My Interview on Al-Jazeera English TV, Saturday, Oct. 1, 2011

I was interviewed on Al-Jazeera English TV on October 1, 2011 about U.S. foreign policy making and implementation in Pakistan and Afghanistan. (I received the video clip only a few days ago, which is why I'm putting it on the blog now instead of much earlier.)

The lead-in by the interviewer was the killing of a high-ranking Al-Qa'ida-linked commander in Pakistan by a U.S. missile strike — undoubtedly fired from an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) — and whether this, as well as the arrest of a senior Haqqani network leader, would “help” the Obama administration or have no impact. I answered that it would give a very short-term boost but their impact would fade very quickly — and it would have no impact on Obama’s re-election chances, which would be determined by the state of the economy in a year.

I emphasized in the interview that the Obama administration’s policies were not so different, in many ways, from the previous Bush administration’s policies, and I hopefully explained the reasons for this. I also tried to give some insights into how U.S. foreign policy decisions are made in the real world, which involve imperfect and conflicting information and where the choices are usually not between good, better, and best but between bad, worse, and worst. In the case of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the choices are usually between worse and worst. Right-wing and left-wing ideologues take note.

Sensible US courage and hapless US imbecility

By Rami G. Khouri

Jordan Times
September 4, 2009

If you wait long enough, sensible things always happen in America, often among the armed forces’ senior command. One example was Commander of US Central Command General David Petraeus’ recent affirmation that resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict fairly is “very central” to the mission of American troops and diplomacy in the Middle East.

This would create a much more favourable regional environment for the United States and its allies, dampen the appeal of militants and terrorist groups, and remove threats to American troops.

Coming from Gen. Petraeus, this sensible and rather obvious conclusion appears now to be more widely shared among top Obama administration officials — who resist the desire of Israel and its Washington lobbyist-proxies to deal with Iran, and instead focus on promoting Arab-Israeli peace.

A second, more dramatic, example of sensible analysis and courageous honesty is the recent article in Joint Force Quarterly by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen. He sharply criticised US government efforts at “strategic communication” with the Muslim world, noting that public relations alone will never generate the credibility the United States seeks if its foreign policy on the ground is perceived as arrogant, uncaring or insulting.

“To put it simply, we need to worry a lot less about how to communicate our actions and much more about what our actions communicate,” Mullen wrote.

“Each time we fail to live up to our values or don’t follow up on a promise, we look more and more like the arrogant Americans the enemy claims we are.”

This is sensible and accurate analysis that Americans should listen to carefully, especially given its source.

Since September 11, 2001, the United States as a whole — government, media, civil society and plumbers everywhere — have been blinded by the rage they experienced due to the September 11 terror attacks. An exaggerated focus on “Islam” and “Muslim extremists” was allowed to define intellectual analysis and foreign policy alike, stressing Islamic religion and culture over the policies practised by all concerned, including Arabs and Islamic states as well as the United States, Europeans and Israel.

This led to two American wars that have not achieved their aims: military wars that have killed tens of thousands in Iraq and Afghanistan without reducing terrorism threats, and “public diplomacy” campaigns that have mainly succeeded in revealing Americans’ most erratic foreign policy eccentricities, intellectual weaknesses and ideological vulnerabilities.

The most recent example of that peculiarly American vortex — where ignorance converges with pedantic arrogance and the crass distortions of special interest lobby groups - was the recent creation of a bizarre new post in the US Department of State, the “office of the special representative to Muslim communities”.

The first person to fill this position, Farah Pandith, recently addressed a special Policy Forum at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), to discuss her new role and the US’ approach to “Muslim engagement”.

WINEP is well respected in Washington circles as a mainstay of pro-Israeli thinking and a pillar of what may people refer to as “the pro-Israel lobby”. So for the US government to launch a new office that seeks to engage Muslims by a speech at a leading pro-Israeli lobby and think tank is about as sensible as launching a New York Yankees Fan Club in Fenway Park in Boston, selling Manchester United scarves in Liverpool, or promoting Israel Bonds at a Palestinian Cultural Centre in Chicago.

Where, oh, where does the US State Department find the wellspring of political imbecility to do this sort of thing?

Everything that Pandith said is exactly what Adm. Mullen seemed to criticise in his article. She listed an impressive list of activities to engage Muslim communities worldwide on the basis of “mutual interest and mutual respect” — break down stereotypes, work with youth at grassroots level, and build new partnerships via education, technology, business, sports and culture.

All this sounds fine and dandy, but in reality it is splendid nonsense, reflecting a continuing, devastating American confusion about the linkages between religion, nationalism and foreign policy.

Muslims do not need engagement or happy talk from hapless American innocents using pro-Israeli platforms. Muslims — if we are going to conduct this discussion in religious terms - need simply to be treated in a manner that allows them to exercise the same personal and national
rights as Jews and Christians. That’s it. Simple.

None of Pandith’s rhetoric has a chance of going anywhere, while the majority of Muslims, Arabs and others in our region broadly perceive American foreign policy as being tilted towards Israeli priorities or the incumbency of Arab autocrats, as has been the case for about four decades now.

Tough American patriots like Gen. Petraeus and Adm. Mullen seem to grasp this, probably because they have escaped the diversionary lunacy of American “public diplomacy” and the chokehold of single-interest lobby groups in Washington.

Obama's Mideast vision: Confusion

By Michael Young

The Daily Star (Lebanon)
August 27, 2009

There is great discomfort these days among those who backed Barack Obama’s “new” approach to the Middle East when he took office 10 months ago. That shouldn’t surprise us. Everything about the president’s shotgun approach to the region, his desire to overhaul all policies from the George W. Bush years simultaneously, without a cohesive strategy binding his actions together, was always going to let the believers down.

As the president’s accelerated pullout from Iraq begins to look increasingly ill-thought-out, as his engagement of Iran and Syria falters, as Arab-Israeli peace looks more elusive than ever, and as Americans express growing doubts about the war in Afghanistan, Obama is discovering that personal charisma is not enough to alter the realities of a Middle East that has whittled down better men than he.

For the US president, the clearest articulation of his approach to the region was his speech in Cairo last June. However, there was always more mood to that address than substance. The president put out a wish-list of American objectives, padded with reassurances and self-criticism, but there was no solid core to what he said — a discernible sense of the values and overriding political ambitions the United States was building toward. As Obama himself admitted, no single speech could answer all the complex questions the Middle East has tossed up. However, American behavior on the ground has made things no easier to understand, which is why regional uncertainties are turning to bite the administration in the leg.

For example, what is the policy in Iraq? In recent weeks, following the American military withdrawal from Iraqi cities, the upsurge in devastating suicide attacks has threatened to reverse years of efforts by Washington to stabilize the country. Ultimately, Obama’s priority can be summed up in one word, reflecting his psychological hesitation to commit to an enterprise that he associates, in a dangerously personalized way, with his predecessor. That word is “withdrawal,” and Obama described his Iraqi policy this way in Cairo: “Today, America has a dual responsibility: to help Iraq forge a better future — and to leave Iraq to Iraqis. I have made it clear to the Iraqi people that we pursue no bases, and no claim on their territory or resources. Iraq’s sovereignty is its own.”

Those were noble thoughts, but how do they square with other American concerns, such as the containment of Iran, the avoidance of sectarian conflict that might engulf the region, the stability of oil supplies, and much else? Obama feels that an America forever signaling its desire to go home will make things better by making America more likable. That’s not how the Middle East works. Politics abhor a vacuum, and as everyone sees how eager the US is to leave, the more they will try to fill the ensuing vacuum to their advantage, and the more intransigent they will be when Washington seeks political solutions to prepare its getaway. That explains the upsurge of bombings in Iraq lately, and it explains why the Taliban feel no need to surrender anything in Afghanistan.

Engagement of Iran and Syria has also come up short, though a breakthrough remains possible. However, there was always something counterintuitive in lowering the pressure on Iran in the hope that this would generate progress in finding a solution to its nuclear program.

Engagement is not an end in itself, it is a means to an end among countless others. Where the Obama administration erred was in not seeing how dialogue would buy Iran more time to advance its nuclear projects, precisely what the Iranians wanted, while breaking the momentum of international efforts to force Tehran to concede something — for example temporary suspension of uranium enrichment. For Obama to rebuild such momentum today seems virtually impossible, when the US itself has made it abundantly clear that it believes war is a bad idea.

Attacking Iran is indeed a bad idea, but in the poker game he has been playing with Tehran, Obama didn’t need to show all of his cards. He’s virtually folded over Iraq, is stumbling in Afghanistan, and does not occupy himself very much with Lebanon, all places where the Iranians can and are hurting the Americans. By placing most of his chips on engagement, the president has failed to develop a more multifaceted strategy while relinquishing other forms of coercion that could have been effective in Washington’s bargaining with the Islamic Republic.

On Syria, the US has been more steadfast, particularly in trying to deny Damascus the means to reimpose its will in Lebanon. However, the Assad regime has shown no signs of breaking away from Iran, a major US incentive in re-engaging with the Syrians, even as it has facilitated suicide attacks in Iraq and encouraged Hamas’ intransigence in inter-Palestinian negotiations in Cairo. The Obama administration can, of course, take the passive view that Syria is entitled to destabilize its neighbors in order to enhance its leverage; or it can behave like a superpower and make the undermining of vital US interests very costly for Bashar Assad. But it certainly cannot defend its vital interests by adopting a passive approach.

With respect to the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, Obama has taken Israel on over its settlements. It was about time, since the Bush administration’s permissiveness on settlement construction neutralized its own “road map”. However, there is more to Palestinian-Israeli peace than settlements. Obama is exerting considerable political capital to confront Israel, but it may be capital wasted at a moment when Hamas can still veto any breakthrough from the Palestinian side. In other words, Washington is working on a narrow front whereas its failure to weaken Hamas may render the whole enterprise meaningless. But how can the US weaken Hamas when improving relations with the movement’s main regional sponsors, Iran and Syria, remains a centerpiece of American efforts?

Barack Obama’s devotees may imagine that because he spent a few years abroad as a boy, he is well equipped to understand our complicated world. Perhaps he is, but his approach to the greater Middle East, shorn of the soaring rhetoric, has been artless and arrogant. The president is being tied up every which way by his foes, who can plainly see that the Obama vision is an unsystematic one. If ever the US has been close to achieving potentially terminal self-marginalization in the region, it is now.

Michael Young is the Opinion Editor and a columnist for Lebanon’s The Daily Star newspaper. He is also a contributing editor at Reason magazine.

Candidly speaking: There may be worse to come (and my comments)

By Isi Leibler

The Jerusalem Post
August 25, 2009

President Obama's naïve efforts to appease the Arabs by bullying and distancing the United States from Israel has backfired. However despite increasing unease extending to some of Obama's most fervent supporters, the administration has yet to signal any change in policy.

The futility of trying to appease tyrannies is evident everywhere; the thuggish behavior of the Iranian regime toward its own people makes a farce of Obama's efforts to reason with Ahmadinejad; in response to unilateral US overtures to the Syrians, President Assad visited the Iranian president, congratulated him on his bogus reelection and declared that their alliance had never been stronger; the North Koreans displayed utter contempt for Obama's friendly outreach; Arabs states all responded negatively to Obama's entreaties to provide a few crumbs of recognition in return for Israeli concessions; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was publicly humiliated by the Saudi Foreign Minister, who insisted there was nothing to negotiate unless Israel accepted all Arab demands.

The Palestinian response was even more noxious. Clearly emboldened, the Fatah General Assembly displayed contempt for any initiative that could further the peace process. Their intransigence again demonstrated the absurdity of the notion that this corrupt and duplicitous leadership could be a genuine peace partner. There were even elements of surrealism when the Fatah Assembly unanimously accused Israel of having assassinated Arafat and provided standing applause for a mass murderer.

They decreed that unless Israel acceded to all their demands, no further negotiations would take place and they could renew the "armed struggle." Far from encouraging Arab moderation, Obama's tough approach to Israel simply bolstered the hardliners.

The facts on the ground today make prospects for peace more remote than ever. The only clear message emerging from the Fatah Congress is that, as with Hamas, elimination of Jewish sovereignty in the region remains its ultimate objective. Were that not so, Mahmoud Abbas would have accepted Ehud Olmert's offer, which virtually granted him all his territorial demands and even hinted at a compromise over the Arab right of return.

Obama's advisers must have been bitterly disappointed when their diktats against Israel backfired. Indeed, their one-sided demands and bullying tactics can take credit for having created a rare consensus among the Israeli public, which today overwhelmingly supports Netanyahu.

To add to Obama's problems and despite predictions to the contrary, American Jewish leaders have begun to openly challenge some of his policies. There is a growing unease even among some Jewish Democrats that Obama is betraying the unequivocal undertakings he made during the elections to faithfully preserve the alliance with Israel.

This was exemplified in remarks made by Howard Berman, the influential Democratic chair of the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, who in a closed meeting with Jewish leaders explicitly criticized the Obama administration's pressure on Israel over settlements. Berman said Abbas was now "waiting for the US to present him Israel on a platter". Steny Hoyer, the Democratic House majority leader visiting Israel, made similar comments at a Jerusalem news conference.

OBAMA MUST also have been stunned when his friend and loyal supporter Alan Solow, the Chairman of the Presidents Conference representing 52 major American Jewish organizations, condemned his demands to limit Jews settlements in Jerusalem and its suburbs.

In a full page New York Times advert Abe Foxman of the Anti Defamation League stated "The problem is not settlements, it's Arab rejection...Mr. President, it's time to stop pressuring our vital friend and ally". David Harris of the American Jewish Committee expressed similar feelings to a Congressional group. Whilst usually ritually reiterating their belief that Obama would not abandon Israel, Jewish leaders have begun openly criticizing the administration's behavior toward the Jewish state.

Obama's standing with American Jewish activists plummeted further when, contemptuously dismissing a rare virtually unanimous Jewish protest, he personally participated in the ceremony honoring former Irish president and 2001 UN Durban hate-fest convener Mary Robinson with the highest human rights award in the US. This was perceived as yet another manifestation of Obama's new love affair with the UN and its anti-Israel affiliates.

It must also have been disappointing for Obama's Jewish advisers promoting the J Street line when they became aware that despite expensive media promotions, opinion polls indicated that most Jewish activists remained contemptuous of the left-wing Jewish fringe groups urging Obama to force Israel to make further concessions.

However, as of now, while continuing to avoid any initiative which could irritate the Arabs, the US is maintaining its heavy-handed approach toward its erstwhile ally, Israel. While a face-saving compromise may soon eventuate, appreciating the unprecedented backing he currently enjoys from his constituency, Netanyahu would be unwise to capitulate to Obama's demands.

Alas, irrespective of the settlement issues, there may be worse to come from this administration. After Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's recent warm meeting with Obama in Washington, he effusively praised the policy changes introduced by the president and hinted of further impending "positive" US initiatives.

There are also chilling predictions that without prior consultations with Israel, Obama intends to unilaterally submit a US plan for a comprehensive settlement at the UN or elsewhere. It is rumored that this plan would use as a starting point the irresponsible offers made to Abbas by Olmert during the death throes of his tenure — offers which would unquestionably have been repudiated by the Knesset and people of Israel in a referendum. Such a move would be an unprecedented betrayal of a long-standing ally.

UNTIL SUCH time as a genuine Palestinian peace partner emerges, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu cannot be expected to create a miraculous magic plan which would bring about a comprehensive final settlement. But his task now must be to preempt a disastrous imposed settlement by the Americans.

In doing so he must he speedily identify the red lines which his government, backed by the vast majority of Israelis, would never contemplate crossing.

To this end he should also marshal the support of the mainstream American Jewish leadership and encourage them to convey to their president that they too have red lines. They have already begun to signal that they will not remain passive if their government attempts to unilaterally impose a solution which could endanger the Jewish state.

Below are some excerpts from Mr. Leibler’s article above with some comments and questions:

Their [Fatah's] intransigence again demonstrated the absurdity of the notion
that this corrupt and duplicitous leadership could be a genuine peace
partner.

Mark says:

Strange — or perhaps ironic — that so many in the Palestinian and Arab commentariats, and especially among Hamas supporters, also described the Fatah leadership as “corrupt and duplicitous.”

They [Fatah] decreed that unless Israel acceded to all their demands, no further
negotiations would take place and they could renew the "armed struggle." Far
from encouraging Arab moderation, Obama's tough approach to Israel simply
bolstered the hardliners.

The great writer Isaac Asimov had one of his characters in the Foundation Trilogy say that “consistency is the last refuge of the unimaginative.” I don’t think that Mr. Leibler lacks imagination — but he is certainly inconsistent. For if I read many of his previous columns and articles correctly, according to Mr. Leibler what Obama or Israel do or don’t do is not going to change the behavior of Arab hardliners, who apparently constitute 99.999 percent of all Palestinian leaders.

The only clear message emerging from the Fatah Congress is that, as with Hamas,
elimination of Jewish sovereignty in the region remains its ultimate objective.
Were that not so, Mahmoud Abbas would have accepted Ehud Olmert's offer, which virtually granted him all his territorial demands and even hinted at a
compromise over the Arab right of return.

However, later in the article Mr. Leibler states:

It is rumored that this [Obama’s] plan would use as a starting point the
irresponsible offers made to Abbas by Olmert during the death throes of his
tenure — offers which would unquestionably have been repudiated by the Knesset
and people of Israel in a referendum.

So, in other words, it wouldn’t have mattered if Mahmoud Abbas had accepted Ehud Olmert’s offers because they “would unquestionably have been repudiated by the Knesset and people of Israel in a referendum.” Perhaps Mr. Abbas was perceptive enough to recognize that and wanted to save himself the resulting political and personal humiliation?

Or perhaps Mr. Abbas, once again, "missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity" because the United States, even under the Bush administration, would have leaped to pressure Israel into accepting a peace plan based on those offers. However, assuming Mr. Leibler’s scenario would have been correct, Israel would then have placed itself in the position of being the intransigent naysayer.

At which point, Mr. Leibler would have written of the administration of George W. Bush (as he is now writing about the Obama administration):

Such a move would be an unprecedented betrayal of a long-standing ally.

It seems that there are always those who inevitably say at some point during the lifespan of every U.S. presidential administration (Nixon, Ford, Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, Bush II, Obama):

Such a move would be an unprecedented betrayal of a long-standing ally.

As Casey Stengel used to say: "You can look it up."

Boycotts only harden Israeli opinion (and my comments)

Mark says:

The author of the following article published in the British Independent is Benjamin Pogrund. (Please pardon the fact that I took most of the biographical information on him from Wikipedia.) The South African-born author began his career as a journalist in 1958, writing for the Johannesburg Rand Daily Mail, eventually becoming its deputy editor. The Rand Daily Mail was the only newspaper in South Africa at that time to report on events in black South African townships. In the course of his work he came to know the major players in the apartheid struggle and gained the respect and confidence of leaders such as Nelson Mandela. Pogrund's reporting of police conduct in the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 was considered a "breakthrough." He was chief author of a 1965 series on beating and torture of black inmates.

During his career reporting on apartheid in South Africa he was put on trial several times, put in prison once, had his passport revoked, and was investigated as a threat to the state by security police. Pogrund moved to London in 1985 after the Rand Daily Mail ceased publication (I presume that means it went out of business) and became the chief foreign sub-editor of The Independent. He immigrated to Israel in 1997 and is founder-director of Yakar's Center for Social Concern. He has written books about Robert Sobukwe, Nelson Mandela, and the South African press under apartheid, and he was co-editor of "Shared Histories: A Palestinian-Israeli Dialogue."

I have also included three of the reader comments to this article — out of the 263 that were submitted. They are by no means a representative sample nor do I include them for "balance." I just found them "interesting" counterpoints to Pogrund's article. "Interesting," of course, is in the eye of the beholder.

Go to http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/aug/24/israel-boycotts-right-traumatised?commentpage=1 if you want to read all the comments — and beware that it often gets pretty nasty — and that doesn't include the comments that were removed by the moderator.

As you read this article and the comments I included (or all of them if you wish) I would ask you to consider the following points:

• Why is it that many of those who support a boycott of Israel are usually the same people who are against boycotting Iran or Hamas in Gaza or were against boycotting Iraq under Saddam Husayn?
• Why is it that many of those who are against a boycott of Israel because boycotts are "ineffective" support boycotts of Iran and Hamas and supported the boycott against Iraq under Saddam Husayn?
• In both cases is the purpose or aim of those who support boycotts to make the countries or the organizations against which they are directed change their policies or is their aim or purpose ultimately to eliminate those countries or organizations?
• If their purpose is to make them change their policies, why are boycotts justified in some cases but not justified in other cases?
• If the purpose of the boycotts is to eliminate any of those countries or organizations is it all of them or just certain ones?
• If it is against just certain ones, why not the others?

Mark


Boycotts only harden Israeli opinion
Far from saving this traumatised nation, boycotts are a gift to the fearmongers — we must educate and persuade Israelis instead

By Benjamin Pogrund

The Guardian (UK)
August 24, 2009

The most inaccurate way to describe Israel today is as an apartheid state. That's the exact opposite of what Neve Gordon said on Cif last week. Level whatever criticisms you want against Israel — start with West Bank occupation and oppression of Palestinians, and go on to the domestic discrimination suffered by the Arab minority — but the simple fact is that none of it is the apartheid of the old South Africa. Abundant evidence of this is readily available, in the Guardian and elsewhere.

Why then is the comparison so often made? One reason, in a different context, is in the words of American comedian Stephen Colbert: "Remember kids! In order to maintain an untenable position, you have to be actively ignorant."

For some, the apartheid accusation is the way to destroy Israel. If Israel can be linked with apartheid then it can be denounced as illegitimate as was white-ruled South Africa and hence be wide open to international sanctions.

Those who pursue this couldn't care less about facts. They have an agenda and are unscrupulous about distortion, lying and exaggeration. Their ultimate purpose is exposed by how they answer a basic question: whether or not they accept the fact of Israel's existence.

Others use the apartheid label because they are genuinely affronted and angered by Israeli behaviour — from the occupation to the attack on Gaza — and it seems an easy way to reduce to digestible size the complexities of the national-religious struggle between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians over a small piece of land. It's wrong and it's lazy but that's how many people behave.

It is surprising, and disappointing, to find Gordon in these ranks. He is a professor of politics at a good Israeli university and one expects a more informed approach. I have never met him but see from his writing that he is a man of conscience. He condemns Israeli misdeeds and has long worked for peace, although to be sure he seems to be at the outer fringe of Israel's peace camp. So active is he that rightwing extremists rant at him and try to pressure his university to get rid of him.

Now, however, not only does he take over the apartheid line but he supports the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions Movement aimed at Israel. That presumably includes the academic boycott that he has previously opposed; he thus becomes both the arrow and the target. He still has to explain how he will resolve this personal contradiction.

Equally the "double standard" which he rightly describes as a problem. Why not boycott China for its egregious violations of human rights, he asks. To which he could add the US because of its many human rights sins, Greece and Romania for mistreating their Roma people, India for Dalits, Turkey for Kurds, Lebanon's denial of rights to Palestinians, Cuba, Libya etc etc. He puts a good question, but does not give an answer.

The explanation for his new outlook is: "The Israeli peace camp has gradually dwindled so that today it is almost non-existent, and Israeli politics are moving more and more to the extreme right."

He is venting the left's despair. The left's influence has probably never been lower. Its efforts to foster peace with Palestinians are ignored. It has been ineffective in halting the rise of the right wing. It is powerless against an aggressively rightwing government whose leaders abusively blame it for Palestinian terrorism. Its warnings of settlement growth on the West Bank are trashed.

In dealing with this situation we are entitled to look to a professor of politics for insights and understanding of why it has happened, if only because therein lies possible solutions. It has not come about in a vacuum. But again, nothing.

However, the factors at work are obvious, such as the absence of a brave and visionary leadership (both Israeli and Palestinian). There is also, at bottom, the Jewish psyche shaped by history: the centuries of persecution culminating in the Holocaust, the triumph of the creation of Israel in 1948 and the immediate invasions by Arab neighbours to eradicate it and the unceasing rejectionism, wars and attacks since then.

The terrorism that Palestinians have resorted to has deeply traumatised Israelis. Suicide bombings have driven many or most Israelis to the right. Thousands of rockets fired by Hamas from the Gaza Strip and missiles by Hezbollah from Lebanon, add to the national anxiety. There is more than buffoonery in Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, wanting to wipe Israel off the map: his nuclear ambitions are scary.

There is certainly Jewish over-sensitivity and over-reaction; some Jews misuse and manipulate antisemitism and the Holocaust to stoke up fears for their own purposes. But allowing for all this, the fact of antisemitism is still a potent and dangerous reality, whether in Arab bloodthirsty threats or the UN Human Rights Council singling out Israel for attack, or a stupid Swedish newspaper article alleging the stealing of human organs.

Day after day, Jewish paranoia is buttressed and justified: Jews see themselves in a world of menace in which their existence is always under threat. In this situation, boycotts, sanctions and divestment are not the way to persuade individual Israelis to change. To believe that it will do the trick is to fail to understand use of boycott as a tactic to achieve defined aims. Applied in this case it will harden Israeli opinion, and make people more determined to tell the world to go to hell. Far from saving Israel from itself, as Gordon wants, it will be a gift to the right wing who will trade on it to foster fear.

That doesn't mean all pressure is useless: it's of a different order when applied, for instance, by the US government through threat of withdrawal of loan guarantees or arms supplies, as has occurred in the past. Such action forces the leaders in government to justify themselves and explain to the public why they have landed the country in such trouble with its most powerful friend.

South Africa offers some lessons. Boycotts were but one of the measures that brought down apartheid and they had variable effects. Sports boycotts sapped the morale of whites; cultural boycotts mainly hurt elites who mostly opposed apartheid; disinvestment, causing loss of jobs, hit the black people whom it was intended to help; industry was not laid low — when Kodak left, Fuji came in; when Ford left, other car makers took over. The most effective action was probably the refusal by US banks in 1985 to roll over loans; that struck the foundations of the economy and was the beginning of the end. Then came the effects of the end of the cold war.

In the case of Israel, resorting to mass boycotts is an admission of failure. It's a cathartic response to despair and floundering. Israelis have turned their backs on Gordon so he blindly lashes out.

Yet there is an alternative. It's old-fashioned: educate and persuade. There is already a head start: opinion polls consistently show a majority of Israelis — and Palestinians too — accept a two-state solution as the means to peace. That must be built on: convince Israelis that they are not going to be murdered and thrown into the sea, and that their children — not only Gordon's two sons — can look forward to a secure future. Convince them that the world — or at least much of it — does not view them as more evil than any other people but wishes them well. Encourage and help maximum contact and co-operation between Israelis and Palestinians.

It's often boring, tedious work, with results that are not always immediately apparent. But it's an affirmation of hope about what can be achieved.


Selected Reader Comments

exiledlondoner
24 Aug 09, 12:37pm (about 8 hours ago)

Mr Pogrund,

The most inaccurate way to describe Israel today is as an apartheid state.
That's the exact opposite of what Neve Gordon said on Cif last week. Level
whatever criticisms you want against Israel — start with West Bank occupation
and oppression of Palestinians, and go on to the domestic discrimination
suffered by the Arab minority — but the simple fact is that none of it is the
apartheid of the old South Africa. Abundant evidence of this is readily
available, in the Guardian and elsewhere.

I don't agree Neve Gordon's description of Israel as an Apartheid state, as I said on his thread. In Israel, behind the green line, there is a functioning democracy — there may be discrimination, but Apartheid doesn't merely describe discrimination; it describes a policy of forced separation of the races, and the denial of political rights on the basis of skin colour or race.

However, I would have no problem in describing the situation in the occupied West Bank as Apartheid-like, especially between the green line and the wall. It seems to me that the proliferation of Jewish only settlements, Jewish only roads, roadblocks and checkpoints for Palestinians, and barriers between the two groups are remarkably similar to Apartheid.

The other issue is the future. As Olmert conceded, a failure to create a Palestinian state alongside Israel comes with the risk of a form of Apartheid developing. If Israel is to continue indefinitely to control all of the land west of the Jordan, then it will either have to grant Palestinians rights, or it will have to rule them as second-class citizens. The ever-expanding settlements make the third option — a legal occupation — unachievable.

Day after day, Jewish paranoia is buttressed and justified: Jews see
themselves in a world of menace in which their existence is always under threat.
In this situation, boycotts, sanctions and divestment are not the way to
persuade individual Israelis to change. To believe that it will do the trick is
to fail to understand use of boycott as a tactic to achieve defined aims.
Applied in this case it will harden Israeli opinion, and make people more
determined to tell the world to go to hell.

I agree with a lot of what you say.

For any proposal to be adopted, it first needs to pass one simple test — will it work? The South African experience would seem to suggest yes, but I believe that's deceptive — boycotts didn't bring down Apartheid; targetted sanctions did. As there's no realistic prospect of the sort of sanctions maintained against SA being applied against Israel, calls for boycotts seem to offer little more than a way of making activists feel good.

Secondly, boycotts are indiscriminate — at a time when the conflict is crying out for moderate Israelis to reverse the extremist tide, it simply doesn't make sense to penalise them for nothing else than being Israeli.

I would support sanctions, but only if they were targetted against specific issues — arms sales, the mislabelling of west bank produce, "charitable" support for the settlement program, or settlement building. The problem is not Israel — it's Israel's actions in the occupied territories.

Yet there is an alternative. It's old-fashioned: educate and persuade.

Yes, but I don't think it's either/or — carrots and sticks both have their uses. Israel's reaction to any suggestion that Iran should only be educated and persuaded is instructive — they don't believe it works.

There is already a head start: opinion polls consistently show a majority of
Israelis — and Palestinians too — accept a two-state solution as the means to
peace.

[R]eassuring as that is, I'm not convinced that you're comparing apples with apples. I suspect that the Palestinian majority is for an agreement on the green line, with a substantial right of return, and full statehood, while the Israeli majority is for an agreement on the wall, little or no right of return, and something that falls way short of Palestinian statehood.

The devil, as always, is in the detail....


DrJohnZoidberg
24 Aug 09, 1:23pm (about 8 hours ago)
quiller-

How can you persuade against the blind politico
theological arguments:

"GOD PROMISED US THIS LAND". "IT SAYS IN THE TORAH OR BIBLE"

and if you disagree, you are an anti semite, a Jew hater, etc

The various Qur'anic revelations and Prophetic statements concerning the blessed land of Palestine endeared the land to the Companions (Sahabah) of Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) to such an extent that when `Umar ibn Al-Khattab entered the region for the first time he announced that all the lands of Palestine would be part of the Islamic Waqf (endowment) for the Muslim generations to come.

http://209.85.229.132/search?q=cache:QdBdyECj0zoJ:www.islamonline.net/fatwaapplication/english/display.asp%3FhFatwaID%3D74021+waqf+palestine&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=uk

and your point is caller? if it's 'all pixie superstisions are crap', then i'm with ya bro...if not, then it looks like your being selective to suit your own agenda....and i won't make any implication...


afancdogge
24 Aug 09, 7:35pm (about 8 hours ago)

Hello Ragworm

I totally oppose the occupation — biggest mistake Israel ever made. It has become a monster with a mouth at both ends biting everybody.

I am trying to understand what those calling for boycott and sanctions are supporting as a positive outcome. One state — two states — an end to Israeli control of Gaza and WB?

There are so many suggested solutions — on the tail of how many over the past 42 years? — it is now impossible to know who is calling for what. This just opens up more ravines into which the WBankers can fall. It also helps to delay serious negotiations — simply adds more hurdles.

I don't know the answer — in fact there is no one solution simply because we are up against so many entenched attitudes, beliefs and aspiration all round. Pressure from one direction causes a pushing back and increased determination to pursue a destructive agenda.

Both sides lack leadership with any vision or it seems goodwill towards the other. In the meantime people suffer and die.

Leni