My Interview on Al-Jazeera English TV, Sunday, Sept. 4, 2011

I was interviewed by Al-Jazeera English TV this past Sunday, September 4, 2011, about 9/11 and the U.S. intelligence community. The call came late on Sunday afternoon on the Labor Day three-day weekend so I'm sure I wasn't the first person they called. Be that as it may, I discussed the reasons why the 9/11 attack took the intelligence community by surprise, some of the reforms that have been implemented in the past 10 years, and whether the United States is consequently "safer" than it was 10 years ago.

Bearing in mind that the entire interview lasted 3 minutes, I emphasized that even if the intelligence agencies had been sharing information with each other and even if they had been connecting the dots ― they still would not have anticipated the 9/11 attacks. This was due to ― first of all ― a failure of imagination, as pointed out in the 9/11 Commission report. It was also because of preconceptions and perceptions, and because of bureaucratic and cultural inertia.

The interviewer threw me a curveball at the end of the interview when he asked me if the U.S. was less free as a result of the increased surveillance of Americans because of the intelligence “reforms.” He did have a point but I ended the interview by pointing out that part of the problem was bureaucratic ― and anyone who has worked in a large bureaucracy should know that the U.S. intelligence “community” is far from being a monolithic, agile, omnipotent entity (despite the fevered imaginings and conspiracy theories of both the left and the right on the political spectrum). Another part of the problem is that Congress has not done anything about one of the most important reforms called for by the 9/11 Commission ― to reform itself.

Ten years ago there were approximately 85 Congressional committees and subcommittees that had some oversight function for homeland security. The Commission report emphasized that this state of affairs actually undermined the security of the United States and it decreased ― not increased ― oversight. It recommended that this be reduced to something like a dozen committees and subcommittees at the most. Instead, in one of its few bipartisan efforts in the past 10 years, Congress, in its infinite wisdom, has increased the number of committees to around 92 at last count.

I feel so much safer. NOT!

My interview is introduced by a report by an Al-Jazeera reporter on 9/11 and the U.S. intelligence community, with an emphasis on questioning whether the creation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has really helped to reform the intelligence community. I referred to that report several times during my interview.

 

The CIA’s Bureaucracy Problem (and my comments)

By Ishmael Jones

National Review
November 5, 2009

An Italian court recently sentenced 23 CIA employees in absentia for their role in the 2003 Abu Omar rendition.

We should capture terrorists anywhere, any time, but we should get the job done right and with a minimum of bureaucracy. Real spying is inexpensive and requires few people. The basic act of espionage is a single CIA officer meeting a single source — a person with access to secrets on terrorists or nuclear proliferators, for example — in a dingy hotel room in a dysfunctional country.

Any CIA operation that is revealed to the public, however, shows these telltale signs: The operation looks busy, a lot of people are involved, and large amounts of money are spent. Often you’ll hear the CIA accused of being risk averse. I agree. However, risk aversion is a complex concept. The CIA will sometimes conduct risky operations in order to achieve a more important goal: looking busy. In the Abu Omar operation, 21 Agency employees flew to Italy to abduct a single terrorist suspect — as an eminent scholar put it, “21 people to get one fat Egyptian!” — who was already under surveillance by the Italian police. The 21 people stayed in five-star hotels and chatted with headquarters on open-line cell phones, all at great expense and awful tradecraft. The number of people managing the operation from headquarters was enormous. But it was a successful operation in that it spent a lot of money, made a lot of people look active, and suggested the CIA’s willingness to take risk.

CIA officials are quick to deny that the organization is risk averse by pointing to risky operations that went wrong. This darker, more complex, passive-aggressive aspect of risk aversion seems to say: We can certainly do risky operations, but here’s what happens when you make us get off our couch and do them.

Take a look at any CIA activity that is revealed in the future and ask yourself: Was this a traditional, inexpensive intelligence operation involving a meeting between a CIA officer and a human source to gather intelligence? Or was this an operation designed to spend a lot of money, to make a lot of people look busy, and to give the appearance that the CIA is willing to take risk?

Whenever we see CIA employees released from bureaucracy, we see success. The tactical intelligence production within Iraq is excellent; the early Afghan campaign, featuring no offices and a flat chain of command, just a few guys and bags of money, was extraordinary.

“Ishmael Jones” is a former deep-cover officer with the Central Intelligence Agency. He is the author of The Human Factor: Inside the CIA’s Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture, published last year by Encounter Books.

Mark says:

I post this article for several reasons. First, I highly recommend Jones' book, referenced above. At the very least, it provides insights into the fact that that the CIA is, probably before anything else, another large bureaucratic government agency.

Second, this article illustrates how bureaucratic politics, organizational drivers (rewards and punishments), and risk aversion can be as important, if not more important, than the goals and objectives of the organization, i.e., the CIA. Or, perhaps the stated public goals and objectives of the organization do not necessarily match or coincide with the bureaucratic goals and objectives of the organization?

Third, this article stands as a retort to the conspiracy mongers who think the CIA is an all-powerful, all-knowing entity responsible for everything that happens. Then again, the fact that the article was written by a former CIA agent would just be proof that it's another example of CIA disinformation to confuse and blind the naive public. Right?

Why is Israel limiting movement of Palestinian-Canadian businessman?

By Amira Hass

Ha'aretz (Israel)
August 19, 2009

Mohammed Sabawi, 65, could have played a leading role in all the stories about the economic revival in the West Bank's cities. His goal of "strengthening the economy of Palestine by utilizing its own capabilities" sounds like Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's vision of "economic peace." In recent months, however, the Palestinian-Canadian businessman has been considering reducing his business activity here, after Israel started limiting his freedom of movement and that of his son and business partner, Khaled. The Sabawis are considering Cyprus as an alternate location.

For 15 years, Sabawi entered and left the country with no problems, as a senior partner in an insurance company and as chairman of a construction company. But in April, he was denied entry at Ben-Gurion International Airport.

"Next time enter by way of the Allenby Bridge," said the Interior Ministry official, after the coordinator for economic affairs at the Israeli Civil Administration in the West Bank convinced authorities not to put the Canadian citizen on a plane back to Istanbul. He wasted seven hours at the airport, left the country, and returned on June 2 via the Allenby Bridge, without looking at what was written in his passport. It was only a few days later, on his way to a meeting with Israeli business people, that he realized his visa was valid "only for Palestinian Authority territory." When he arrived at the Hizme checkpoint northeast of Jerusalem, driving a car with Israeli license plates, the soldier there leafed through his passport and told a surprised Sabawi that he had to turn back.

Sabawi purchased $500,000 in products and services from an Israeli software company. His company cars are Israeli. Many of his company's suppliers — machinery, raw materials, etc. — are Israeli, both the importers and the manufacturers. Many Israelis have shown an interest in the subsidiary headed by his son, which develops advanced green technology for heating and cooling homes through use of the ground temperature, but the Sabawis, both Canadian citizens, are barred from meeting with them.

Sabawi was born in 1944 in the village of Salame, now South Tel Aviv, and was expelled to Gaza in 1948 with his family. He later moved between Kuwait and Egypt, always as a second-class stateless person. In 1987, when Khaled was 4, he moved to Canada with his family. For the first time, he felt like a full-fledged citizen there. He became a member of the board of trustees of the Peres Center for Peace when it was founded in 1996, and participated in three or four meetings, until they stopped due to the outbreak of the second intifada.

Sabawi had to transfer his insurance company's Gaza headquarters to Ramallah, because after the 2005 disengagement, Israel made it almost impossible for foreign nationals to enter Gaza. That year, he and other Palestinian and Arab business people established UCI, a Ramallah-based construction and investment company, with $40 million in capital. Two years ago it moved to permanent offices in a new building, "the greenest in Ramallah," says Khaled. It is equipped with geothermal air conditioning.

They are currently completing construction of a residential subdivision in northern Ramallah, three kilometers from Bir Zeit University. The neighborhood has 62 semi-detached homes, a sports center, pool, a playground and a commercial center. They also intend to install geothermal systems in buildings they are planning in other residential neighborhoods in the West Bank and Gaza.

This is all on the condition that they can stay in the country. Khaled, 25, is an engineer specializing in energy. He joined his father in Ramallah two and a half years ago and heads their subsidiary MENA Geothermal. He expresses a mix of enthusiasm, pride, frustration and concern. MENA is the only company of its kind in the Middle East and North Africa, including Israel. His green technology specialization requires Khaled to travel frequently, so the tourist visas he received every time he arrived over the past few years didn't bother him.

In January, however, everything got more complicated. That month, he returned from an international conference in Abu Dhabi on future sources of energy. He and a manager at the company, another Palestinian Canadian, came to the Sheikh Hussein crossing between Jordan and Israel. They were denied entrance to Israel.

"We were in shock," Khaled said. "We were told: 'You spend too much time in Israel.' We told them: 'We work in Ramallah.' They told us: 'You are not allowed to work. You have tourist visas.' We told them: 'We'd be more than happy to have work visas, but we can't.'"

Khaled Sabawi sought to bring Canadian engineers to his "green" company in the West Bank, and they turned to the Israeli embassy in Canada to request work visas. They reported being told that that was within the purview of the Palestinian Authority. The PA, of course, said it was within Israel's authority. Israel, however, grants almost no work visas to foreigners working in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, generally preferring to renew their tourist visas instead.

Khaled Sabawi and his manager were forced to return to Amman at night. His father called everywhere, until he reached the Civil Administration in the West Bank. He was promised the travelers could return via the Allenby Bridge. They tried a week later, but were turned away. In despair, they flew to Canada, where they managed the business remotely, staying awake at night for the Ramallah business day. After a month and a half of efforts and the Civil Administration's intervention, the younger Sabawi managed to return.

In April he got a one-week visa. On other occasions, he received a visa for a month. On June 29, he returned via the Allenby crossing from a Sharm el-Sheikh convention on renewable energy. He was again turned away — after waiting at the crossing for eight hours. After more telephone calls, promises and other efforts, he returned the next day, but his passport was stamped with a visa limiting his visit to a month and only to Palestinian Authority territory. Last week on another visit, he received the same visa, forcing him to cancel a meeting with an Israeli investor interested in a partnership.