army to visit the camp this summer, it became very clear to me why the army wanted a DVD copy of everything I recorded before publication.
I found thousands of Palestinians literally shoved in door-to-door type steel containers — initially used as emergency housing in 2007. They freeze in the winter and burn in the summer. Up to six human beings, including children, sleep on the floor, eat, and live in the same space. The tiny “bathroom” consists of a hole in the ground with no shower or bath. Beside the bathroom is a kitchenette where streams of cockroaches, ants and flies enjoy leftover food.
This is not the point where we point a finger at the UNRWA. It’s unfair to blame the organization for all the ailments of Palestinian society in Lebanon, especially that some UNRWA staff died on the job attending to the needs of Palestinians in the crisis. The refugees remain the primary responsibility of the international community at large. In collaboration with the Lebanese government, UNRWA remains accountable and committed to improving living standards, but the needs of refugees are many times beyond available resources.
At a time when swine flu cases have been reported in Lebanon and winter is approaching, this situation also poses a potential health hazard, especially given the number of Lebanese and foreign social workers who walk in and out of the camp everyday.
Alarmed, I went searching for a hospital and came across a 24-hour emergency unit — the Palestinian Red Crescent. I walked past it four times before I realized the roof made of zinc and covered with stones was it! I found two beds, frequently used by the doctors due to housing shortages, and a small “lab.” I stood motionless as thirsty flies from the window nearby took a dive in the blood samples being tested.
I was petrified of catching a virus or disease that I would bring back home to my family and friends. But I had to have deep respect for the doctor who risked his life everyday and burned in the heat without AC, consoled by the mere fact that he could drive critical patients to neighboring hospitals around the clock.
Clearly, the reconstruction of hospitals and clinics, access to healthcare, education and proper personal hygiene is critical in Nahr al Bared.
With the help of the international community, many shops in Nahr al Bared have opened including bakeries, grocery stores, pharmacies, and even a place offering internet access and a mobile phone shop among others.
But army checkpoints are killing economic revival at a time when Nahr al Bared was known to have excellent trade and social relations with its surrounding area. The emotional damage is also so severe that some Palestinians have referred to Nahr al Bared as another “Nakba”.
Surely, we owe these Palestinians an explanation for what really happened in Nahr al Bared. And we owe an explanation to the families of almost 200 soldiers who were killed in this battle.
The quest for the truth must not die, and Nahr al Bared shall rise again. You can put a price on an antique, but the hopes and dreams of thousands of refugees living in despair are priceless. The truth, which will foster transparency and accountability so we can build Lebanon, is priceless.
Rima Merhi is the first Lebanese to win the Gebran Tueni fellowship at Harvard. Rima participated in the media and relief committees presided by Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora to manage the Nahr al Bared crisis in 2007.
Monday, October 12, 2009
Egypt Ponders Failed Drive for Unesco
By Michael Slackman
The New York Times
September 29, 2009
CAIRO — For days after Egypt’s culture minister, Farouk Hosny, failed in his bid to lead the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Egyptian newspapers and government officials presented the defeat as a sign of Western prejudice against Islam and the Arab world, the product of an international Jewish conspiracy.
“America, Europe and the Jewish lobby brought down Farouk Hosni,” read a headline in an independent daily newspaper, Al Masry Al Yom. The foreign minister, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, criticized “international Judaism and Western powers” in a television interview. Mr. Hosny himself helped stoke those sentiments, saying, “There was a group of the world’s Jews who had a major influence in the elections who were a serious threat to Egypt taking this position.”
All of Egypt, indeed all of the Arab world, was talking with one voice of outrage and insult. Or so it seemed.
While no one here would argue that Israel and its supporters played no role in Mr. Hosny’s defeat to a Bulgarian diplomat, many people said that his failure was at least as much a sign of Egypt’s long, slow slide as the center of Arab culture, thought and influence. They said the defeat might represent a rejection of Muslims and Arabs, but perhaps more importantly a rejection of their authoritarian leaders.
Mr. Hosny, a favorite of President Hosni Mubarak, was roundly despised by many members of the nation’s cultural elite, who say he did little or nothing in his 22 years as culture minister to encourage cultural development and did much, particularly through the enforcement of strict government censorship, to stunt it.
In the independent newspaper Shorouk, Fahmy Howeidy wrote: “I am not exaggerating when I say that the failure of Mr. Farouk Hosny is not due to his hostility against Israel, as it was said, but the important reason that contributed to his failure is he represents a country that ranks among the politically failed states, where a monopoly of power and governing the state under emergency rule for more than a quarter of a century, where it suppresses public freedom, affects the image of its candidate.”
The defeat provoked a degree of quiet soul-searching here. The state’s retreat to anti-Zionism and to some extent, anti-Semitism, underscored for many here the region’s collective political impotence, a failure of Arab leaders to form a powerful regional bloc capable of winning support from power brokers in Washington, London or Paris that has lasted decades.
The pan-Arab daily newspaper Al Quds Al Arabi wrote that Mr. Hosny’s loss “comes as yet another confirmation of the Arab world’s — and Egypt’s in particular — backslide on the international arena, and the general lack of respect towards it in all areas, not exclusively culture.”
Mr. Hosny, 71, is a well-known figure in Egypt. He has been the minister for more than two decades. Oddly enough, considering the charges of anti-Semitism that derailed his candidacy, he has never been known as a strong opponent of normalizing ties with Israel.
True, he has resisted a warm peace, refused to visit Tel Aviv and was quoted as saying that he would burn Israeli books if he found them in a library. But proponents say he took these actions as the bare minimum to defend himself from a population that views Israel as the enemy.
Throughout his candidacy, Mr. Hosny struggled to mute the charges of anti-Semitism, efforts that caused many people in Egypt to wince as they watched a stalwart of the state apologize, to Israel no less. And they winced again, when he blamed a Jewish-Zionist conspiracy for his loss.
“He did not take an anti-normalization stand until the end,” said Hossam el-Hamalawy, an independent Egyptian blogger and journalist. “The moment he lost he came back and started saying some of the most foul anti-Semitic statements against the Jews, confirming what the West had said about him.”
Mr. Hosny lost his bid for Unesco, but tried to turn that into a victory at home, returning as a victim, and for the state-run media a hero. The charges of a Western, Jewish-Zionist conspiracy may have been amplified by a government eager to limit its embarrassment after having staked its credibility on Mr. Hosny.
But they are not new, said Hala Mustafa, editor in chief of the weekly magazine Democracy and a member of Mr. Mubarak’s governing party. When it comes to domestic politics, she said, Egyptian officials often try to present themselves as anti-Israeli, even while serving as a mediator between Israel and the Palestinians.
Ms. Mustafa has been squeezed by that dual identity.
In her capacity as an editor and academic in the state-financed Ahram Center, she recently met with Israel’s ambassador to Egypt, Shalom Cohen. She has since been tarred in the press as a “normalizer,” and the Egyptian Journalists Syndicate has tried to blacklist her. Ms. Mustafa said she saw the state’s rush to blame Israel for Mr. Hosny’s loss as stemming from the same forces busy attacking her.
“We have been under this propaganda for 30 years,” she said. “Like Egypt doesn’t have a peace treaty with Israel? Like Egypt does not play a peace role between Israel and the Palestinians? If that is Egypt’s role, why are we not allowed to play the same role?”
There is another view, too, one that was published in English, allowing, perhaps for a degree of candor not found in the Arabic news media. Writing in the English-language Daily News, the chief editor, Rania al-Malky, suggested that Mr. Hosny might have done as well as he did because he was Arab and Muslim, not because he was qualified. His defeat, she wrote, should not surprise anyone.
“I will say this at the risk of being branded unpatriotic, but no matter where you stand on the political spectrum,” she wrote, “you must admit that the Egyptian administration did not deserve to win this bid. How can a 22-year minister of a country where culture, education, health and science have regressed to the Dark Ages become the head of Unesco?”
Mona El-Naggar contributed reporting.
The New York Times
September 29, 2009
CAIRO — For days after Egypt’s culture minister, Farouk Hosny, failed in his bid to lead the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Egyptian newspapers and government officials presented the defeat as a sign of Western prejudice against Islam and the Arab world, the product of an international Jewish conspiracy.
“America, Europe and the Jewish lobby brought down Farouk Hosni,” read a headline in an independent daily newspaper, Al Masry Al Yom. The foreign minister, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, criticized “international Judaism and Western powers” in a television interview. Mr. Hosny himself helped stoke those sentiments, saying, “There was a group of the world’s Jews who had a major influence in the elections who were a serious threat to Egypt taking this position.”
All of Egypt, indeed all of the Arab world, was talking with one voice of outrage and insult. Or so it seemed.
While no one here would argue that Israel and its supporters played no role in Mr. Hosny’s defeat to a Bulgarian diplomat, many people said that his failure was at least as much a sign of Egypt’s long, slow slide as the center of Arab culture, thought and influence. They said the defeat might represent a rejection of Muslims and Arabs, but perhaps more importantly a rejection of their authoritarian leaders.
Mr. Hosny, a favorite of President Hosni Mubarak, was roundly despised by many members of the nation’s cultural elite, who say he did little or nothing in his 22 years as culture minister to encourage cultural development and did much, particularly through the enforcement of strict government censorship, to stunt it.
In the independent newspaper Shorouk, Fahmy Howeidy wrote: “I am not exaggerating when I say that the failure of Mr. Farouk Hosny is not due to his hostility against Israel, as it was said, but the important reason that contributed to his failure is he represents a country that ranks among the politically failed states, where a monopoly of power and governing the state under emergency rule for more than a quarter of a century, where it suppresses public freedom, affects the image of its candidate.”
The defeat provoked a degree of quiet soul-searching here. The state’s retreat to anti-Zionism and to some extent, anti-Semitism, underscored for many here the region’s collective political impotence, a failure of Arab leaders to form a powerful regional bloc capable of winning support from power brokers in Washington, London or Paris that has lasted decades.
The pan-Arab daily newspaper Al Quds Al Arabi wrote that Mr. Hosny’s loss “comes as yet another confirmation of the Arab world’s — and Egypt’s in particular — backslide on the international arena, and the general lack of respect towards it in all areas, not exclusively culture.”
Mr. Hosny, 71, is a well-known figure in Egypt. He has been the minister for more than two decades. Oddly enough, considering the charges of anti-Semitism that derailed his candidacy, he has never been known as a strong opponent of normalizing ties with Israel.
True, he has resisted a warm peace, refused to visit Tel Aviv and was quoted as saying that he would burn Israeli books if he found them in a library. But proponents say he took these actions as the bare minimum to defend himself from a population that views Israel as the enemy.
Throughout his candidacy, Mr. Hosny struggled to mute the charges of anti-Semitism, efforts that caused many people in Egypt to wince as they watched a stalwart of the state apologize, to Israel no less. And they winced again, when he blamed a Jewish-Zionist conspiracy for his loss.
“He did not take an anti-normalization stand until the end,” said Hossam el-Hamalawy, an independent Egyptian blogger and journalist. “The moment he lost he came back and started saying some of the most foul anti-Semitic statements against the Jews, confirming what the West had said about him.”
Mr. Hosny lost his bid for Unesco, but tried to turn that into a victory at home, returning as a victim, and for the state-run media a hero. The charges of a Western, Jewish-Zionist conspiracy may have been amplified by a government eager to limit its embarrassment after having staked its credibility on Mr. Hosny.
But they are not new, said Hala Mustafa, editor in chief of the weekly magazine Democracy and a member of Mr. Mubarak’s governing party. When it comes to domestic politics, she said, Egyptian officials often try to present themselves as anti-Israeli, even while serving as a mediator between Israel and the Palestinians.
Ms. Mustafa has been squeezed by that dual identity.
In her capacity as an editor and academic in the state-financed Ahram Center, she recently met with Israel’s ambassador to Egypt, Shalom Cohen. She has since been tarred in the press as a “normalizer,” and the Egyptian Journalists Syndicate has tried to blacklist her. Ms. Mustafa said she saw the state’s rush to blame Israel for Mr. Hosny’s loss as stemming from the same forces busy attacking her.
“We have been under this propaganda for 30 years,” she said. “Like Egypt doesn’t have a peace treaty with Israel? Like Egypt does not play a peace role between Israel and the Palestinians? If that is Egypt’s role, why are we not allowed to play the same role?”
There is another view, too, one that was published in English, allowing, perhaps for a degree of candor not found in the Arabic news media. Writing in the English-language Daily News, the chief editor, Rania al-Malky, suggested that Mr. Hosny might have done as well as he did because he was Arab and Muslim, not because he was qualified. His defeat, she wrote, should not surprise anyone.
“I will say this at the risk of being branded unpatriotic, but no matter where you stand on the political spectrum,” she wrote, “you must admit that the Egyptian administration did not deserve to win this bid. How can a 22-year minister of a country where culture, education, health and science have regressed to the Dark Ages become the head of Unesco?”
Mona El-Naggar contributed reporting.
Hosni and the Zionist Plot
By Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed
Asharq Al-Awsat (London)
October 10, 2009
Following the Egyptian Minister of Culture Farouk Hosni’s failed bid to head UNESCO, many people stated that this loss was a catastrophe and blamed it on an international Zionist plot, even though it was nothing more than competition for an international position.
The following week, US President Barack Obama received a real blow when the city of Chicago lost the competition to host the 2016 Olympic Games to Rio de Janeiro in Brazil.
Barack Obama made a personal visit to Copenhagen, Denmark, together with some influential personalities and media figures to support the Chicago bid for the Olympics. However, he returned home in his giant jet disappointed. “You can play a great game and still not win…” Obama said. He did not call it a conspiracy and place the blame on others even though he is the most powerful president in the world in terms of influence, and his country’s chances of hosting the international Olympic Games were higher by virtue of Chicago’s sports facilities and its huge financial resources in comparison to the other three competing cities. Obama lost simply because this time the majority voted for another country and this is the kind of thing that happens in any competition.
What I mean is that after years of experiencing the same thing over and over, we still insist on giving Israel a title it does not deserve and that title is the “force majeure” of all Arabs. Anybody who knows public work, including political work, must be aware that Israel’s assumed capability is a false notion including the defeat of Minister Hosni, which was nothing more than a competition that could have been lost by the best candidate.
The belief that the Egyptian Minister of Culture’s failure to win the UNESCO position is a catastrophe belittles Egypt as well, as it is too big a state to value itself on a temporary post. In the same way, this also exaggerates the value of the UNESCO post, as it is merely a cultural organization that cannot be compared to the UN or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is headed by an Egyptian.
I read some of what was written about Minister Hosni and the false accusations cast against him of hatred and book burning and this is nothing more than the opinions of some people that every minister, or anyone in a public position, should be used to. As for voting for the UNESCO position, this was political action being practiced and in most cases it is subject to each country’s considerations. But to accuse Israel of being behind it means we would be awarding Israel a championship medal it does not deserve.
We should be used to defeats as long as we aspire to win; this is part of life, unless we choose to stay at home and refrain from entering competitions, in which case there would be no winners or losers.
Egypt is the most populated Arab country, and one of the developing countries with the most figures assuming international posts even though the country is not the biggest in terms of size or population, or richest in natural resources. This in itself is enough to make one feel satisfied rather than bitter or angry. As for Israel — which is great in our eyes only — its figures have not assumed a single international post at any organization in its entire history.
Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed is general manager of Al-Arabiya television and former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat.
Asharq Al-Awsat (London)
October 10, 2009
Following the Egyptian Minister of Culture Farouk Hosni’s failed bid to head UNESCO, many people stated that this loss was a catastrophe and blamed it on an international Zionist plot, even though it was nothing more than competition for an international position.
The following week, US President Barack Obama received a real blow when the city of Chicago lost the competition to host the 2016 Olympic Games to Rio de Janeiro in Brazil.
Barack Obama made a personal visit to Copenhagen, Denmark, together with some influential personalities and media figures to support the Chicago bid for the Olympics. However, he returned home in his giant jet disappointed. “You can play a great game and still not win…” Obama said. He did not call it a conspiracy and place the blame on others even though he is the most powerful president in the world in terms of influence, and his country’s chances of hosting the international Olympic Games were higher by virtue of Chicago’s sports facilities and its huge financial resources in comparison to the other three competing cities. Obama lost simply because this time the majority voted for another country and this is the kind of thing that happens in any competition.
What I mean is that after years of experiencing the same thing over and over, we still insist on giving Israel a title it does not deserve and that title is the “force majeure” of all Arabs. Anybody who knows public work, including political work, must be aware that Israel’s assumed capability is a false notion including the defeat of Minister Hosni, which was nothing more than a competition that could have been lost by the best candidate.
The belief that the Egyptian Minister of Culture’s failure to win the UNESCO position is a catastrophe belittles Egypt as well, as it is too big a state to value itself on a temporary post. In the same way, this also exaggerates the value of the UNESCO post, as it is merely a cultural organization that cannot be compared to the UN or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is headed by an Egyptian.
I read some of what was written about Minister Hosni and the false accusations cast against him of hatred and book burning and this is nothing more than the opinions of some people that every minister, or anyone in a public position, should be used to. As for voting for the UNESCO position, this was political action being practiced and in most cases it is subject to each country’s considerations. But to accuse Israel of being behind it means we would be awarding Israel a championship medal it does not deserve.
We should be used to defeats as long as we aspire to win; this is part of life, unless we choose to stay at home and refrain from entering competitions, in which case there would be no winners or losers.
Egypt is the most populated Arab country, and one of the developing countries with the most figures assuming international posts even though the country is not the biggest in terms of size or population, or richest in natural resources. This in itself is enough to make one feel satisfied rather than bitter or angry. As for Israel — which is great in our eyes only — its figures have not assumed a single international post at any organization in its entire history.
Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed is general manager of Al-Arabiya television and former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat.
Sunday, October 11, 2009
Enflamed language
By Tim Franks
BBC News
September 7, 2009
Jerusalem - It was, said one angry onlooker, "a holocaust".
Time to back up. The onlooker was, according to the Ha'aretz newspaper, a supporter of the "pale, agitated and tearful" former welfare minister, Shlomo Benizri. Mr Benizri had just arrived at Masiyahu Prison in central Israel to begin a four-year sentence for taking bribes.
A crowd of big-wigs and supporters was on hand to display their loyalty to the former minister. The newspaper reported that some blew shofars — ceremonial ram's horns. Some handed out stickers showing Mr Benizri's face and the word "innocent".
And some proclaimed their disgust at his imprisonment. "A disgrace," said one. "A holocaust," said another.
This is no aberration. In Mea She'arim, the haredi (ultra-orthodox) Jerusalem neighbourhood, you can see posters calling the Israeli police — with whom some haredi men are regularly battling at demonstrations over a number of complaints — "Zionist Gestapo".
Earlier in the summer, when a haredi woman was accused of starving her child, the Jerusalem hospital doctors who had raised the alarm were described, by outraged haredim, as "Doctor Mengeles" — after the incomparably sadistic doctor at Auschwitz.
And when, from time to time, the Israeli border police move on to a hill-top in the West Bank to dismantle the shacks marking out a new Jewish outpost, what do the settler youth chant?
"Kapo! Kapo!" A kapo was a class of inmate at the Nazi concentration camps and death camps, whom the guards used to do some of their dirty work on the ordinary prisoners.
It is odd. The Oxford English Dictionary traces the etymology of "holocaust" back to 1250.
It meant a sacrifice completely consumed by fire. From the 17th Century it carried wider connotations of utter destruction. But since the Nazi genocide, the Holocaust has acquired a capital letter and become inseparable from the deaths of six million Jews.
Almost all Jews believe that the Holocaust was an episode of unique evil.
They shudder when non-Jews refer to Gaza as a "concentration camp", or when Hamas deplores draft UN plans for Gazan children at UN schools to be taught about the Holocaust because — in the words of a Hamas spokesman — it is "a big lie".
And yet Matan Vilnai remains deputy defence minister, 18 months after he warned the Palestinians in Gaza that they might bring a "shoah" (the Hebrew for holocaust) on themselves, if militants were to carry on firing rockets into southern Israel.
He meant, we were told, a "catastrophe", rather than a "holocaust". But it was, at the least, a rather maladroit use of the word.
Some Israeli Jews have explained to me that their compatriots use the word "shoah" in the way that black Americans use racist terminology that would be unacceptable coming from the mouths of white people. Indeed, it can be empowering to throw around a term once used as a badge of your victimhood.
But in this case, it could quite easily be a symptom of how fractured and febrile this place has become. One liberal rabbi, whose parents are both Holocaust survivors, managed to smile in wonder, as he told dinner guests from America about how some haredim were comparing Jerusalem's main hospital to Auschwitz.
"It's amazing how they jump straight in with the most extreme language they can," he said. "And then they just turn it up a notch or two."
BBC News
September 7, 2009
Jerusalem - It was, said one angry onlooker, "a holocaust".
Time to back up. The onlooker was, according to the Ha'aretz newspaper, a supporter of the "pale, agitated and tearful" former welfare minister, Shlomo Benizri. Mr Benizri had just arrived at Masiyahu Prison in central Israel to begin a four-year sentence for taking bribes.
A crowd of big-wigs and supporters was on hand to display their loyalty to the former minister. The newspaper reported that some blew shofars — ceremonial ram's horns. Some handed out stickers showing Mr Benizri's face and the word "innocent".
And some proclaimed their disgust at his imprisonment. "A disgrace," said one. "A holocaust," said another.
This is no aberration. In Mea She'arim, the haredi (ultra-orthodox) Jerusalem neighbourhood, you can see posters calling the Israeli police — with whom some haredi men are regularly battling at demonstrations over a number of complaints — "Zionist Gestapo".
Earlier in the summer, when a haredi woman was accused of starving her child, the Jerusalem hospital doctors who had raised the alarm were described, by outraged haredim, as "Doctor Mengeles" — after the incomparably sadistic doctor at Auschwitz.
And when, from time to time, the Israeli border police move on to a hill-top in the West Bank to dismantle the shacks marking out a new Jewish outpost, what do the settler youth chant?
"Kapo! Kapo!" A kapo was a class of inmate at the Nazi concentration camps and death camps, whom the guards used to do some of their dirty work on the ordinary prisoners.
It is odd. The Oxford English Dictionary traces the etymology of "holocaust" back to 1250.
It meant a sacrifice completely consumed by fire. From the 17th Century it carried wider connotations of utter destruction. But since the Nazi genocide, the Holocaust has acquired a capital letter and become inseparable from the deaths of six million Jews.
Almost all Jews believe that the Holocaust was an episode of unique evil.
They shudder when non-Jews refer to Gaza as a "concentration camp", or when Hamas deplores draft UN plans for Gazan children at UN schools to be taught about the Holocaust because — in the words of a Hamas spokesman — it is "a big lie".
And yet Matan Vilnai remains deputy defence minister, 18 months after he warned the Palestinians in Gaza that they might bring a "shoah" (the Hebrew for holocaust) on themselves, if militants were to carry on firing rockets into southern Israel.
He meant, we were told, a "catastrophe", rather than a "holocaust". But it was, at the least, a rather maladroit use of the word.
Some Israeli Jews have explained to me that their compatriots use the word "shoah" in the way that black Americans use racist terminology that would be unacceptable coming from the mouths of white people. Indeed, it can be empowering to throw around a term once used as a badge of your victimhood.
But in this case, it could quite easily be a symptom of how fractured and febrile this place has become. One liberal rabbi, whose parents are both Holocaust survivors, managed to smile in wonder, as he told dinner guests from America about how some haredim were comparing Jerusalem's main hospital to Auschwitz.
"It's amazing how they jump straight in with the most extreme language they can," he said. "And then they just turn it up a notch or two."
Saturday, October 10, 2009
Chasing buffaloes (and my comments)
Recent wrangling over normalisation, writes Abdel-Moneim Said, once again betrays the confusion of means with ends
Al-Ahram Weekly (Egypt)
8-14 October 2009
I am an American history buff and in the course of my readings I have been particularly drawn to attempts to explain why the Native Americans were defeated and confined to "reservations" by settlers hailing from Europe. One of the most commonly cited explanations holds that the American Indian tribes were divided, technologically backward, poor and superstitious by the standards of Western civilisation which had begun to bourgeon in the period following its discovery of the New World. However, I was particularly struck by another explanation which focussed on the military conduct of the tribes. According to this perspective, European settlers followed the military customs in practice in Europe, which entailed building forts and fortified camps from which they observed the hostile environment outside. The tribes, accustomed to open warfare, laid siege to these camps in the hope of forcing those inside to surrender out of fear or hunger. However, in those dull intervals of waiting, the besiegers would often catch sight of a passing herd of wild buffalo and break off the siege in order to chase after the precious quarry. These moments of relief, naturally, afforded those inside the camp the opportunity to bring in food and ammunition and to send out messages for help to other camps.
The moral here is crystal clear: departing from the original purpose, however tempting the lures, puts original goals at risk. I have frequently related this explanation of the defeat of Native Americans to my students and to those with whom I was working towards a common goal. Most recently I found myself repeating it to my colleagues in Al-Ahram who have been desperate to respond to certain political attacks which have often defied the rules of propriety and been gratuitously crude.
To me the goals have always been as clear as daylight. They are to restore Al-Ahram to its "natural" place in our country's intellectual, cultural and political sphere; to preserve the fiscal equilibrium which has been regained through many hard sacrifices; and to raise the performance of its employees to a standard commensurate with an eminent international institution. I was determined not to allow myself, or Al-Ahram, to be drawn into a media fray meant to give us a "break" from the "succession" issue by dredging up another no less familiar one — "normalisation" — with the purpose of settling old scores, obstructing the aspirations of Al-Ahram or racking up electoral campaign points. In all events, I have addressed the subject of "normalisation" innumerable times over the past three decades, in newspaper articles, on television programmes and in many public debates. Fortunately, the vast majority of my fellow "Ahramists" did not fall into the trap. They did not rush off to hunt buffaloes. In all my meetings with my colleagues we could focus on what was needed in order to achieve the goals enumerated above.
Nevertheless, during the recent clamour over normalisation I could not help but remark the sweeping nature in which some of my fellow journalists treated it. According to one commentator, the steps that have already been taken towards normalisation reflected a "backslide" in "Egyptian patriotism". Another lashed out against what he regarded as a flagrant contradiction between the current trend towards religiosity in Egyptian society and Egyptians' tendency to ignore a matter no less serious than normalisation, which is the relentless Judaisation of Jerusalem. What such statements have in common is that they take us to the brink of an insight without going further. They fail to continue along the path of philosophical and intellectual enquiry. They do not ask how and why this or that occurred, let alone probe grey areas in order to untangle the jumble of threads. In short, the clamour concealed the failure of our intellectual community to delve beneath the surface and investigate the roots of crucial questions, foremost among them the relation of war, conflict and armed violence to politics and the peaceful use of power.
This matter should have been given priority from the outset. For, as is the case with the question of the relationship between religion and the state, failure to solve it perpetuates society's anxieties and tensions, rendering it more vulnerable, making the public easy prey for the politicians' arts of toying with feelings for campaign purposes or personal fame or even to sabotage the wheels of progress and change. No one expressed the relationship between war and politics more succinctly than the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz who, in his famous military treatise On War, wrote that war was a continuation of politics by other means. He held that a tactical military victory is per force a temporary victory if it is not crowned by a more comprehensive political aim to make it a strategic victory, and that the achievement of a political end is the chief aim of war, which is only a means towards that end, for means cannot be isolated from their ends.
It follows that the purpose of war is to bend the will of the adversary, by military or political means, to the will of the other party. The notion is certainly not alien to Egyptian and Arab thought. But as familiar as Clausewitz may be in intellectual and military circles here, rarely has his concept of the relationship between war and politics been put into practice in treating such "core" Arab questions as the Arab-Israeli conflict. When it has it proved not only an attempt on the part of the intellectuals to evade probing the roots of the problem itself but also an evasion of the task of applying one's mind to translating theoretical principles into strategy. After all, war and violence or politics and diplomacy are not necessarily things to be glorified for their own sake; rather, they should be regarded as alternative ways to "engage" with the enemy in order to achieve strategic aims. But perhaps it is better to look at the matter another way. It is no longer possible to resolve international disputes solely through the use of military force. While some political or strategic aims can only be achieved through war, the display of might and exacting revenge are not aims that legitimise recourse to war. Hence, it is impossible to separate war from peace; they are two sides of the same coin, mutually complementary states.We can only explain the "decline in Egyptian patriotism" and the "negligence of the pious with respect to Jerusalem" in terms of the disgraceful negligence on the part of intellectuals with regard to such crucial issues as war and diplomacy, violence and peace, development and conflict. The Egyptian public should not be corralled into journalistic battles or media wars. They should not be tempted to chase "buffaloes" that have no bearing on what it takes to liberate occupied Arab territory. The history of the past half century testifies to how successful or not the Arabs have been in dealing — both peacefully and violently — with an Israeli adversary that is undeniably hostile and that has worked relentlessly against Egyptian and Arab strategic interests.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the premise was that the Arab-Israeli conflict was not about borders but an existential conflict. On the basis of this premise, the military instrument reigned as the critical factor between the two sides until the 1967 war, which ended in the defeat of the Arab armies and the Israeli occupation of Arab territories for years to come. The tables began to turn in 1970 with the arrival to power of Anwar El-Sadat, who set into motion a new phase of military preparations. However, preparing for an offensive war took considerable time and effort, especially since Egypt did not produce its own arms but relied almost exclusively on outside powers (the USSR, to be precise). Under such conditions, the procuring of arms was inevitably subordinated to political considerations between Egypt and its suppliers at a time when international and regional balances of power favoured Israel and when the Egyptian economy was in severe straits.
Egypt's aim in the 1973 War was not to eliminate Israel. Rather, it was to break the Israeli will to make war and propel them to the negotiating table. On another level, it aimed to destroy the myth of Israeli invincibility and persuade the Israelis that they would never be able to live in peace by relying on military force. President Sadat's stroke of genius to achieve this end was a "limited offensive war" that would entail crossing the Suez Canal, breaking through the Bar Lev line and occupying the eastern bank of the canal to a depth of 15 to 18 kilometres, and causing as much attrition and damage as possible to Israeli land and air forces. The scheme brought into play another well-conceived tactic, which was to keep Israeli forces mobilised for as long as possible. Israel's demographic structure meant that Israel had to keep 20 per cent of its population (about three million at the time) mobilised during wartime. Such a ratio is unsustainable for any long period of time because of the enormous economic attrition it wreaks. The longer the war lasted, the more Israel would feel compelled to ask for a ceasefire or call for the intervention of international forces.
This war thus proved the engine to liberate our land. It is useful to take a look at the goals of the October War as outlined in Sadat's letter of 5 October to the General Commander of Egyptian Forces, Ahmed Ismail. These aims were, first, to break the stagnation in the peace process; second, to cause the greatest amount of moral and material damage to the armed forces of the enemy; and, three, to liberate the Sinai in phases, as the capacities of Egyptian forces permit. We see the political dimension of the 6 October 1973 War again in Sadat's letter to US secretary of state Henry Kissinger on 7 October 1973 (conveyed via a secret channel arranged between Sadat's national security adviser, Hafez Ismail, and president Nixon in February 1973), which clarifies the Egyptian position on war and peace as follows:
Many Arabs and Egyptians have never read Clausewitz. Among those who have, few understood him, and among those who understood him, even fewer put his ideas into practice. Perhaps this is because this takes moral, mental and physical energy, when it is so much easier to point the finger of accusation at others. As a result the situation remains pending in the Golan, and in Palestine the sense of disappointment is greater than ever. It is not just an appreciation of the relationship between war and politics that has been lacking in recent days. The roots of other problems have been overlooked or skilfully concealed.
Mark says:
In comparing the Native Americans who encountered the European settlers to the Arabs of today in their encounters with Israel, Abdel-Moneim Said uses an old and, in many cases, largely discredited theory about some of the reasons for the success of the settlers over Native Americans. The tribes were not necessarily "divided, technologically backward, poor and superstitious by the standards of Western civilisation." One must start with the fact that as many as 90 percent of the inhabitants of the North, Central, and South Americas died from diseases brought by Europeans — primarily smallpox and influenza. For more on the extent and levels of civilization of the Native Americans prior to and after the European invasions, I would highly recommend starting with 1491: New Revelations of the Americas Before Columbus, by Charles C. Mann, and Guns Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, by Jared M. Diamond. Both books are, by the way, pleasures to read and mostly free of academese.
Be that as it may, Abdel-Moneim Said is trying to make a point about strategy versus tactics and what I would call the "attention deficit disorder" (ADD) that plagues much of the Arab world today in general, and Said's Egypt in particular. In view of his past publications, I'm sure he would have come up with another equally apt analogy as "chasing buffalos" to illustrate his points about many Arab and Egyptian intellectuals and normalization with Israel.
Said alludes to the fact that 30 years after Egypt and Israel signed their peace treaty there are still many Egyptians who have not come to terms with its reality. This goes beyond ADD and should be described by whatever psychological term you may choose for someone who cannot cope with reality.
At the same time — again, 30 years later — there are still some Israelis and some supporters of Israel who believe that Sadat's strategy of negotiations with Israel and signing the peace treaty was nothing more than just the first stage in the "strategy of stages" to get Israel to withdraw to the pre-Six Day War boundaries in preparation for the final and fatal assault on Israel. I'm sure that some or many, if not most of the Egyptians that Said analyzes in his article would wish that this were so — even as they have disparaged and condemned and cursed Sadat for signing the peace treaty with Israel.
The degrees and extent of these respective inabilities to come to terms with reality may differ between and among Egyptians and Israelis but the term fits for both.
Al-Ahram Weekly (Egypt)
8-14 October 2009
I am an American history buff and in the course of my readings I have been particularly drawn to attempts to explain why the Native Americans were defeated and confined to "reservations" by settlers hailing from Europe. One of the most commonly cited explanations holds that the American Indian tribes were divided, technologically backward, poor and superstitious by the standards of Western civilisation which had begun to bourgeon in the period following its discovery of the New World. However, I was particularly struck by another explanation which focussed on the military conduct of the tribes. According to this perspective, European settlers followed the military customs in practice in Europe, which entailed building forts and fortified camps from which they observed the hostile environment outside. The tribes, accustomed to open warfare, laid siege to these camps in the hope of forcing those inside to surrender out of fear or hunger. However, in those dull intervals of waiting, the besiegers would often catch sight of a passing herd of wild buffalo and break off the siege in order to chase after the precious quarry. These moments of relief, naturally, afforded those inside the camp the opportunity to bring in food and ammunition and to send out messages for help to other camps.
The moral here is crystal clear: departing from the original purpose, however tempting the lures, puts original goals at risk. I have frequently related this explanation of the defeat of Native Americans to my students and to those with whom I was working towards a common goal. Most recently I found myself repeating it to my colleagues in Al-Ahram who have been desperate to respond to certain political attacks which have often defied the rules of propriety and been gratuitously crude.
To me the goals have always been as clear as daylight. They are to restore Al-Ahram to its "natural" place in our country's intellectual, cultural and political sphere; to preserve the fiscal equilibrium which has been regained through many hard sacrifices; and to raise the performance of its employees to a standard commensurate with an eminent international institution. I was determined not to allow myself, or Al-Ahram, to be drawn into a media fray meant to give us a "break" from the "succession" issue by dredging up another no less familiar one — "normalisation" — with the purpose of settling old scores, obstructing the aspirations of Al-Ahram or racking up electoral campaign points. In all events, I have addressed the subject of "normalisation" innumerable times over the past three decades, in newspaper articles, on television programmes and in many public debates. Fortunately, the vast majority of my fellow "Ahramists" did not fall into the trap. They did not rush off to hunt buffaloes. In all my meetings with my colleagues we could focus on what was needed in order to achieve the goals enumerated above.
Nevertheless, during the recent clamour over normalisation I could not help but remark the sweeping nature in which some of my fellow journalists treated it. According to one commentator, the steps that have already been taken towards normalisation reflected a "backslide" in "Egyptian patriotism". Another lashed out against what he regarded as a flagrant contradiction between the current trend towards religiosity in Egyptian society and Egyptians' tendency to ignore a matter no less serious than normalisation, which is the relentless Judaisation of Jerusalem. What such statements have in common is that they take us to the brink of an insight without going further. They fail to continue along the path of philosophical and intellectual enquiry. They do not ask how and why this or that occurred, let alone probe grey areas in order to untangle the jumble of threads. In short, the clamour concealed the failure of our intellectual community to delve beneath the surface and investigate the roots of crucial questions, foremost among them the relation of war, conflict and armed violence to politics and the peaceful use of power.
This matter should have been given priority from the outset. For, as is the case with the question of the relationship between religion and the state, failure to solve it perpetuates society's anxieties and tensions, rendering it more vulnerable, making the public easy prey for the politicians' arts of toying with feelings for campaign purposes or personal fame or even to sabotage the wheels of progress and change. No one expressed the relationship between war and politics more succinctly than the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz who, in his famous military treatise On War, wrote that war was a continuation of politics by other means. He held that a tactical military victory is per force a temporary victory if it is not crowned by a more comprehensive political aim to make it a strategic victory, and that the achievement of a political end is the chief aim of war, which is only a means towards that end, for means cannot be isolated from their ends.
It follows that the purpose of war is to bend the will of the adversary, by military or political means, to the will of the other party. The notion is certainly not alien to Egyptian and Arab thought. But as familiar as Clausewitz may be in intellectual and military circles here, rarely has his concept of the relationship between war and politics been put into practice in treating such "core" Arab questions as the Arab-Israeli conflict. When it has it proved not only an attempt on the part of the intellectuals to evade probing the roots of the problem itself but also an evasion of the task of applying one's mind to translating theoretical principles into strategy. After all, war and violence or politics and diplomacy are not necessarily things to be glorified for their own sake; rather, they should be regarded as alternative ways to "engage" with the enemy in order to achieve strategic aims. But perhaps it is better to look at the matter another way. It is no longer possible to resolve international disputes solely through the use of military force. While some political or strategic aims can only be achieved through war, the display of might and exacting revenge are not aims that legitimise recourse to war. Hence, it is impossible to separate war from peace; they are two sides of the same coin, mutually complementary states.We can only explain the "decline in Egyptian patriotism" and the "negligence of the pious with respect to Jerusalem" in terms of the disgraceful negligence on the part of intellectuals with regard to such crucial issues as war and diplomacy, violence and peace, development and conflict. The Egyptian public should not be corralled into journalistic battles or media wars. They should not be tempted to chase "buffaloes" that have no bearing on what it takes to liberate occupied Arab territory. The history of the past half century testifies to how successful or not the Arabs have been in dealing — both peacefully and violently — with an Israeli adversary that is undeniably hostile and that has worked relentlessly against Egyptian and Arab strategic interests.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the premise was that the Arab-Israeli conflict was not about borders but an existential conflict. On the basis of this premise, the military instrument reigned as the critical factor between the two sides until the 1967 war, which ended in the defeat of the Arab armies and the Israeli occupation of Arab territories for years to come. The tables began to turn in 1970 with the arrival to power of Anwar El-Sadat, who set into motion a new phase of military preparations. However, preparing for an offensive war took considerable time and effort, especially since Egypt did not produce its own arms but relied almost exclusively on outside powers (the USSR, to be precise). Under such conditions, the procuring of arms was inevitably subordinated to political considerations between Egypt and its suppliers at a time when international and regional balances of power favoured Israel and when the Egyptian economy was in severe straits.
Egypt's aim in the 1973 War was not to eliminate Israel. Rather, it was to break the Israeli will to make war and propel them to the negotiating table. On another level, it aimed to destroy the myth of Israeli invincibility and persuade the Israelis that they would never be able to live in peace by relying on military force. President Sadat's stroke of genius to achieve this end was a "limited offensive war" that would entail crossing the Suez Canal, breaking through the Bar Lev line and occupying the eastern bank of the canal to a depth of 15 to 18 kilometres, and causing as much attrition and damage as possible to Israeli land and air forces. The scheme brought into play another well-conceived tactic, which was to keep Israeli forces mobilised for as long as possible. Israel's demographic structure meant that Israel had to keep 20 per cent of its population (about three million at the time) mobilised during wartime. Such a ratio is unsustainable for any long period of time because of the enormous economic attrition it wreaks. The longer the war lasted, the more Israel would feel compelled to ask for a ceasefire or call for the intervention of international forces.
This war thus proved the engine to liberate our land. It is useful to take a look at the goals of the October War as outlined in Sadat's letter of 5 October to the General Commander of Egyptian Forces, Ahmed Ismail. These aims were, first, to break the stagnation in the peace process; second, to cause the greatest amount of moral and material damage to the armed forces of the enemy; and, three, to liberate the Sinai in phases, as the capacities of Egyptian forces permit. We see the political dimension of the 6 October 1973 War again in Sadat's letter to US secretary of state Henry Kissinger on 7 October 1973 (conveyed via a secret channel arranged between Sadat's national security adviser, Hafez Ismail, and president Nixon in February 1973), which clarifies the Egyptian position on war and peace as follows:
- Egypt's chief aim is not to conclude partial settlements but to achieve peace in the Middle East.
- Egypt does not intend to deepen the engagement or expand the scope of confrontation. (This point came under heavy criticism when taken out of context from Sadat's original strategy!)
- Israel must withdraw from all occupied territories. When it does, Egypt will be willing to participate in a UN peace conference of any acceptable form, whether under the auspices of the secretary- general, the permanent members of the Security Council, or any other representative body.
- Egypt agrees to the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran and it accepts, as a guarantee, the presence of an international force for a limited period.
Sadat's purpose was to turn the Egyptian military achievement into the best possible political advantages that Egypt could gain under a military situation characterised by parity. After the war, there followed the talks at the 101st kilometre line, the first disengagement treaty of January 1974, and the second disengagement treaty of September 1975. In retrospect Sadat's decision to travel to Jerusalem should surprise only as a daring application of Clausewitz's principle regarding the complementariness of military and political means of engagement. On 9 November 1977 Sadat declared before the People's Assembly, "I am ready to go to the ends of the earth in quest of a just peace... Indeed, I am even prepared to go to the Israeli Knesset, because we do not fear peace, nor do we fear confrontation with Israel."
As a consequence of this decision Egypt was plunged into another battle no less ferocious than the October war, even if it differed in quality. This was the battle for peace. Sadat's visit to Jerusalem put paid, before the eyes of the entire world, to the notion that Israel is surrounded by people bent on its annihilation. In the course of a few hours Sadat brought down the powerful propaganda wall that Israel had erected over three decades. Then he followed through with intensive efforts that, over the following years, brought the peace treaty with Israel on 26 March 1979, the liberation of the whole of the Sinai in 1982 and the return of Taba through international arbitration in 1989.Many Arabs and Egyptians have never read Clausewitz. Among those who have, few understood him, and among those who understood him, even fewer put his ideas into practice. Perhaps this is because this takes moral, mental and physical energy, when it is so much easier to point the finger of accusation at others. As a result the situation remains pending in the Golan, and in Palestine the sense of disappointment is greater than ever. It is not just an appreciation of the relationship between war and politics that has been lacking in recent days. The roots of other problems have been overlooked or skilfully concealed.
Mark says:
In comparing the Native Americans who encountered the European settlers to the Arabs of today in their encounters with Israel, Abdel-Moneim Said uses an old and, in many cases, largely discredited theory about some of the reasons for the success of the settlers over Native Americans. The tribes were not necessarily "divided, technologically backward, poor and superstitious by the standards of Western civilisation." One must start with the fact that as many as 90 percent of the inhabitants of the North, Central, and South Americas died from diseases brought by Europeans — primarily smallpox and influenza. For more on the extent and levels of civilization of the Native Americans prior to and after the European invasions, I would highly recommend starting with 1491: New Revelations of the Americas Before Columbus, by Charles C. Mann, and Guns Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, by Jared M. Diamond. Both books are, by the way, pleasures to read and mostly free of academese.
Be that as it may, Abdel-Moneim Said is trying to make a point about strategy versus tactics and what I would call the "attention deficit disorder" (ADD) that plagues much of the Arab world today in general, and Said's Egypt in particular. In view of his past publications, I'm sure he would have come up with another equally apt analogy as "chasing buffalos" to illustrate his points about many Arab and Egyptian intellectuals and normalization with Israel.
Said alludes to the fact that 30 years after Egypt and Israel signed their peace treaty there are still many Egyptians who have not come to terms with its reality. This goes beyond ADD and should be described by whatever psychological term you may choose for someone who cannot cope with reality.
At the same time — again, 30 years later — there are still some Israelis and some supporters of Israel who believe that Sadat's strategy of negotiations with Israel and signing the peace treaty was nothing more than just the first stage in the "strategy of stages" to get Israel to withdraw to the pre-Six Day War boundaries in preparation for the final and fatal assault on Israel. I'm sure that some or many, if not most of the Egyptians that Said analyzes in his article would wish that this were so — even as they have disparaged and condemned and cursed Sadat for signing the peace treaty with Israel.
The degrees and extent of these respective inabilities to come to terms with reality may differ between and among Egyptians and Israelis but the term fits for both.
Thursday, October 8, 2009
Report: Global Muslim population hits 1.57 billion
By Eric Gorski
Associated Press
October 8, 2009
The global Muslim population stands at 1.57 billion, meaning that nearly 1 in 4 people in the world practice Islam, according to a report Wednesday billed as the most comprehensive of its kind.
The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life report provides a precise number for a population whose size has long has been subject to guesswork, with estimates ranging anywhere from 1 billion to 1.8 billion.
The project, three years in the making, also presents a portrait of the Muslim world that might surprise some. For instance, Germany has more Muslims than Lebanon, China has more Muslims than Syria, Russia has more Muslims than Jordan and Libya combined, and Ethiopia has nearly as many Muslims as Afghanistan.
"This whole idea that Muslims are Arabs and Arabs are Muslims is really just obliterated by this report," said Amaney Jamal, an assistant professor of politics at Princeton University who reviewed an advance copy.
Pew officials call the report the most thorough on the size and distribution of adherents of the world's second largest religion behind Christianity, which has an estimated 2.1 billion to 2.2 billion followers.
The arduous task of determining the Muslim populations in 232 countries and territories involved analyzing census reports, demographic studies and general population surveys, the report says. In cases where the data was a few years old, researchers projected 2009 numbers.
The report also sought to pinpoint the world's Sunni-Shiite breakdown, but difficulties arose because so few countries track sectarian affiliation, said Brian Grim, the project's senior researcher.
As a result, the Shiite numbers are not as precise; the report estimates that Shiites represent between 10 and 13 percent of the Muslim population, in line with or slightly lower than other studies. As much as 80 percent of the world's Shiite population lives in four countries: Iran, Pakistan, India and Iraq.
The report provides further evidence that while the heart of Islam might beat in the Middle East, its greatest numbers lie in Asia: More than 60 percent of the world's Muslims live in Asia.
About 20 percent live in the Middle East and North Africa, 15 percent live in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2.4 percent are in Europe and 0.3 percent are in the Americas. While the Middle East and North Africa have fewer Muslims overall than Asia, the region easily claims the most Muslim-majority countries.
While those population trends are well established, the large numbers of Muslims who live as minorities in countries aren't as scrutinized. The report identified about 317 million Muslims — or one-fifth of the world's Muslim population — living in countries where Islam is not the majority religion.
About three-quarters of Muslims living as minorities are concentrated in five countries: India (161 million), Ethiopia (28 million), China (22 million), Russia (16 million) and Tanzania (13 million).
In several of these countries — from India to Nigeria and China to France — divisions featuring a volatile mix of religion, class and politics have contributed to tension and bloodshed among groups.
The immense size of majority-Hindu India is underscored by the fact that it boasts the third-largest Muslim population of any nation — yet Muslims account for just 13 percent of India's population.
"Most people think of the Muslim world being Muslims living mostly in Muslim-majority countries," Grim said. "But with India... that sort of turns that on its head a bit."
Among the report's other highlights:
A similar study on global Christianity is planned to begin next year.
Associated Press
October 8, 2009
The global Muslim population stands at 1.57 billion, meaning that nearly 1 in 4 people in the world practice Islam, according to a report Wednesday billed as the most comprehensive of its kind.
The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life report provides a precise number for a population whose size has long has been subject to guesswork, with estimates ranging anywhere from 1 billion to 1.8 billion.
The project, three years in the making, also presents a portrait of the Muslim world that might surprise some. For instance, Germany has more Muslims than Lebanon, China has more Muslims than Syria, Russia has more Muslims than Jordan and Libya combined, and Ethiopia has nearly as many Muslims as Afghanistan.
"This whole idea that Muslims are Arabs and Arabs are Muslims is really just obliterated by this report," said Amaney Jamal, an assistant professor of politics at Princeton University who reviewed an advance copy.
Pew officials call the report the most thorough on the size and distribution of adherents of the world's second largest religion behind Christianity, which has an estimated 2.1 billion to 2.2 billion followers.
The arduous task of determining the Muslim populations in 232 countries and territories involved analyzing census reports, demographic studies and general population surveys, the report says. In cases where the data was a few years old, researchers projected 2009 numbers.
The report also sought to pinpoint the world's Sunni-Shiite breakdown, but difficulties arose because so few countries track sectarian affiliation, said Brian Grim, the project's senior researcher.
As a result, the Shiite numbers are not as precise; the report estimates that Shiites represent between 10 and 13 percent of the Muslim population, in line with or slightly lower than other studies. As much as 80 percent of the world's Shiite population lives in four countries: Iran, Pakistan, India and Iraq.
The report provides further evidence that while the heart of Islam might beat in the Middle East, its greatest numbers lie in Asia: More than 60 percent of the world's Muslims live in Asia.
About 20 percent live in the Middle East and North Africa, 15 percent live in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2.4 percent are in Europe and 0.3 percent are in the Americas. While the Middle East and North Africa have fewer Muslims overall than Asia, the region easily claims the most Muslim-majority countries.
While those population trends are well established, the large numbers of Muslims who live as minorities in countries aren't as scrutinized. The report identified about 317 million Muslims — or one-fifth of the world's Muslim population — living in countries where Islam is not the majority religion.
About three-quarters of Muslims living as minorities are concentrated in five countries: India (161 million), Ethiopia (28 million), China (22 million), Russia (16 million) and Tanzania (13 million).
In several of these countries — from India to Nigeria and China to France — divisions featuring a volatile mix of religion, class and politics have contributed to tension and bloodshed among groups.
The immense size of majority-Hindu India is underscored by the fact that it boasts the third-largest Muslim population of any nation — yet Muslims account for just 13 percent of India's population.
"Most people think of the Muslim world being Muslims living mostly in Muslim-majority countries," Grim said. "But with India... that sort of turns that on its head a bit."
Among the report's other highlights:
- Two-thirds of all Muslims live in 10 countries. Six are in Asia (Indonesia, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Iran and Turkey), three are in North Africa (Egypt, Algeria and Morocco) and one is in sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria).
- Indonesia, which has a tradition of a more tolerant Islam, has the world's largest Muslim population (203 million, or 13 percent of the world's total). Religious extremists have been involved in several high-profile bombings there in recent years.
- In China, the highest concentrations of Muslims were in western provinces. The country experienced its worst outbreak of ethnic violence in decades when rioting broke out this summer between minority Muslim Uighurs and majority Han Chinese.
- Europe is home to about 38 million Muslims, or about five percent of its population. Germany appears to have more than 4 million Muslims — almost as many as North and South America combined. In France, where tensions have run high over an influx of Muslim immigrant laborers, the overall numbers were lower but a larger percentage of the population is Muslim.
- Of roughly 4.6 million Muslims in the Americas, more than half live in the United States although they only make up 0.8 percent of the population there. About 700,000 people in Canada are Muslim, or about 2 percent of the total population.
A similar study on global Christianity is planned to begin next year.
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