By Michael Slackman
The New York Times
September 29, 2009
CAIRO — For days after Egypt’s culture minister, Farouk Hosny, failed in his bid to lead the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Egyptian newspapers and government officials presented the defeat as a sign of Western prejudice against Islam and the Arab world, the product of an international Jewish conspiracy.
“America, Europe and the Jewish lobby brought down Farouk Hosni,” read a headline in an independent daily newspaper, Al Masry Al Yom. The foreign minister, Ahmed Aboul Gheit, criticized “international Judaism and Western powers” in a television interview. Mr. Hosny himself helped stoke those sentiments, saying, “There was a group of the world’s Jews who had a major influence in the elections who were a serious threat to Egypt taking this position.”
All of Egypt, indeed all of the Arab world, was talking with one voice of outrage and insult. Or so it seemed.
While no one here would argue that Israel and its supporters played no role in Mr. Hosny’s defeat to a Bulgarian diplomat, many people said that his failure was at least as much a sign of Egypt’s long, slow slide as the center of Arab culture, thought and influence. They said the defeat might represent a rejection of Muslims and Arabs, but perhaps more importantly a rejection of their authoritarian leaders.
Mr. Hosny, a favorite of President Hosni Mubarak, was roundly despised by many members of the nation’s cultural elite, who say he did little or nothing in his 22 years as culture minister to encourage cultural development and did much, particularly through the enforcement of strict government censorship, to stunt it.
In the independent newspaper Shorouk, Fahmy Howeidy wrote: “I am not exaggerating when I say that the failure of Mr. Farouk Hosny is not due to his hostility against Israel, as it was said, but the important reason that contributed to his failure is he represents a country that ranks among the politically failed states, where a monopoly of power and governing the state under emergency rule for more than a quarter of a century, where it suppresses public freedom, affects the image of its candidate.”
The defeat provoked a degree of quiet soul-searching here. The state’s retreat to anti-Zionism and to some extent, anti-Semitism, underscored for many here the region’s collective political impotence, a failure of Arab leaders to form a powerful regional bloc capable of winning support from power brokers in Washington, London or Paris that has lasted decades.
The pan-Arab daily newspaper Al Quds Al Arabi wrote that Mr. Hosny’s loss “comes as yet another confirmation of the Arab world’s — and Egypt’s in particular — backslide on the international arena, and the general lack of respect towards it in all areas, not exclusively culture.”
Mr. Hosny, 71, is a well-known figure in Egypt. He has been the minister for more than two decades. Oddly enough, considering the charges of anti-Semitism that derailed his candidacy, he has never been known as a strong opponent of normalizing ties with Israel.
True, he has resisted a warm peace, refused to visit Tel Aviv and was quoted as saying that he would burn Israeli books if he found them in a library. But proponents say he took these actions as the bare minimum to defend himself from a population that views Israel as the enemy.
Throughout his candidacy, Mr. Hosny struggled to mute the charges of anti-Semitism, efforts that caused many people in Egypt to wince as they watched a stalwart of the state apologize, to Israel no less. And they winced again, when he blamed a Jewish-Zionist conspiracy for his loss.
“He did not take an anti-normalization stand until the end,” said Hossam el-Hamalawy, an independent Egyptian blogger and journalist. “The moment he lost he came back and started saying some of the most foul anti-Semitic statements against the Jews, confirming what the West had said about him.”
Mr. Hosny lost his bid for Unesco, but tried to turn that into a victory at home, returning as a victim, and for the state-run media a hero. The charges of a Western, Jewish-Zionist conspiracy may have been amplified by a government eager to limit its embarrassment after having staked its credibility on Mr. Hosny.
But they are not new, said Hala Mustafa, editor in chief of the weekly magazine Democracy and a member of Mr. Mubarak’s governing party. When it comes to domestic politics, she said, Egyptian officials often try to present themselves as anti-Israeli, even while serving as a mediator between Israel and the Palestinians.
Ms. Mustafa has been squeezed by that dual identity.
In her capacity as an editor and academic in the state-financed Ahram Center, she recently met with Israel’s ambassador to Egypt, Shalom Cohen. She has since been tarred in the press as a “normalizer,” and the Egyptian Journalists Syndicate has tried to blacklist her. Ms. Mustafa said she saw the state’s rush to blame Israel for Mr. Hosny’s loss as stemming from the same forces busy attacking her.
“We have been under this propaganda for 30 years,” she said. “Like Egypt doesn’t have a peace treaty with Israel? Like Egypt does not play a peace role between Israel and the Palestinians? If that is Egypt’s role, why are we not allowed to play the same role?”
There is another view, too, one that was published in English, allowing, perhaps for a degree of candor not found in the Arabic news media. Writing in the English-language Daily News, the chief editor, Rania al-Malky, suggested that Mr. Hosny might have done as well as he did because he was Arab and Muslim, not because he was qualified. His defeat, she wrote, should not surprise anyone.
“I will say this at the risk of being branded unpatriotic, but no matter where you stand on the political spectrum,” she wrote, “you must admit that the Egyptian administration did not deserve to win this bid. How can a 22-year minister of a country where culture, education, health and science have regressed to the Dark Ages become the head of Unesco?”
Mona El-Naggar contributed reporting.
Showing posts with label Egypt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Egypt. Show all posts
Monday, October 12, 2009
Hosni and the Zionist Plot
By Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed
Asharq Al-Awsat (London)
October 10, 2009
Following the Egyptian Minister of Culture Farouk Hosni’s failed bid to head UNESCO, many people stated that this loss was a catastrophe and blamed it on an international Zionist plot, even though it was nothing more than competition for an international position.
The following week, US President Barack Obama received a real blow when the city of Chicago lost the competition to host the 2016 Olympic Games to Rio de Janeiro in Brazil.
Barack Obama made a personal visit to Copenhagen, Denmark, together with some influential personalities and media figures to support the Chicago bid for the Olympics. However, he returned home in his giant jet disappointed. “You can play a great game and still not win…” Obama said. He did not call it a conspiracy and place the blame on others even though he is the most powerful president in the world in terms of influence, and his country’s chances of hosting the international Olympic Games were higher by virtue of Chicago’s sports facilities and its huge financial resources in comparison to the other three competing cities. Obama lost simply because this time the majority voted for another country and this is the kind of thing that happens in any competition.
What I mean is that after years of experiencing the same thing over and over, we still insist on giving Israel a title it does not deserve and that title is the “force majeure” of all Arabs. Anybody who knows public work, including political work, must be aware that Israel’s assumed capability is a false notion including the defeat of Minister Hosni, which was nothing more than a competition that could have been lost by the best candidate.
The belief that the Egyptian Minister of Culture’s failure to win the UNESCO position is a catastrophe belittles Egypt as well, as it is too big a state to value itself on a temporary post. In the same way, this also exaggerates the value of the UNESCO post, as it is merely a cultural organization that cannot be compared to the UN or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is headed by an Egyptian.
I read some of what was written about Minister Hosni and the false accusations cast against him of hatred and book burning and this is nothing more than the opinions of some people that every minister, or anyone in a public position, should be used to. As for voting for the UNESCO position, this was political action being practiced and in most cases it is subject to each country’s considerations. But to accuse Israel of being behind it means we would be awarding Israel a championship medal it does not deserve.
We should be used to defeats as long as we aspire to win; this is part of life, unless we choose to stay at home and refrain from entering competitions, in which case there would be no winners or losers.
Egypt is the most populated Arab country, and one of the developing countries with the most figures assuming international posts even though the country is not the biggest in terms of size or population, or richest in natural resources. This in itself is enough to make one feel satisfied rather than bitter or angry. As for Israel — which is great in our eyes only — its figures have not assumed a single international post at any organization in its entire history.
Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed is general manager of Al-Arabiya television and former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat.
Asharq Al-Awsat (London)
October 10, 2009
Following the Egyptian Minister of Culture Farouk Hosni’s failed bid to head UNESCO, many people stated that this loss was a catastrophe and blamed it on an international Zionist plot, even though it was nothing more than competition for an international position.
The following week, US President Barack Obama received a real blow when the city of Chicago lost the competition to host the 2016 Olympic Games to Rio de Janeiro in Brazil.
Barack Obama made a personal visit to Copenhagen, Denmark, together with some influential personalities and media figures to support the Chicago bid for the Olympics. However, he returned home in his giant jet disappointed. “You can play a great game and still not win…” Obama said. He did not call it a conspiracy and place the blame on others even though he is the most powerful president in the world in terms of influence, and his country’s chances of hosting the international Olympic Games were higher by virtue of Chicago’s sports facilities and its huge financial resources in comparison to the other three competing cities. Obama lost simply because this time the majority voted for another country and this is the kind of thing that happens in any competition.
What I mean is that after years of experiencing the same thing over and over, we still insist on giving Israel a title it does not deserve and that title is the “force majeure” of all Arabs. Anybody who knows public work, including political work, must be aware that Israel’s assumed capability is a false notion including the defeat of Minister Hosni, which was nothing more than a competition that could have been lost by the best candidate.
The belief that the Egyptian Minister of Culture’s failure to win the UNESCO position is a catastrophe belittles Egypt as well, as it is too big a state to value itself on a temporary post. In the same way, this also exaggerates the value of the UNESCO post, as it is merely a cultural organization that cannot be compared to the UN or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is headed by an Egyptian.
I read some of what was written about Minister Hosni and the false accusations cast against him of hatred and book burning and this is nothing more than the opinions of some people that every minister, or anyone in a public position, should be used to. As for voting for the UNESCO position, this was political action being practiced and in most cases it is subject to each country’s considerations. But to accuse Israel of being behind it means we would be awarding Israel a championship medal it does not deserve.
We should be used to defeats as long as we aspire to win; this is part of life, unless we choose to stay at home and refrain from entering competitions, in which case there would be no winners or losers.
Egypt is the most populated Arab country, and one of the developing countries with the most figures assuming international posts even though the country is not the biggest in terms of size or population, or richest in natural resources. This in itself is enough to make one feel satisfied rather than bitter or angry. As for Israel — which is great in our eyes only — its figures have not assumed a single international post at any organization in its entire history.
Abdul Rahman Al-Rashed is general manager of Al-Arabiya television and former editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat.
Saturday, October 10, 2009
Chasing buffaloes (and my comments)
Recent wrangling over normalisation, writes Abdel-Moneim Said, once again betrays the confusion of means with ends
Al-Ahram Weekly (Egypt)
8-14 October 2009
I am an American history buff and in the course of my readings I have been particularly drawn to attempts to explain why the Native Americans were defeated and confined to "reservations" by settlers hailing from Europe. One of the most commonly cited explanations holds that the American Indian tribes were divided, technologically backward, poor and superstitious by the standards of Western civilisation which had begun to bourgeon in the period following its discovery of the New World. However, I was particularly struck by another explanation which focussed on the military conduct of the tribes. According to this perspective, European settlers followed the military customs in practice in Europe, which entailed building forts and fortified camps from which they observed the hostile environment outside. The tribes, accustomed to open warfare, laid siege to these camps in the hope of forcing those inside to surrender out of fear or hunger. However, in those dull intervals of waiting, the besiegers would often catch sight of a passing herd of wild buffalo and break off the siege in order to chase after the precious quarry. These moments of relief, naturally, afforded those inside the camp the opportunity to bring in food and ammunition and to send out messages for help to other camps.
The moral here is crystal clear: departing from the original purpose, however tempting the lures, puts original goals at risk. I have frequently related this explanation of the defeat of Native Americans to my students and to those with whom I was working towards a common goal. Most recently I found myself repeating it to my colleagues in Al-Ahram who have been desperate to respond to certain political attacks which have often defied the rules of propriety and been gratuitously crude.
To me the goals have always been as clear as daylight. They are to restore Al-Ahram to its "natural" place in our country's intellectual, cultural and political sphere; to preserve the fiscal equilibrium which has been regained through many hard sacrifices; and to raise the performance of its employees to a standard commensurate with an eminent international institution. I was determined not to allow myself, or Al-Ahram, to be drawn into a media fray meant to give us a "break" from the "succession" issue by dredging up another no less familiar one — "normalisation" — with the purpose of settling old scores, obstructing the aspirations of Al-Ahram or racking up electoral campaign points. In all events, I have addressed the subject of "normalisation" innumerable times over the past three decades, in newspaper articles, on television programmes and in many public debates. Fortunately, the vast majority of my fellow "Ahramists" did not fall into the trap. They did not rush off to hunt buffaloes. In all my meetings with my colleagues we could focus on what was needed in order to achieve the goals enumerated above.
Nevertheless, during the recent clamour over normalisation I could not help but remark the sweeping nature in which some of my fellow journalists treated it. According to one commentator, the steps that have already been taken towards normalisation reflected a "backslide" in "Egyptian patriotism". Another lashed out against what he regarded as a flagrant contradiction between the current trend towards religiosity in Egyptian society and Egyptians' tendency to ignore a matter no less serious than normalisation, which is the relentless Judaisation of Jerusalem. What such statements have in common is that they take us to the brink of an insight without going further. They fail to continue along the path of philosophical and intellectual enquiry. They do not ask how and why this or that occurred, let alone probe grey areas in order to untangle the jumble of threads. In short, the clamour concealed the failure of our intellectual community to delve beneath the surface and investigate the roots of crucial questions, foremost among them the relation of war, conflict and armed violence to politics and the peaceful use of power.
This matter should have been given priority from the outset. For, as is the case with the question of the relationship between religion and the state, failure to solve it perpetuates society's anxieties and tensions, rendering it more vulnerable, making the public easy prey for the politicians' arts of toying with feelings for campaign purposes or personal fame or even to sabotage the wheels of progress and change. No one expressed the relationship between war and politics more succinctly than the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz who, in his famous military treatise On War, wrote that war was a continuation of politics by other means. He held that a tactical military victory is per force a temporary victory if it is not crowned by a more comprehensive political aim to make it a strategic victory, and that the achievement of a political end is the chief aim of war, which is only a means towards that end, for means cannot be isolated from their ends.
It follows that the purpose of war is to bend the will of the adversary, by military or political means, to the will of the other party. The notion is certainly not alien to Egyptian and Arab thought. But as familiar as Clausewitz may be in intellectual and military circles here, rarely has his concept of the relationship between war and politics been put into practice in treating such "core" Arab questions as the Arab-Israeli conflict. When it has it proved not only an attempt on the part of the intellectuals to evade probing the roots of the problem itself but also an evasion of the task of applying one's mind to translating theoretical principles into strategy. After all, war and violence or politics and diplomacy are not necessarily things to be glorified for their own sake; rather, they should be regarded as alternative ways to "engage" with the enemy in order to achieve strategic aims. But perhaps it is better to look at the matter another way. It is no longer possible to resolve international disputes solely through the use of military force. While some political or strategic aims can only be achieved through war, the display of might and exacting revenge are not aims that legitimise recourse to war. Hence, it is impossible to separate war from peace; they are two sides of the same coin, mutually complementary states.We can only explain the "decline in Egyptian patriotism" and the "negligence of the pious with respect to Jerusalem" in terms of the disgraceful negligence on the part of intellectuals with regard to such crucial issues as war and diplomacy, violence and peace, development and conflict. The Egyptian public should not be corralled into journalistic battles or media wars. They should not be tempted to chase "buffaloes" that have no bearing on what it takes to liberate occupied Arab territory. The history of the past half century testifies to how successful or not the Arabs have been in dealing — both peacefully and violently — with an Israeli adversary that is undeniably hostile and that has worked relentlessly against Egyptian and Arab strategic interests.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the premise was that the Arab-Israeli conflict was not about borders but an existential conflict. On the basis of this premise, the military instrument reigned as the critical factor between the two sides until the 1967 war, which ended in the defeat of the Arab armies and the Israeli occupation of Arab territories for years to come. The tables began to turn in 1970 with the arrival to power of Anwar El-Sadat, who set into motion a new phase of military preparations. However, preparing for an offensive war took considerable time and effort, especially since Egypt did not produce its own arms but relied almost exclusively on outside powers (the USSR, to be precise). Under such conditions, the procuring of arms was inevitably subordinated to political considerations between Egypt and its suppliers at a time when international and regional balances of power favoured Israel and when the Egyptian economy was in severe straits.
Egypt's aim in the 1973 War was not to eliminate Israel. Rather, it was to break the Israeli will to make war and propel them to the negotiating table. On another level, it aimed to destroy the myth of Israeli invincibility and persuade the Israelis that they would never be able to live in peace by relying on military force. President Sadat's stroke of genius to achieve this end was a "limited offensive war" that would entail crossing the Suez Canal, breaking through the Bar Lev line and occupying the eastern bank of the canal to a depth of 15 to 18 kilometres, and causing as much attrition and damage as possible to Israeli land and air forces. The scheme brought into play another well-conceived tactic, which was to keep Israeli forces mobilised for as long as possible. Israel's demographic structure meant that Israel had to keep 20 per cent of its population (about three million at the time) mobilised during wartime. Such a ratio is unsustainable for any long period of time because of the enormous economic attrition it wreaks. The longer the war lasted, the more Israel would feel compelled to ask for a ceasefire or call for the intervention of international forces.
This war thus proved the engine to liberate our land. It is useful to take a look at the goals of the October War as outlined in Sadat's letter of 5 October to the General Commander of Egyptian Forces, Ahmed Ismail. These aims were, first, to break the stagnation in the peace process; second, to cause the greatest amount of moral and material damage to the armed forces of the enemy; and, three, to liberate the Sinai in phases, as the capacities of Egyptian forces permit. We see the political dimension of the 6 October 1973 War again in Sadat's letter to US secretary of state Henry Kissinger on 7 October 1973 (conveyed via a secret channel arranged between Sadat's national security adviser, Hafez Ismail, and president Nixon in February 1973), which clarifies the Egyptian position on war and peace as follows:
Many Arabs and Egyptians have never read Clausewitz. Among those who have, few understood him, and among those who understood him, even fewer put his ideas into practice. Perhaps this is because this takes moral, mental and physical energy, when it is so much easier to point the finger of accusation at others. As a result the situation remains pending in the Golan, and in Palestine the sense of disappointment is greater than ever. It is not just an appreciation of the relationship between war and politics that has been lacking in recent days. The roots of other problems have been overlooked or skilfully concealed.
Mark says:
In comparing the Native Americans who encountered the European settlers to the Arabs of today in their encounters with Israel, Abdel-Moneim Said uses an old and, in many cases, largely discredited theory about some of the reasons for the success of the settlers over Native Americans. The tribes were not necessarily "divided, technologically backward, poor and superstitious by the standards of Western civilisation." One must start with the fact that as many as 90 percent of the inhabitants of the North, Central, and South Americas died from diseases brought by Europeans — primarily smallpox and influenza. For more on the extent and levels of civilization of the Native Americans prior to and after the European invasions, I would highly recommend starting with 1491: New Revelations of the Americas Before Columbus, by Charles C. Mann, and Guns Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, by Jared M. Diamond. Both books are, by the way, pleasures to read and mostly free of academese.
Be that as it may, Abdel-Moneim Said is trying to make a point about strategy versus tactics and what I would call the "attention deficit disorder" (ADD) that plagues much of the Arab world today in general, and Said's Egypt in particular. In view of his past publications, I'm sure he would have come up with another equally apt analogy as "chasing buffalos" to illustrate his points about many Arab and Egyptian intellectuals and normalization with Israel.
Said alludes to the fact that 30 years after Egypt and Israel signed their peace treaty there are still many Egyptians who have not come to terms with its reality. This goes beyond ADD and should be described by whatever psychological term you may choose for someone who cannot cope with reality.
At the same time — again, 30 years later — there are still some Israelis and some supporters of Israel who believe that Sadat's strategy of negotiations with Israel and signing the peace treaty was nothing more than just the first stage in the "strategy of stages" to get Israel to withdraw to the pre-Six Day War boundaries in preparation for the final and fatal assault on Israel. I'm sure that some or many, if not most of the Egyptians that Said analyzes in his article would wish that this were so — even as they have disparaged and condemned and cursed Sadat for signing the peace treaty with Israel.
The degrees and extent of these respective inabilities to come to terms with reality may differ between and among Egyptians and Israelis but the term fits for both.
Al-Ahram Weekly (Egypt)
8-14 October 2009
I am an American history buff and in the course of my readings I have been particularly drawn to attempts to explain why the Native Americans were defeated and confined to "reservations" by settlers hailing from Europe. One of the most commonly cited explanations holds that the American Indian tribes were divided, technologically backward, poor and superstitious by the standards of Western civilisation which had begun to bourgeon in the period following its discovery of the New World. However, I was particularly struck by another explanation which focussed on the military conduct of the tribes. According to this perspective, European settlers followed the military customs in practice in Europe, which entailed building forts and fortified camps from which they observed the hostile environment outside. The tribes, accustomed to open warfare, laid siege to these camps in the hope of forcing those inside to surrender out of fear or hunger. However, in those dull intervals of waiting, the besiegers would often catch sight of a passing herd of wild buffalo and break off the siege in order to chase after the precious quarry. These moments of relief, naturally, afforded those inside the camp the opportunity to bring in food and ammunition and to send out messages for help to other camps.
The moral here is crystal clear: departing from the original purpose, however tempting the lures, puts original goals at risk. I have frequently related this explanation of the defeat of Native Americans to my students and to those with whom I was working towards a common goal. Most recently I found myself repeating it to my colleagues in Al-Ahram who have been desperate to respond to certain political attacks which have often defied the rules of propriety and been gratuitously crude.
To me the goals have always been as clear as daylight. They are to restore Al-Ahram to its "natural" place in our country's intellectual, cultural and political sphere; to preserve the fiscal equilibrium which has been regained through many hard sacrifices; and to raise the performance of its employees to a standard commensurate with an eminent international institution. I was determined not to allow myself, or Al-Ahram, to be drawn into a media fray meant to give us a "break" from the "succession" issue by dredging up another no less familiar one — "normalisation" — with the purpose of settling old scores, obstructing the aspirations of Al-Ahram or racking up electoral campaign points. In all events, I have addressed the subject of "normalisation" innumerable times over the past three decades, in newspaper articles, on television programmes and in many public debates. Fortunately, the vast majority of my fellow "Ahramists" did not fall into the trap. They did not rush off to hunt buffaloes. In all my meetings with my colleagues we could focus on what was needed in order to achieve the goals enumerated above.
Nevertheless, during the recent clamour over normalisation I could not help but remark the sweeping nature in which some of my fellow journalists treated it. According to one commentator, the steps that have already been taken towards normalisation reflected a "backslide" in "Egyptian patriotism". Another lashed out against what he regarded as a flagrant contradiction between the current trend towards religiosity in Egyptian society and Egyptians' tendency to ignore a matter no less serious than normalisation, which is the relentless Judaisation of Jerusalem. What such statements have in common is that they take us to the brink of an insight without going further. They fail to continue along the path of philosophical and intellectual enquiry. They do not ask how and why this or that occurred, let alone probe grey areas in order to untangle the jumble of threads. In short, the clamour concealed the failure of our intellectual community to delve beneath the surface and investigate the roots of crucial questions, foremost among them the relation of war, conflict and armed violence to politics and the peaceful use of power.
This matter should have been given priority from the outset. For, as is the case with the question of the relationship between religion and the state, failure to solve it perpetuates society's anxieties and tensions, rendering it more vulnerable, making the public easy prey for the politicians' arts of toying with feelings for campaign purposes or personal fame or even to sabotage the wheels of progress and change. No one expressed the relationship between war and politics more succinctly than the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz who, in his famous military treatise On War, wrote that war was a continuation of politics by other means. He held that a tactical military victory is per force a temporary victory if it is not crowned by a more comprehensive political aim to make it a strategic victory, and that the achievement of a political end is the chief aim of war, which is only a means towards that end, for means cannot be isolated from their ends.
It follows that the purpose of war is to bend the will of the adversary, by military or political means, to the will of the other party. The notion is certainly not alien to Egyptian and Arab thought. But as familiar as Clausewitz may be in intellectual and military circles here, rarely has his concept of the relationship between war and politics been put into practice in treating such "core" Arab questions as the Arab-Israeli conflict. When it has it proved not only an attempt on the part of the intellectuals to evade probing the roots of the problem itself but also an evasion of the task of applying one's mind to translating theoretical principles into strategy. After all, war and violence or politics and diplomacy are not necessarily things to be glorified for their own sake; rather, they should be regarded as alternative ways to "engage" with the enemy in order to achieve strategic aims. But perhaps it is better to look at the matter another way. It is no longer possible to resolve international disputes solely through the use of military force. While some political or strategic aims can only be achieved through war, the display of might and exacting revenge are not aims that legitimise recourse to war. Hence, it is impossible to separate war from peace; they are two sides of the same coin, mutually complementary states.We can only explain the "decline in Egyptian patriotism" and the "negligence of the pious with respect to Jerusalem" in terms of the disgraceful negligence on the part of intellectuals with regard to such crucial issues as war and diplomacy, violence and peace, development and conflict. The Egyptian public should not be corralled into journalistic battles or media wars. They should not be tempted to chase "buffaloes" that have no bearing on what it takes to liberate occupied Arab territory. The history of the past half century testifies to how successful or not the Arabs have been in dealing — both peacefully and violently — with an Israeli adversary that is undeniably hostile and that has worked relentlessly against Egyptian and Arab strategic interests.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the premise was that the Arab-Israeli conflict was not about borders but an existential conflict. On the basis of this premise, the military instrument reigned as the critical factor between the two sides until the 1967 war, which ended in the defeat of the Arab armies and the Israeli occupation of Arab territories for years to come. The tables began to turn in 1970 with the arrival to power of Anwar El-Sadat, who set into motion a new phase of military preparations. However, preparing for an offensive war took considerable time and effort, especially since Egypt did not produce its own arms but relied almost exclusively on outside powers (the USSR, to be precise). Under such conditions, the procuring of arms was inevitably subordinated to political considerations between Egypt and its suppliers at a time when international and regional balances of power favoured Israel and when the Egyptian economy was in severe straits.
Egypt's aim in the 1973 War was not to eliminate Israel. Rather, it was to break the Israeli will to make war and propel them to the negotiating table. On another level, it aimed to destroy the myth of Israeli invincibility and persuade the Israelis that they would never be able to live in peace by relying on military force. President Sadat's stroke of genius to achieve this end was a "limited offensive war" that would entail crossing the Suez Canal, breaking through the Bar Lev line and occupying the eastern bank of the canal to a depth of 15 to 18 kilometres, and causing as much attrition and damage as possible to Israeli land and air forces. The scheme brought into play another well-conceived tactic, which was to keep Israeli forces mobilised for as long as possible. Israel's demographic structure meant that Israel had to keep 20 per cent of its population (about three million at the time) mobilised during wartime. Such a ratio is unsustainable for any long period of time because of the enormous economic attrition it wreaks. The longer the war lasted, the more Israel would feel compelled to ask for a ceasefire or call for the intervention of international forces.
This war thus proved the engine to liberate our land. It is useful to take a look at the goals of the October War as outlined in Sadat's letter of 5 October to the General Commander of Egyptian Forces, Ahmed Ismail. These aims were, first, to break the stagnation in the peace process; second, to cause the greatest amount of moral and material damage to the armed forces of the enemy; and, three, to liberate the Sinai in phases, as the capacities of Egyptian forces permit. We see the political dimension of the 6 October 1973 War again in Sadat's letter to US secretary of state Henry Kissinger on 7 October 1973 (conveyed via a secret channel arranged between Sadat's national security adviser, Hafez Ismail, and president Nixon in February 1973), which clarifies the Egyptian position on war and peace as follows:
- Egypt's chief aim is not to conclude partial settlements but to achieve peace in the Middle East.
- Egypt does not intend to deepen the engagement or expand the scope of confrontation. (This point came under heavy criticism when taken out of context from Sadat's original strategy!)
- Israel must withdraw from all occupied territories. When it does, Egypt will be willing to participate in a UN peace conference of any acceptable form, whether under the auspices of the secretary- general, the permanent members of the Security Council, or any other representative body.
- Egypt agrees to the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran and it accepts, as a guarantee, the presence of an international force for a limited period.
Sadat's purpose was to turn the Egyptian military achievement into the best possible political advantages that Egypt could gain under a military situation characterised by parity. After the war, there followed the talks at the 101st kilometre line, the first disengagement treaty of January 1974, and the second disengagement treaty of September 1975. In retrospect Sadat's decision to travel to Jerusalem should surprise only as a daring application of Clausewitz's principle regarding the complementariness of military and political means of engagement. On 9 November 1977 Sadat declared before the People's Assembly, "I am ready to go to the ends of the earth in quest of a just peace... Indeed, I am even prepared to go to the Israeli Knesset, because we do not fear peace, nor do we fear confrontation with Israel."
As a consequence of this decision Egypt was plunged into another battle no less ferocious than the October war, even if it differed in quality. This was the battle for peace. Sadat's visit to Jerusalem put paid, before the eyes of the entire world, to the notion that Israel is surrounded by people bent on its annihilation. In the course of a few hours Sadat brought down the powerful propaganda wall that Israel had erected over three decades. Then he followed through with intensive efforts that, over the following years, brought the peace treaty with Israel on 26 March 1979, the liberation of the whole of the Sinai in 1982 and the return of Taba through international arbitration in 1989.Many Arabs and Egyptians have never read Clausewitz. Among those who have, few understood him, and among those who understood him, even fewer put his ideas into practice. Perhaps this is because this takes moral, mental and physical energy, when it is so much easier to point the finger of accusation at others. As a result the situation remains pending in the Golan, and in Palestine the sense of disappointment is greater than ever. It is not just an appreciation of the relationship between war and politics that has been lacking in recent days. The roots of other problems have been overlooked or skilfully concealed.
Mark says:
In comparing the Native Americans who encountered the European settlers to the Arabs of today in their encounters with Israel, Abdel-Moneim Said uses an old and, in many cases, largely discredited theory about some of the reasons for the success of the settlers over Native Americans. The tribes were not necessarily "divided, technologically backward, poor and superstitious by the standards of Western civilisation." One must start with the fact that as many as 90 percent of the inhabitants of the North, Central, and South Americas died from diseases brought by Europeans — primarily smallpox and influenza. For more on the extent and levels of civilization of the Native Americans prior to and after the European invasions, I would highly recommend starting with 1491: New Revelations of the Americas Before Columbus, by Charles C. Mann, and Guns Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, by Jared M. Diamond. Both books are, by the way, pleasures to read and mostly free of academese.
Be that as it may, Abdel-Moneim Said is trying to make a point about strategy versus tactics and what I would call the "attention deficit disorder" (ADD) that plagues much of the Arab world today in general, and Said's Egypt in particular. In view of his past publications, I'm sure he would have come up with another equally apt analogy as "chasing buffalos" to illustrate his points about many Arab and Egyptian intellectuals and normalization with Israel.
Said alludes to the fact that 30 years after Egypt and Israel signed their peace treaty there are still many Egyptians who have not come to terms with its reality. This goes beyond ADD and should be described by whatever psychological term you may choose for someone who cannot cope with reality.
At the same time — again, 30 years later — there are still some Israelis and some supporters of Israel who believe that Sadat's strategy of negotiations with Israel and signing the peace treaty was nothing more than just the first stage in the "strategy of stages" to get Israel to withdraw to the pre-Six Day War boundaries in preparation for the final and fatal assault on Israel. I'm sure that some or many, if not most of the Egyptians that Said analyzes in his article would wish that this were so — even as they have disparaged and condemned and cursed Sadat for signing the peace treaty with Israel.
The degrees and extent of these respective inabilities to come to terms with reality may differ between and among Egyptians and Israelis but the term fits for both.
Saturday, September 5, 2009
The Region: Let's pretend we're making peace
By Barry Rubin
The Jerusalem Post
August 30, 2009
Here is one of my favorite stories explaining how the Middle East works as told by the famed Egyptian journalist Muhammad Hussanein Heikal. Like all of Heikal's stories, it may or may not be true, which is also part of the lesson being taught.
When Muammar Gaddafi first became Libya's ruler, Heikal was dispatched to meet and evaluate him by Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. After returning to Cairo, Heikal was quickly ushered into the president's office.
"Well," said Nasser, "what do you think of Gaddafi?"
"He's a disaster! A catastrophe!"
"Why," asked the president, "is he against us?"
"Oh no, far worse than that," Heikal claims to have replied, "he's for us and he really believes all the stuff we are saying!"
The point was that the Egyptian regime took the propaganda line out of self-interest that all Arabs should be united into one state under its leadership, all the Arab monarchies overthrown, Israel wiped off the map immediately and Western influence expelled, but it knew itself incapable of achieving these goals and to try to do so would bring disaster. Indeed, when Nasser had tried to implement part of this program in 1967, he provoked Israel into attacking and suffered his worst nightmare.
Come to think of it, Arab regimes are still playing this game of systematically purveying radicalism, hatred and unachievable goals to distract their populace, excuse their own failings, focus antagonism against foreign scapegoats and seek regional ambitions.
Western governments do this kind of thing a bit differently.
In this regard, recent statements by a number of leaders including US President Barack Obama, prime ministers Gordon Brown and Binyamin Netanyahu and others establish an important principle: Actually achieving Middle East peace is of no importance. The only thing that is important is saying that progress is being made and that peace will come soon.
I don't mean that as a statement of cynicism, but as an accurate analysis of what goes on in international affairs at present. What's achieved by pretending there is progress and success is imminent? Some very real and — in their way — important things:
THE FREEZE on settlement construction, as another example, is a scam. If Israel gives something on this issue, the Western governments declare victory and go home, so to speak. That doesn't mean there aren't reasons for not doing so, but the virtually open cynicism of the US and European strategy is striking.
When the US president portrays the possibility of two tiny states, Oman and Qatar, letting one-man Israeli trade offices reopen as a major triumph in confidence-building, despite being his sole achievement after months of top-level diplomacy, what can one do but snicker?
Finally, since Israeli-Palestinian peace is not within reach, pretending it is while knowing the truth is not such a bad alternative. It is certainly progress, since the Obama administration came into office and originally pursued a policy based on the idea that it could achieve peace in a matter of months.
What is the downside here?
There are three problems. The first is if Western leaders believe their own propaganda. Because if peace is "within reach" but isn't actually grasped, then someone must be blamed. That someone will, of course, be Israel.
Why? Because if the West blames the Palestinians, leaders presume that Arabs and Muslims will be angry and not cooperate on other matters. There could be more terrorism and fewer profitable deals and investments. They gain nothing.
But if they insist that everything is going well, there is no need to blame anyone. This is the phase we are now entering.
The second problem, however, is that neither the Palestinians nor Arab regimes will join in the optimism. Their line is: The Palestinians are suffering! The situation is intolerable! Something must be done! And since we will make no concessions or compromises, the only solution is for the West to pressure Israel to give more and more while getting nothing in return.
Since this is not going to happen if Israel resists, they fall back on their alternative approach: Okay, so since you aren't forcing Israel to give us what we want, you have to give us other things, like money, and you cannot demand we help you.
The best outcome is that certain Arab states, with other interests at stake, will downplay the conflict altogether and focus on more pragmatic needs. The radicals — principally Iran and Syria — will never do so and will claim that the situation shows how the West cannot be trusted and must be defeated.
What's the third problem? Actions that might actually promote regional stability, or even Arab-Israeli peace, are not taken. These include two especially important tactics:
The Jerusalem Post
August 30, 2009
Here is one of my favorite stories explaining how the Middle East works as told by the famed Egyptian journalist Muhammad Hussanein Heikal. Like all of Heikal's stories, it may or may not be true, which is also part of the lesson being taught.
When Muammar Gaddafi first became Libya's ruler, Heikal was dispatched to meet and evaluate him by Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. After returning to Cairo, Heikal was quickly ushered into the president's office.
"Well," said Nasser, "what do you think of Gaddafi?"
"He's a disaster! A catastrophe!"
"Why," asked the president, "is he against us?"
"Oh no, far worse than that," Heikal claims to have replied, "he's for us and he really believes all the stuff we are saying!"
The point was that the Egyptian regime took the propaganda line out of self-interest that all Arabs should be united into one state under its leadership, all the Arab monarchies overthrown, Israel wiped off the map immediately and Western influence expelled, but it knew itself incapable of achieving these goals and to try to do so would bring disaster. Indeed, when Nasser had tried to implement part of this program in 1967, he provoked Israel into attacking and suffered his worst nightmare.
Come to think of it, Arab regimes are still playing this game of systematically purveying radicalism, hatred and unachievable goals to distract their populace, excuse their own failings, focus antagonism against foreign scapegoats and seek regional ambitions.
Western governments do this kind of thing a bit differently.
In this regard, recent statements by a number of leaders including US President Barack Obama, prime ministers Gordon Brown and Binyamin Netanyahu and others establish an important principle: Actually achieving Middle East peace is of no importance. The only thing that is important is saying that progress is being made and that peace will come soon.
I don't mean that as a statement of cynicism, but as an accurate analysis of what goes on in international affairs at present. What's achieved by pretending there is progress and success is imminent? Some very real and — in their way — important things:
- World leaders are saying that they are doing a great job, doing the right things, remaining active and achieving success.
- By saying peace is near, the situation is defused. Why fight if you are about to make a deal?
- Israel (and anyone else from the region who joins in) shows that it is cooperating, so others should be patient and not apply pressure.
- Since the West is taking care of business, Arab states will supposedly feel comfortable working with it on other issues, like Iran for example.
THE FREEZE on settlement construction, as another example, is a scam. If Israel gives something on this issue, the Western governments declare victory and go home, so to speak. That doesn't mean there aren't reasons for not doing so, but the virtually open cynicism of the US and European strategy is striking.
When the US president portrays the possibility of two tiny states, Oman and Qatar, letting one-man Israeli trade offices reopen as a major triumph in confidence-building, despite being his sole achievement after months of top-level diplomacy, what can one do but snicker?
Finally, since Israeli-Palestinian peace is not within reach, pretending it is while knowing the truth is not such a bad alternative. It is certainly progress, since the Obama administration came into office and originally pursued a policy based on the idea that it could achieve peace in a matter of months.
What is the downside here?
There are three problems. The first is if Western leaders believe their own propaganda. Because if peace is "within reach" but isn't actually grasped, then someone must be blamed. That someone will, of course, be Israel.
Why? Because if the West blames the Palestinians, leaders presume that Arabs and Muslims will be angry and not cooperate on other matters. There could be more terrorism and fewer profitable deals and investments. They gain nothing.
But if they insist that everything is going well, there is no need to blame anyone. This is the phase we are now entering.
The second problem, however, is that neither the Palestinians nor Arab regimes will join in the optimism. Their line is: The Palestinians are suffering! The situation is intolerable! Something must be done! And since we will make no concessions or compromises, the only solution is for the West to pressure Israel to give more and more while getting nothing in return.
Since this is not going to happen if Israel resists, they fall back on their alternative approach: Okay, so since you aren't forcing Israel to give us what we want, you have to give us other things, like money, and you cannot demand we help you.
The best outcome is that certain Arab states, with other interests at stake, will downplay the conflict altogether and focus on more pragmatic needs. The radicals — principally Iran and Syria — will never do so and will claim that the situation shows how the West cannot be trusted and must be defeated.
What's the third problem? Actions that might actually promote regional stability, or even Arab-Israeli peace, are not taken. These include two especially important tactics:
- More energetic efforts to overthrow the Hamas regime in the Gaza Strip. As long as Hamas is running half the Palestinian territories and outflanking Fatah in militancy, there won't be peace. Keeping Hamas from taking over the West Bank, isolating it and maintaining sanctions against it is a good policy and can preserve the status quo. It is not, however, the best policy and the pressure on Hamas could erode over time.
- More pressure on the Palestinian Authority to moderate and compromise. The PA and its positions are the main barriers to peace. As the PA possibly becomes more radical, the likelihood of violence increases. Thus, while in the short-to-medium run the "feel good" and status quo policy may work, it also has risks and limits.
Tuesday, August 18, 2009
The Arab future: conspiracy vs reality
A legal conflict between the daughters of former Egyptian presidents is a sad commentary on the condition of the Arab world
By Hazem Saghieh
openDemocracy
August 12, 2009
The predicament of the Arab world is exposed in unexpected ways. Consider the following passage, part of a lengthy news-item in the 28 July 2009 edition of the London-based Palestinian daily newspaper Al-Quds al-Arabi:
"The judgment-enforcement services visited Dr. Hoda Abdel Nasser's apartment in the new Egyptian suburbs in order to seize her assets and furniture, in execution of a court judgment in favor of Ruqaya Sadat, daughter of late president Anwar Sadat. The south Cairo court had ordered [the daughter of Sadat's predecessor as Egypt's president, Gamal Abdel Nasser] to pay a 150,000 Egyptian-pound indemnity to Ruqaya, whom she had accused of tainting her father's image after she had accused him of masterminding a plan to kill Gamal Abdel Nasser."
Hoda Abdel Nasser, the paper continued, had in 2008 lost a court case after describing Ruqaya Sadat as "the killer of my father" because he is "an American agent, and American newspapers have said this."
The main characters in this drama are not ordinary ones: the daughter of Nasser, who ruled Egypt for eighteen years (July 1952-June 1970), and the daughter of Sadat, who ruled it for eleven years (June 1970-October 1981) — and the link between them nothing less than a murder accusation! It is obvious that there is enough material here to produce a long and entertaining soap opera.
The plot is irresistible, and rewrites Egypt's modern history. The myth that Sadat was Nasser's loyal companion, his vice-president, speaker of parliament and heir is at last exploded. Rather, he is an anti-Nasser plotter; and since he killed him politically (by turning away from his policies) couldn't he also be his biological killer, and in the pay of the CIA?
The mix of farce and bathos here is accentuated by the story's timing: days after the commemoration of the "July 23 revolution," referring to the moment in 1952 when the young Nasser and his "free officer" colleagues seized power and changed Egypt for ever. The memory of this "revolution" is today so emptied of all meaning that the Israeli president Shimon Peres and his prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu could celebrate it in the Egyptian ambassador's house in Tel Aviv. Indeed, the daughters’ dispute is all that this year has had to energise the occasion and refill its void with content.
But this content gives no ground for celebration. For what is on display here is only an exaggerated form of the conspiracy theories that are reaching unprecedented levels in Egypt and the Arab world. The leading Palestinian politician Farouk Qaddumi has accused the Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas of killing Abbas's own predecessor Yasser Arafat. It is surely time to ask: can the "natural" death of any Arab leader be taken as a fact? Is it possible for an Arab leader to die without being murdered?
The shared feature of the "murder victims," Nasser and Arafat is that these very different political figures represent a way of thinking and behaving that is now dead. Since admitting its death is hard, a resort to conspiracy theories becomes for those who seek to "keep them alive" an urgent duty and necessary outlet.
The alternative, after all, is hard. It would require the parties involved to discard conspiracies and summon the courage to face the death of the political current that prevailed between the mid-1950s and the early 1970s, known as the Arab national-liberation movement.
The evidence, from the Maghreb to the Mashreq, is plain. The Algerian revolution, the jewel of this movement, produced a regime that incubated a civil war costing around 200,000 deaths. The Yemeni revolutions of north and south were followed by military coups, mutinies, and assassinations; the dream of "unity" between the two states has for many Yemenis turned into a nightmare. The Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi marries pan-Arabism one day only to divorce it the next. Sudan has been transformed from the time of Ja'afar Nimeiri (who initiated his regime by liquidating Sudan's Communist Party) into a state ruled by Islamists responsible for the Darfur genocide.
The Ba'ath party itself, crucible of the Arab nationalism mission and of the drive to unit the "eternal Arab nation," split into two groups centred on Damascus and Baghdad; each then gave birth to further rival claimants. Before and since Saddam Hussein's demise, the record of the Ba'athists in power in both capitals was characterised by voices of family betrayal, siblings at war, sons and daughters exchanging shrill accusations of violating the scared cause. The circle here loops back to the daughters of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat — the repetition of history, but "the second time as farce."
This spectacle, the death of an entire project, does not need conspiracies to grasp it. It only requires the tracing of the adventurous journey of the corpse, including Ayatollah Khomeini's attempt to inherit it in 1979 and George W. Bush's very different effort to appropriate it in 2003.
Now, the decomposition is well advanced. To evade it, to prefer conspiracy to reality, is to allow the putrefaction to grow. Arabs can't keep quiet much longer. Hoda and Ruqaya are the latest to disclose our family secret.
Hazem Saghieh is senior commentator for the London-based paper Al-Hayat.
By Hazem Saghieh
openDemocracy
August 12, 2009
The predicament of the Arab world is exposed in unexpected ways. Consider the following passage, part of a lengthy news-item in the 28 July 2009 edition of the London-based Palestinian daily newspaper Al-Quds al-Arabi:
"The judgment-enforcement services visited Dr. Hoda Abdel Nasser's apartment in the new Egyptian suburbs in order to seize her assets and furniture, in execution of a court judgment in favor of Ruqaya Sadat, daughter of late president Anwar Sadat. The south Cairo court had ordered [the daughter of Sadat's predecessor as Egypt's president, Gamal Abdel Nasser] to pay a 150,000 Egyptian-pound indemnity to Ruqaya, whom she had accused of tainting her father's image after she had accused him of masterminding a plan to kill Gamal Abdel Nasser."
Hoda Abdel Nasser, the paper continued, had in 2008 lost a court case after describing Ruqaya Sadat as "the killer of my father" because he is "an American agent, and American newspapers have said this."
The main characters in this drama are not ordinary ones: the daughter of Nasser, who ruled Egypt for eighteen years (July 1952-June 1970), and the daughter of Sadat, who ruled it for eleven years (June 1970-October 1981) — and the link between them nothing less than a murder accusation! It is obvious that there is enough material here to produce a long and entertaining soap opera.
The plot is irresistible, and rewrites Egypt's modern history. The myth that Sadat was Nasser's loyal companion, his vice-president, speaker of parliament and heir is at last exploded. Rather, he is an anti-Nasser plotter; and since he killed him politically (by turning away from his policies) couldn't he also be his biological killer, and in the pay of the CIA?
The mix of farce and bathos here is accentuated by the story's timing: days after the commemoration of the "July 23 revolution," referring to the moment in 1952 when the young Nasser and his "free officer" colleagues seized power and changed Egypt for ever. The memory of this "revolution" is today so emptied of all meaning that the Israeli president Shimon Peres and his prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu could celebrate it in the Egyptian ambassador's house in Tel Aviv. Indeed, the daughters’ dispute is all that this year has had to energise the occasion and refill its void with content.
But this content gives no ground for celebration. For what is on display here is only an exaggerated form of the conspiracy theories that are reaching unprecedented levels in Egypt and the Arab world. The leading Palestinian politician Farouk Qaddumi has accused the Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas of killing Abbas's own predecessor Yasser Arafat. It is surely time to ask: can the "natural" death of any Arab leader be taken as a fact? Is it possible for an Arab leader to die without being murdered?
The shared feature of the "murder victims," Nasser and Arafat is that these very different political figures represent a way of thinking and behaving that is now dead. Since admitting its death is hard, a resort to conspiracy theories becomes for those who seek to "keep them alive" an urgent duty and necessary outlet.
The alternative, after all, is hard. It would require the parties involved to discard conspiracies and summon the courage to face the death of the political current that prevailed between the mid-1950s and the early 1970s, known as the Arab national-liberation movement.
The evidence, from the Maghreb to the Mashreq, is plain. The Algerian revolution, the jewel of this movement, produced a regime that incubated a civil war costing around 200,000 deaths. The Yemeni revolutions of north and south were followed by military coups, mutinies, and assassinations; the dream of "unity" between the two states has for many Yemenis turned into a nightmare. The Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi marries pan-Arabism one day only to divorce it the next. Sudan has been transformed from the time of Ja'afar Nimeiri (who initiated his regime by liquidating Sudan's Communist Party) into a state ruled by Islamists responsible for the Darfur genocide.
The Ba'ath party itself, crucible of the Arab nationalism mission and of the drive to unit the "eternal Arab nation," split into two groups centred on Damascus and Baghdad; each then gave birth to further rival claimants. Before and since Saddam Hussein's demise, the record of the Ba'athists in power in both capitals was characterised by voices of family betrayal, siblings at war, sons and daughters exchanging shrill accusations of violating the scared cause. The circle here loops back to the daughters of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat — the repetition of history, but "the second time as farce."
This spectacle, the death of an entire project, does not need conspiracies to grasp it. It only requires the tracing of the adventurous journey of the corpse, including Ayatollah Khomeini's attempt to inherit it in 1979 and George W. Bush's very different effort to appropriate it in 2003.
Now, the decomposition is well advanced. To evade it, to prefer conspiracy to reality, is to allow the putrefaction to grow. Arabs can't keep quiet much longer. Hoda and Ruqaya are the latest to disclose our family secret.
Hazem Saghieh is senior commentator for the London-based paper Al-Hayat.
Monday, August 17, 2009
Ask Mustafa Khalil
By Shimon Shamir
Ha'aretz (Israel)
August 17, 2009
In Israeli political discourse, the demand that the Arabs, and especially the Palestinians, recognize Israel as a Jewish state or as the state of the Jewish people has been heard more and more recently. The demand is being presented as an ultimatum, ruling out peace agreements with Arabs who reject it. It is a problematic demand.
Defining Israel as Jewish is an ideological decision and a matter for the country's citizens alone to make. In international relations, recognition of states is based on criteria such as sovereignty, independence and control of territory. A state's ideological definition of itself is not a matter for consideration by other countries as long as it doesn't represent an aggressive threat.
It is not our concern, for example, if Egypt defines itself as Islamic, Arab, African or pharaonic. We recognize Egypt as a political entity, but its ideological character is determined only by Egypt's political community. Countries are recognized by other countries without regard to whether they are communist or capitalist, or whether they are national or multinational in character.
Israel made peace with Egypt and Jordan without demanding recognition of the state's Jewish character. There was no opportunity nor was it reasonable to extract such a demand from them. I recall that after the peace treaty with Egypt was signed, Egyptian minister Boutros Boutros-Ghali and prime minister Mustafa Khalil came to Tel Aviv University in 1980 to speak with the faculty about relations in the wake of the signing. Khalil said emotionally: "We want relations of friendship and peace with Israel, but I must say in all candor that when we speak about the Jews, we never conceive [of them] as a national entity. Of course, for you in Israel and in the Zionist movement, there is a different outlook, but that is our viewpoint in Egypt, and I must present it to you honestly." Khalil was a devoted supporter of peace with Israel.
The demand for recognition of the state's Jewishness serves two purposes. On the conceptual level, it provides a lifeline for those who have always argued that the Arabs are not willing to make peace, even though they now face an Arab leadership that expresses consent in principle for peace with Israel. The Arab peace initiative, which proposes normal relations and an end of the conflict and makes Palestinian refugees' right of return subject to Israel's consent, is especially disturbing to people of this school of thought. All of this is in return for steps by Israel, most of them no different from those required, for example, by the Americans. Therefore, imposing an additional "test" supports Arab rejectionist reasoning.
On the functional level, the demand eases pressure to renew negotiations, particularly after the Israeli government was dragged into recognizing the principle of two states subject to a condition the Palestinians clearly cannot accept. Acceptance of the condition would require the Palestinians to convert their national narrative to a Zionist narrative, which much of the world community also does not accept - as opposed to recognizing Israel as an existing state. Our existence does not depend on what they say.
The state's definition has ramifications on subjects such as the Law of Return for Jews and the right of return for Palestinians and relations between the majority and the Arab minority, as well as the state's language and culture. These, however, are practical problems, some of which should be solved through political negotiations or decision making within the Israeli political process.
The Palestinians fell into the trap that those who demanded recognition of a Jewish state had set for them. Instead of responding that it is not their concern how the Israelis define their state (as Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad recently suggested), they coalesced around a position explicitly rejecting the existence of a Jewish state, which is not their right. Their adamant response has created an obstacle to peace that is the counterpart to the demand for recognizing the state as Jewish.
Ha'aretz (Israel)
August 17, 2009
In Israeli political discourse, the demand that the Arabs, and especially the Palestinians, recognize Israel as a Jewish state or as the state of the Jewish people has been heard more and more recently. The demand is being presented as an ultimatum, ruling out peace agreements with Arabs who reject it. It is a problematic demand.
Defining Israel as Jewish is an ideological decision and a matter for the country's citizens alone to make. In international relations, recognition of states is based on criteria such as sovereignty, independence and control of territory. A state's ideological definition of itself is not a matter for consideration by other countries as long as it doesn't represent an aggressive threat.
It is not our concern, for example, if Egypt defines itself as Islamic, Arab, African or pharaonic. We recognize Egypt as a political entity, but its ideological character is determined only by Egypt's political community. Countries are recognized by other countries without regard to whether they are communist or capitalist, or whether they are national or multinational in character.
Israel made peace with Egypt and Jordan without demanding recognition of the state's Jewish character. There was no opportunity nor was it reasonable to extract such a demand from them. I recall that after the peace treaty with Egypt was signed, Egyptian minister Boutros Boutros-Ghali and prime minister Mustafa Khalil came to Tel Aviv University in 1980 to speak with the faculty about relations in the wake of the signing. Khalil said emotionally: "We want relations of friendship and peace with Israel, but I must say in all candor that when we speak about the Jews, we never conceive [of them] as a national entity. Of course, for you in Israel and in the Zionist movement, there is a different outlook, but that is our viewpoint in Egypt, and I must present it to you honestly." Khalil was a devoted supporter of peace with Israel.
The demand for recognition of the state's Jewishness serves two purposes. On the conceptual level, it provides a lifeline for those who have always argued that the Arabs are not willing to make peace, even though they now face an Arab leadership that expresses consent in principle for peace with Israel. The Arab peace initiative, which proposes normal relations and an end of the conflict and makes Palestinian refugees' right of return subject to Israel's consent, is especially disturbing to people of this school of thought. All of this is in return for steps by Israel, most of them no different from those required, for example, by the Americans. Therefore, imposing an additional "test" supports Arab rejectionist reasoning.
On the functional level, the demand eases pressure to renew negotiations, particularly after the Israeli government was dragged into recognizing the principle of two states subject to a condition the Palestinians clearly cannot accept. Acceptance of the condition would require the Palestinians to convert their national narrative to a Zionist narrative, which much of the world community also does not accept - as opposed to recognizing Israel as an existing state. Our existence does not depend on what they say.
The state's definition has ramifications on subjects such as the Law of Return for Jews and the right of return for Palestinians and relations between the majority and the Arab minority, as well as the state's language and culture. These, however, are practical problems, some of which should be solved through political negotiations or decision making within the Israeli political process.
The Palestinians fell into the trap that those who demanded recognition of a Jewish state had set for them. Instead of responding that it is not their concern how the Israelis define their state (as Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad recently suggested), they coalesced around a position explicitly rejecting the existence of a Jewish state, which is not their right. Their adamant response has created an obstacle to peace that is the counterpart to the demand for recognizing the state as Jewish.
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