Showing posts with label Ba'ath. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ba'ath. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 18, 2009

The Arab future: conspiracy vs reality

A legal conflict between the daughters of former Egyptian presidents is a sad commentary on the condition of the Arab world

By Hazem Saghieh

openDemocracy
August 12, 2009

The predicament of the Arab world is exposed in unexpected ways. Consider the following passage, part of a lengthy news-item in the 28 July 2009 edition of the London-based Palestinian daily newspaper Al-Quds al-Arabi:

"The judgment-enforcement services visited Dr. Hoda Abdel Nasser's apartment in the new Egyptian suburbs in order to seize her assets and furniture, in execution of a court judgment in favor of Ruqaya Sadat, daughter of late president Anwar Sadat. The south Cairo court had ordered [the daughter of Sadat's predecessor as Egypt's president, Gamal Abdel Nasser] to pay a 150,000 Egyptian-pound indemnity to Ruqaya, whom she had accused of tainting her father's image after she had accused him of masterminding a plan to kill Gamal Abdel Nasser."

Hoda Abdel Nasser, the paper continued, had in 2008 lost a court case after describing Ruqaya Sadat as "the killer of my father" because he is "an American agent, and American newspapers have said this."

The main characters in this drama are not ordinary ones: the daughter of Nasser, who ruled Egypt for eighteen years (July 1952-June 1970), and the daughter of Sadat, who ruled it for eleven years (June 1970-October 1981) — and the link between them nothing less than a murder accusation! It is obvious that there is enough material here to produce a long and entertaining soap opera.

The plot is irresistible, and rewrites Egypt's modern history. The myth that Sadat was Nasser's loyal companion, his vice-president, speaker of parliament and heir is at last exploded. Rather, he is an anti-Nasser plotter; and since he killed him politically (by turning away from his policies) couldn't he also be his biological killer, and in the pay of the CIA?

The mix of farce and bathos here is accentuated by the story's timing: days after the commemoration of the "July 23 revolution," referring to the moment in 1952 when the young Nasser and his "free officer" colleagues seized power and changed Egypt for ever. The memory of this "revolution" is today so emptied of all meaning that the Israeli president Shimon Peres and his prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu could celebrate it in the Egyptian ambassador's house in Tel Aviv. Indeed, the daughters’ dispute is all that this year has had to energise the occasion and refill its void with content.

But this content gives no ground for celebration. For what is on display here is only an exaggerated form of the conspiracy theories that are reaching unprecedented levels in Egypt and the Arab world. The leading Palestinian politician Farouk Qaddumi has accused the Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas of killing Abbas's own predecessor Yasser Arafat. It is surely time to ask: can the "natural" death of any Arab leader be taken as a fact? Is it possible for an Arab leader to die without being murdered?

The shared feature of the "murder victims," Nasser and Arafat is that these very different political figures represent a way of thinking and behaving that is now dead. Since admitting its death is hard, a resort to conspiracy theories becomes for those who seek to "keep them alive" an urgent duty and necessary outlet.

The alternative, after all, is hard. It would require the parties involved to discard conspiracies and summon the courage to face the death of the political current that prevailed between the mid-1950s and the early 1970s, known as the Arab national-liberation movement.

The evidence, from the Maghreb to the Mashreq, is plain. The Algerian revolution, the jewel of this movement, produced a regime that incubated a civil war costing around 200,000 deaths. The Yemeni revolutions of north and south were followed by military coups, mutinies, and assassinations; the dream of "unity" between the two states has for many Yemenis turned into a nightmare. The Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi marries pan-Arabism one day only to divorce it the next. Sudan has been transformed from the time of Ja'afar Nimeiri (who initiated his regime by liquidating Sudan's Communist Party) into a state ruled by Islamists responsible for the Darfur genocide.

The Ba'ath party itself, crucible of the Arab nationalism mission and of the drive to unit the "eternal Arab nation," split into two groups centred on Damascus and Baghdad; each then gave birth to further rival claimants. Before and since Saddam Hussein's demise, the record of the Ba'athists in power in both capitals was characterised by voices of family betrayal, siblings at war, sons and daughters exchanging shrill accusations of violating the scared cause. The circle here loops back to the daughters of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat — the repetition of history, but "the second time as farce."

This spectacle, the death of an entire project, does not need conspiracies to grasp it. It only requires the tracing of the adventurous journey of the corpse, including Ayatollah Khomeini's attempt to inherit it in 1979 and George W. Bush's very different effort to appropriate it in 2003.

Now, the decomposition is well advanced. To evade it, to prefer conspiracy to reality, is to allow the putrefaction to grow. Arabs can't keep quiet much longer. Hoda and Ruqaya are the latest to disclose our family secret.

Hazem Saghieh is senior commentator for the London-based paper Al-Hayat.


Sunday, August 16, 2009

Analysis: How Fatah has evolved into the Palestinian Ba'ath party

By Khaled Abu Toameh

The Jerusalem Post (Israel)
August 10, 2009

Fatah's sixth General Assembly has shown that the 44-year-old faction is still not ready to transform itself from a revolutionary movement into a governing body — one that cares about establishing institutions and infrastructure for the future Palestinian state.

Instead, Fatah seems determined more than ever to maintain its status as a "national liberation movement."

In light of the conference, many Palestinians are beginning to draw parallels between Fatah and Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party. As far as they are concerned, Fatah remains part of the problem and not part of any solution.

The fiery rhetoric of the delegates and the signs and graffiti on the walls of the conference hall in Bethlehem are testimony that Fatah continues to live in the past and not in the present.

Moreover, most of the resolutions that were adopted by the 2,000 Fatah delegates appear as if they were taken directly out of the fifth General Assembly that was held in Tunis two decades ago.

The conference is about to conclude its meeting by endorsing almost the same political platform that has been accompanying Fatah since its founding.

Delegates spent more time talking about the past than the present or future. They chose to blame Israel and Hamas for almost all the miseries that have hit Fatah and the Palestinians in recent years.

The delegates spent more time attacking Israel and Hamas than discussing the reasons behind Fatah's defeat in the January 2006 parliamentary election and its expulsion from the Gaza Strip a year later.

For some time during the conference, one got the impression that Israel and Hamas were responsible for Fatah's financial corruption and incompetence.

Had it not been for the security fence and the construction in settlements, Fatah would be less corrupt. And had it not been for Hamas's violent takeover of the Gaza Strip, Fatah would have succeeded in turning the Palestinian territories into the Middle East's Hong Kong.

In short, everyone is to blame for the miseries of the Palestinians and Fatah except for Fatah.


Instead of forming committees to look into ways of reforming Fatah, injecting fresh blood into its veins and restoring its lost credibility among a majority of Palestinians, the delegates preferred to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate the death of Arafat.

Why is there a need for such a commission if Fatah has already (and unanimously) determined that Israel was behind the "assassination" of the Palestinian leader? And why establish a commission of inquiry into the defeat of Fatah in the 2006 election when every Palestinian knows that Hamas won that vote largely because of the state of financial corruption and anarchy under the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority? Most of the Fatah officials who appeared before the gathering spoke and acted as if they were still in the battlefields of Lebanon and Jordan.

In scenes reminiscent of the last Fatah conference 20 years ago, old slogans such as "Revolution Until Victory," "Long Live Palestine" and "Fatah Will Liberate Palestine" were issued by almost all the speakers who took the podium.

Political resolutions adopted by the conference also served as a reminder that Fatah has not changed much despite the Oslo Accords and the departure of its founder and leader.

Leaving no room for doubt that Fatah is not headed toward moderation, one resolution stated that the faction "remains committed to its status as a national liberation movement whose goal is to defeat the occupation and achieve independence for the Palestinians. Fatah is part of the Arab liberation movement."

Regarding the issue of armed struggle against Israel, Fatah chose ambiguity over straight talk. Aware of the sensitivity surrounding the use of the explosive term — armed struggle — and to avoid a clash with US and European donors, Fatah is now talking about its "right to pursue the resistance" against Israel "in all methods and forms." To Western audiences, Fatah leaders can always argue that they are actually talking about a "peaceful resistance" where Palestinians, together with Israeli and international activists, hold weekly demonstrations and marches in protest against Israeli policies and measures.

On the other hand, the Fatah leaders can always defend their decision to replace the armed struggle term with the need to win the backing (and money) of the West. In addition, they can also explain that the resistance they are talking about includes the right to resort to armed struggle against Israel.

Fatah after the conference remains the same Fatah it was before the meeting in Bethlehem. The Fatah leadership did not even see any need to provide its delegates with a report about the financial and administrative performance of the faction over the past 20 years. Why bother to do so when Israel is continuing to build in settlements and when Hamas retains its tight grip on the Gaza Strip?