Chasing buffaloes (and my comments)

Recent wrangling over normalisation, writes Abdel-Moneim Said, once again betrays the confusion of means with ends

Al-Ahram Weekly (Egypt)
8-14 October 2009

I am an American history buff and in the course of my readings I have been particularly drawn to attempts to explain why the Native Americans were defeated and confined to "reservations" by settlers hailing from Europe. One of the most commonly cited explanations holds that the American Indian tribes were divided, technologically backward, poor and superstitious by the standards of Western civilisation which had begun to bourgeon in the period following its discovery of the New World. However, I was particularly struck by another explanation which focussed on the military conduct of the tribes. According to this perspective, European settlers followed the military customs in practice in Europe, which entailed building forts and fortified camps from which they observed the hostile environment outside. The tribes, accustomed to open warfare, laid siege to these camps in the hope of forcing those inside to surrender out of fear or hunger. However, in those dull intervals of waiting, the besiegers would often catch sight of a passing herd of wild buffalo and break off the siege in order to chase after the precious quarry. These moments of relief, naturally, afforded those inside the camp the opportunity to bring in food and ammunition and to send out messages for help to other camps.

The moral here is crystal clear: departing from the original purpose, however tempting the lures, puts original goals at risk. I have frequently related this explanation of the defeat of Native Americans to my students and to those with whom I was working towards a common goal. Most recently I found myself repeating it to my colleagues in Al-Ahram who have been desperate to respond to certain political attacks which have often defied the rules of propriety and been gratuitously crude.

To me the goals have always been as clear as daylight. They are to restore Al-Ahram to its "natural" place in our country's intellectual, cultural and political sphere; to preserve the fiscal equilibrium which has been regained through many hard sacrifices; and to raise the performance of its employees to a standard commensurate with an eminent international institution. I was determined not to allow myself, or Al-Ahram, to be drawn into a media fray meant to give us a "break" from the "succession" issue by dredging up another no less familiar one — "normalisation" — with the purpose of settling old scores, obstructing the aspirations of Al-Ahram or racking up electoral campaign points. In all events, I have addressed the subject of "normalisation" innumerable times over the past three decades, in newspaper articles, on television programmes and in many public debates. Fortunately, the vast majority of my fellow "Ahramists" did not fall into the trap. They did not rush off to hunt buffaloes. In all my meetings with my colleagues we could focus on what was needed in order to achieve the goals enumerated above.

Nevertheless, during the recent clamour over normalisation I could not help but remark the sweeping nature in which some of my fellow journalists treated it. According to one commentator, the steps that have already been taken towards normalisation reflected a "backslide" in "Egyptian patriotism". Another lashed out against what he regarded as a flagrant contradiction between the current trend towards religiosity in Egyptian society and Egyptians' tendency to ignore a matter no less serious than normalisation, which is the relentless Judaisation of Jerusalem. What such statements have in common is that they take us to the brink of an insight without going further. They fail to continue along the path of philosophical and intellectual enquiry. They do not ask how and why this or that occurred, let alone probe grey areas in order to untangle the jumble of threads. In short, the clamour concealed the failure of our intellectual community to delve beneath the surface and investigate the roots of crucial questions, foremost among them the relation of war, conflict and armed violence to politics and the peaceful use of power.

This matter should have been given priority from the outset. For, as is the case with the question of the relationship between religion and the state, failure to solve it perpetuates society's anxieties and tensions, rendering it more vulnerable, making the public easy prey for the politicians' arts of toying with feelings for campaign purposes or personal fame or even to sabotage the wheels of progress and change. No one expressed the relationship between war and politics more succinctly than the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz who, in his famous military treatise On War, wrote that war was a continuation of politics by other means. He held that a tactical military victory is per force a temporary victory if it is not crowned by a more comprehensive political aim to make it a strategic victory, and that the achievement of a political end is the chief aim of war, which is only a means towards that end, for means cannot be isolated from their ends.

It follows that the purpose of war is to bend the will of the adversary, by military or political means, to the will of the other party. The notion is certainly not alien to Egyptian and Arab thought. But as familiar as Clausewitz may be in intellectual and military circles here, rarely has his concept of the relationship between war and politics been put into practice in treating such "core" Arab questions as the Arab-Israeli conflict. When it has it proved not only an attempt on the part of the intellectuals to evade probing the roots of the problem itself but also an evasion of the task of applying one's mind to translating theoretical principles into strategy. After all, war and violence or politics and diplomacy are not necessarily things to be glorified for their own sake; rather, they should be regarded as alternative ways to "engage" with the enemy in order to achieve strategic aims. But perhaps it is better to look at the matter another way. It is no longer possible to resolve international disputes solely through the use of military force. While some political or strategic aims can only be achieved through war, the display of might and exacting revenge are not aims that legitimise recourse to war. Hence, it is impossible to separate war from peace; they are two sides of the same coin, mutually complementary states.We can only explain the "decline in Egyptian patriotism" and the "negligence of the pious with respect to Jerusalem" in terms of the disgraceful negligence on the part of intellectuals with regard to such crucial issues as war and diplomacy, violence and peace, development and conflict. The Egyptian public should not be corralled into journalistic battles or media wars. They should not be tempted to chase "buffaloes" that have no bearing on what it takes to liberate occupied Arab territory. The history of the past half century testifies to how successful or not the Arabs have been in dealing — both peacefully and violently — with an Israeli adversary that is undeniably hostile and that has worked relentlessly against Egyptian and Arab strategic interests.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the premise was that the Arab-Israeli conflict was not about borders but an existential conflict. On the basis of this premise, the military instrument reigned as the critical factor between the two sides until the 1967 war, which ended in the defeat of the Arab armies and the Israeli occupation of Arab territories for years to come. The tables began to turn in 1970 with the arrival to power of Anwar El-Sadat, who set into motion a new phase of military preparations. However, preparing for an offensive war took considerable time and effort, especially since Egypt did not produce its own arms but relied almost exclusively on outside powers (the USSR, to be precise). Under such conditions, the procuring of arms was inevitably subordinated to political considerations between Egypt and its suppliers at a time when international and regional balances of power favoured Israel and when the Egyptian economy was in severe straits.

Egypt's aim in the 1973 War was not to eliminate Israel. Rather, it was to break the Israeli will to make war and propel them to the negotiating table. On another level, it aimed to destroy the myth of Israeli invincibility and persuade the Israelis that they would never be able to live in peace by relying on military force. President Sadat's stroke of genius to achieve this end was a "limited offensive war" that would entail crossing the Suez Canal, breaking through the Bar Lev line and occupying the eastern bank of the canal to a depth of 15 to 18 kilometres, and causing as much attrition and damage as possible to Israeli land and air forces. The scheme brought into play another well-conceived tactic, which was to keep Israeli forces mobilised for as long as possible. Israel's demographic structure meant that Israel had to keep 20 per cent of its population (about three million at the time) mobilised during wartime. Such a ratio is unsustainable for any long period of time because of the enormous economic attrition it wreaks. The longer the war lasted, the more Israel would feel compelled to ask for a ceasefire or call for the intervention of international forces.

This war thus proved the engine to liberate our land. It is useful to take a look at the goals of the October War as outlined in Sadat's letter of 5 October to the General Commander of Egyptian Forces, Ahmed Ismail. These aims were, first, to break the stagnation in the peace process; second, to cause the greatest amount of moral and material damage to the armed forces of the enemy; and, three, to liberate the Sinai in phases, as the capacities of Egyptian forces permit. We see the political dimension of the 6 October 1973 War again in Sadat's letter to US secretary of state Henry Kissinger on 7 October 1973 (conveyed via a secret channel arranged between Sadat's national security adviser, Hafez Ismail, and president Nixon in February 1973), which clarifies the Egyptian position on war and peace as follows:

• Egypt's chief aim is not to conclude partial settlements but to achieve peace in the Middle East.
• Egypt does not intend to deepen the engagement or expand the scope of confrontation. (This point came under heavy criticism when taken out of context from Sadat's original strategy!)
• Israel must withdraw from all occupied territories. When it does, Egypt will be willing to participate in a UN peace conference of any acceptable form, whether under the auspices of the secretary- general, the permanent members of the Security Council, or any other representative body.
• Egypt agrees to the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran and it accepts, as a guarantee, the presence of an international force for a limited period.
  

Sadat's purpose was to turn the Egyptian military achievement into the best possible political advantages that Egypt could gain under a military situation characterised by parity. After the war, there followed the talks at the 101st kilometre line, the first disengagement treaty of January 1974, and the second disengagement treaty of September 1975. In retrospect Sadat's decision to travel to Jerusalem should surprise only as a daring application of Clausewitz's principle regarding the complementariness of military and political means of engagement. On 9 November 1977 Sadat declared before the People's Assembly, "I am ready to go to the ends of the earth in quest of a just peace... Indeed, I am even prepared to go to the Israeli Knesset, because we do not fear peace, nor do we fear confrontation with Israel."

As a consequence of this decision Egypt was plunged into another battle no less ferocious than the October war, even if it differed in quality. This was the battle for peace. Sadat's visit to Jerusalem put paid, before the eyes of the entire world, to the notion that Israel is surrounded by people bent on its annihilation. In the course of a few hours Sadat brought down the powerful propaganda wall that Israel had erected over three decades. Then he followed through with intensive efforts that, over the following years, brought the peace treaty with Israel on 26 March 1979, the liberation of the whole of the Sinai in 1982 and the return of Taba through international arbitration in 1989.

Many Arabs and Egyptians have never read Clausewitz. Among those who have, few understood him, and among those who understood him, even fewer put his ideas into practice. Perhaps this is because this takes moral, mental and physical energy, when it is so much easier to point the finger of accusation at others. As a result the situation remains pending in the Golan, and in Palestine the sense of disappointment is greater than ever. It is not just an appreciation of the relationship between war and politics that has been lacking in recent days. The roots of other problems have been overlooked or skilfully concealed.

Mark says:

In comparing the Native Americans who encountered the European settlers to the Arabs of today in their encounters with Israel, Abdel-Moneim Said uses an old and, in many cases, largely discredited theory about some of the reasons for the success of the settlers over Native Americans. The tribes were not necessarily "divided, technologically backward, poor and superstitious by the standards of Western civilisation." One must start with the fact that as many as 90 percent of the inhabitants of the North, Central, and South Americas died from diseases brought by Europeans — primarily smallpox and influenza. For more on the extent and levels of civilization of the Native Americans prior to and after the European invasions, I would highly recommend starting with 1491: New Revelations of the Americas Before Columbus, by Charles C. Mann, and Guns Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, by Jared M. Diamond. Both books are, by the way, pleasures to read and mostly free of academese.

Be that as it may, Abdel-Moneim Said is trying to make a point about strategy versus tactics and what I would call the "attention deficit disorder" (ADD) that plagues much of the Arab world today in general, and Said's Egypt in particular. In view of his past publications, I'm sure he would have come up with another equally apt analogy as "chasing buffalos" to illustrate his points about many Arab and Egyptian intellectuals and normalization with Israel.

Said alludes to the fact that 30 years after Egypt and Israel signed their peace treaty there are still many Egyptians who have not come to terms with its reality. This goes beyond ADD and should be described by whatever psychological term you may choose for someone who cannot cope with reality.

At the same time — again, 30 years later — there are still some Israelis and some supporters of Israel who believe that Sadat's strategy of negotiations with Israel and signing the peace treaty was nothing more than just the first stage in the "strategy of stages" to get Israel to withdraw to the pre-Six Day War boundaries in preparation for the final and fatal assault on Israel. I'm sure that some or many, if not most of the Egyptians that Said analyzes in his article would wish that this were so — even as they have disparaged and condemned and cursed Sadat for signing the peace treaty with Israel.

The degrees and extent of these respective inabilities to come to terms with reality may differ between and among Egyptians and Israelis but the term fits for both.

The Region: Let's pretend we're making peace

By Barry Rubin

The Jerusalem Post
August 30, 2009

Here is one of my favorite stories explaining how the Middle East works as told by the famed Egyptian journalist Muhammad Hussanein Heikal. Like all of Heikal's stories, it may or may not be true, which is also part of the lesson being taught.

When Muammar Gaddafi first became Libya's ruler, Heikal was dispatched to meet and evaluate him by Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. After returning to Cairo, Heikal was quickly ushered into the president's office.

"Well," said Nasser, "what do you think of Gaddafi?"

"He's a disaster! A catastrophe!"

"Why," asked the president, "is he against us?"

"Oh no, far worse than that," Heikal claims to have replied, "he's for us and he really believes all the stuff we are saying!"

The point was that the Egyptian regime took the propaganda line out of self-interest that all Arabs should be united into one state under its leadership, all the Arab monarchies overthrown, Israel wiped off the map immediately and Western influence expelled, but it knew itself incapable of achieving these goals and to try to do so would bring disaster. Indeed, when Nasser had tried to implement part of this program in 1967, he provoked Israel into attacking and suffered his worst nightmare.

Come to think of it, Arab regimes are still playing this game of systematically purveying radicalism, hatred and unachievable goals to distract their populace, excuse their own failings, focus antagonism against foreign scapegoats and seek regional ambitions.

Western governments do this kind of thing a bit differently.

In this regard, recent statements by a number of leaders including US President Barack Obama, prime ministers Gordon Brown and Binyamin Netanyahu and others establish an important principle: Actually achieving Middle East peace is of no importance. The only thing that is important is saying that progress is being made and that peace will come soon.

I don't mean that as a statement of cynicism, but as an accurate analysis of what goes on in international affairs at present. What's achieved by pretending there is progress and success is imminent? Some very real and — in their way — important things:

• World leaders are saying that they are doing a great job, doing the right things, remaining active and achieving success.
• By saying peace is near, the situation is defused. Why fight if you are about to make a deal?
• Israel (and anyone else from the region who joins in) shows that it is cooperating, so others should be patient and not apply pressure.
• Since the West is taking care of business, Arab states will supposedly feel comfortable working with it on other issues, like Iran for example.

I want to stress that this behavior is not as silly as it might seem. Often this is how politics actually work.

THE FREEZE on settlement construction, as another example, is a scam. If Israel gives something on this issue, the Western governments declare victory and go home, so to speak. That doesn't mean there aren't reasons for not doing so, but the virtually open cynicism of the US and European strategy is striking.

When the US president portrays the possibility of two tiny states, Oman and Qatar, letting one-man Israeli trade offices reopen as a major triumph in confidence-building, despite being his sole achievement after months of top-level diplomacy, what can one do but snicker?

Finally, since Israeli-Palestinian peace is not within reach, pretending it is while knowing the truth is not such a bad alternative. It is certainly progress, since the Obama administration came into office and originally pursued a policy based on the idea that it could achieve peace in a matter of months.

What is the downside here?

There are three problems. The first is if Western leaders believe their own propaganda. Because if peace is "within reach" but isn't actually grasped, then someone must be blamed. That someone will, of course, be Israel.

Why? Because if the West blames the Palestinians, leaders presume that Arabs and Muslims will be angry and not cooperate on other matters. There could be more terrorism and fewer profitable deals and investments. They gain nothing.

But if they insist that everything is going well, there is no need to blame anyone. This is the phase we are now entering.

The second problem, however, is that neither the Palestinians nor Arab regimes will join in the optimism. Their line is: The Palestinians are suffering! The situation is intolerable! Something must be done! And since we will make no concessions or compromises, the only solution is for the West to pressure Israel to give more and more while getting nothing in return.

Since this is not going to happen if Israel resists, they fall back on their alternative approach: Okay, so since you aren't forcing Israel to give us what we want, you have to give us other things, like money, and you cannot demand we help you.

The best outcome is that certain Arab states, with other interests at stake, will downplay the conflict altogether and focus on more pragmatic needs. The radicals — principally Iran and Syria — will never do so and will claim that the situation shows how the West cannot be trusted and must be defeated.

What's the third problem? Actions that might actually promote regional stability, or even Arab-Israeli peace, are not taken. These include two especially important tactics:

• More energetic efforts to overthrow the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip. As long as Hamas is running half the Palestinian territories and outflanking Fatah in militancy, there won't be peace. Keeping Hamas from taking over the West Bank, isolating it and maintaining sanctions against it is a good policy and can preserve the status quo. It is not, however, the best policy and the pressure on Hamas could erode over time.
• More pressure on the Palestinian Authority to moderate and compromise. The PA and its positions are the main barriers to peace. As the PA possibly becomes more radical, the likelihood of violence increases. Thus, while in the short-to-medium run the "feel good" and status quo policy may work, it also has risks and limits.

Still, it is the best that can be expected at present.

Candidly speaking: There may be worse to come (and my comments)

By Isi Leibler

The Jerusalem Post
August 25, 2009

President Obama's naïve efforts to appease the Arabs by bullying and distancing the United States from Israel has backfired. However despite increasing unease extending to some of Obama's most fervent supporters, the administration has yet to signal any change in policy.

The futility of trying to appease tyrannies is evident everywhere; the thuggish behavior of the Iranian regime toward its own people makes a farce of Obama's efforts to reason with Ahmadinejad; in response to unilateral US overtures to the Syrians, President Assad visited the Iranian president, congratulated him on his bogus reelection and declared that their alliance had never been stronger; the North Koreans displayed utter contempt for Obama's friendly outreach; Arabs states all responded negatively to Obama's entreaties to provide a few crumbs of recognition in return for Israeli concessions; Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was publicly humiliated by the Saudi Foreign Minister, who insisted there was nothing to negotiate unless Israel accepted all Arab demands.

The Palestinian response was even more noxious. Clearly emboldened, the Fatah General Assembly displayed contempt for any initiative that could further the peace process. Their intransigence again demonstrated the absurdity of the notion that this corrupt and duplicitous leadership could be a genuine peace partner. There were even elements of surrealism when the Fatah Assembly unanimously accused Israel of having assassinated Arafat and provided standing applause for a mass murderer.

They decreed that unless Israel acceded to all their demands, no further negotiations would take place and they could renew the "armed struggle." Far from encouraging Arab moderation, Obama's tough approach to Israel simply bolstered the hardliners.

The facts on the ground today make prospects for peace more remote than ever. The only clear message emerging from the Fatah Congress is that, as with Hamas, elimination of Jewish sovereignty in the region remains its ultimate objective. Were that not so, Mahmoud Abbas would have accepted Ehud Olmert's offer, which virtually granted him all his territorial demands and even hinted at a compromise over the Arab right of return.

Obama's advisers must have been bitterly disappointed when their diktats against Israel backfired. Indeed, their one-sided demands and bullying tactics can take credit for having created a rare consensus among the Israeli public, which today overwhelmingly supports Netanyahu.

To add to Obama's problems and despite predictions to the contrary, American Jewish leaders have begun to openly challenge some of his policies. There is a growing unease even among some Jewish Democrats that Obama is betraying the unequivocal undertakings he made during the elections to faithfully preserve the alliance with Israel.

This was exemplified in remarks made by Howard Berman, the influential Democratic chair of the US House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, who in a closed meeting with Jewish leaders explicitly criticized the Obama administration's pressure on Israel over settlements. Berman said Abbas was now "waiting for the US to present him Israel on a platter". Steny Hoyer, the Democratic House majority leader visiting Israel, made similar comments at a Jerusalem news conference.

OBAMA MUST also have been stunned when his friend and loyal supporter Alan Solow, the Chairman of the Presidents Conference representing 52 major American Jewish organizations, condemned his demands to limit Jews settlements in Jerusalem and its suburbs.

In a full page New York Times advert Abe Foxman of the Anti Defamation League stated "The problem is not settlements, it's Arab rejection...Mr. President, it's time to stop pressuring our vital friend and ally". David Harris of the American Jewish Committee expressed similar feelings to a Congressional group. Whilst usually ritually reiterating their belief that Obama would not abandon Israel, Jewish leaders have begun openly criticizing the administration's behavior toward the Jewish state.

Obama's standing with American Jewish activists plummeted further when, contemptuously dismissing a rare virtually unanimous Jewish protest, he personally participated in the ceremony honoring former Irish president and 2001 UN Durban hate-fest convener Mary Robinson with the highest human rights award in the US. This was perceived as yet another manifestation of Obama's new love affair with the UN and its anti-Israel affiliates.

It must also have been disappointing for Obama's Jewish advisers promoting the J Street line when they became aware that despite expensive media promotions, opinion polls indicated that most Jewish activists remained contemptuous of the left-wing Jewish fringe groups urging Obama to force Israel to make further concessions.

However, as of now, while continuing to avoid any initiative which could irritate the Arabs, the US is maintaining its heavy-handed approach toward its erstwhile ally, Israel. While a face-saving compromise may soon eventuate, appreciating the unprecedented backing he currently enjoys from his constituency, Netanyahu would be unwise to capitulate to Obama's demands.

Alas, irrespective of the settlement issues, there may be worse to come from this administration. After Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's recent warm meeting with Obama in Washington, he effusively praised the policy changes introduced by the president and hinted of further impending "positive" US initiatives.

There are also chilling predictions that without prior consultations with Israel, Obama intends to unilaterally submit a US plan for a comprehensive settlement at the UN or elsewhere. It is rumored that this plan would use as a starting point the irresponsible offers made to Abbas by Olmert during the death throes of his tenure — offers which would unquestionably have been repudiated by the Knesset and people of Israel in a referendum. Such a move would be an unprecedented betrayal of a long-standing ally.

UNTIL SUCH time as a genuine Palestinian peace partner emerges, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu cannot be expected to create a miraculous magic plan which would bring about a comprehensive final settlement. But his task now must be to preempt a disastrous imposed settlement by the Americans.

In doing so he must he speedily identify the red lines which his government, backed by the vast majority of Israelis, would never contemplate crossing.

To this end he should also marshal the support of the mainstream American Jewish leadership and encourage them to convey to their president that they too have red lines. They have already begun to signal that they will not remain passive if their government attempts to unilaterally impose a solution which could endanger the Jewish state.

Below are some excerpts from Mr. Leibler’s article above with some comments and questions:

Their [Fatah's] intransigence again demonstrated the absurdity of the notion
that this corrupt and duplicitous leadership could be a genuine peace
partner.

Mark says:

Strange — or perhaps ironic — that so many in the Palestinian and Arab commentariats, and especially among Hamas supporters, also described the Fatah leadership as “corrupt and duplicitous.”

They [Fatah] decreed that unless Israel acceded to all their demands, no further
negotiations would take place and they could renew the "armed struggle." Far
from encouraging Arab moderation, Obama's tough approach to Israel simply
bolstered the hardliners.

The great writer Isaac Asimov had one of his characters in the Foundation Trilogy say that “consistency is the last refuge of the unimaginative.” I don’t think that Mr. Leibler lacks imagination — but he is certainly inconsistent. For if I read many of his previous columns and articles correctly, according to Mr. Leibler what Obama or Israel do or don’t do is not going to change the behavior of Arab hardliners, who apparently constitute 99.999 percent of all Palestinian leaders.

The only clear message emerging from the Fatah Congress is that, as with Hamas,
elimination of Jewish sovereignty in the region remains its ultimate objective.
Were that not so, Mahmoud Abbas would have accepted Ehud Olmert's offer, which virtually granted him all his territorial demands and even hinted at a
compromise over the Arab right of return.

However, later in the article Mr. Leibler states:

It is rumored that this [Obama’s] plan would use as a starting point the
irresponsible offers made to Abbas by Olmert during the death throes of his
tenure — offers which would unquestionably have been repudiated by the Knesset
and people of Israel in a referendum.

So, in other words, it wouldn’t have mattered if Mahmoud Abbas had accepted Ehud Olmert’s offers because they “would unquestionably have been repudiated by the Knesset and people of Israel in a referendum.” Perhaps Mr. Abbas was perceptive enough to recognize that and wanted to save himself the resulting political and personal humiliation?

Or perhaps Mr. Abbas, once again, "missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity" because the United States, even under the Bush administration, would have leaped to pressure Israel into accepting a peace plan based on those offers. However, assuming Mr. Leibler’s scenario would have been correct, Israel would then have placed itself in the position of being the intransigent naysayer.

At which point, Mr. Leibler would have written of the administration of George W. Bush (as he is now writing about the Obama administration):

Such a move would be an unprecedented betrayal of a long-standing ally.

It seems that there are always those who inevitably say at some point during the lifespan of every U.S. presidential administration (Nixon, Ford, Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, Bush II, Obama):

Such a move would be an unprecedented betrayal of a long-standing ally.

As Casey Stengel used to say: "You can look it up."