By Hussein Ibish
The Daily Star (Lebanon)
September 8, 2009
On college campuses in the United States and the United Kingdom, and increasingly among grassroots activists in the West generally, the cause of ending the Israeli occupation and securing independence for a Palestinian state is being abandoned in favor of a much more far-reaching goal of replacing Israel with a single, democratic state for all Israelis and Palestinians, including all of the refugees. Until now, this rhetoric has been largely unchallenged from a pro-Palestinian perspective, which has probably been a significant factor in its appeal.
My new book, “What’s Wrong with the One-State Agenda?”, traces the development of this agenda and interrogates its assumptions and claims.
The outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000, which inflicted profound suffering and created deep ill-will on both the sides of the Palestinian-Israeli divide, bolstered stridently nationalist perspectives among Israelis and Palestinians. For many, it prompted a negative re-evaluation of what kind of peace was possible and desirable.
In Israel, this was manifested in the collapse of the “peace camp,” a radical shift to the political right and the election of Ariel Sharon, who became prime minister. Among the Palestinians, Islamists, especially Hamas, gained significant ground. In the Palestinian diaspora, where support for Hamas is limited and, especially in the United States, politically untenable and even legally risky, this same disillusionment and radicalization was largely expressed through the rise of the one-state agenda.
More generally, the one-state agenda reflects the conclusion that Israel will never agree to seriously end the occupation and allow for the creation of a fully sovereign, viable Palestinian state, therefore that negotiations and diplomacy are pointless. At the end of Part One of my book I pose a series of pointed questions that are not usually addressed to, or have been insufficiently answered by, one-state advocates, and that in many cases their sympathizers have not adequately considered. Here are the six of them:
First, if Israel will not agree to end the occupation, what makes anyone think that it will possibly agree to dissolve itself? If Israel cannot be compelled or convinced to surrender 22 percent of the territory it holds, how can it be compelled or convinced to surrender or share 100 percent of it?
Second, what, as a practical matter, does this vision of a single, democratic state offer to Jewish Israelis?
Third, what efforts have Palestinian and pro-Palestinian one-state advocates made in reaching out to mainstream Jews and Israelis and to incorporating their national narrative into this vision?
Fourth, how do one-state advocates propose to supersede or transcend Palestinian national identity and ambitions? Why is it that no significant Palestinian political party or faction has adopted the one-state goal?
Fifth, how, apart from empty slogans about largely nonexistent and highly implausible boycotts, do one-state advocates propose to realize or advance their vision? What practical steps do they imagine and what is their road map for success?
And sixth, since they reject both Palestinian independence and the ongoing agenda of infrastructural and institutional development presently defining the strategy of what they consider the “quisling” Palestinian Authority, what do one-state advocates, as a practical matter, offer those living under occupation other than expressions of solidarity and interminable decades of continued struggle and suffering?
It is striking that the most ardent and tenacious one-state advocates seem to be taking a great deal of their time in even starting to formulate answers to these questions. Assad AbuKhalil, who comments on anything and everything on his blog, has remained strangely silent. Ali Abunimah, who is surely the most ardent and prolific one-state proponent in the United States, and who also runs a well-read blog, also appears at a loss for words. Even the overgrown juvenile delinquents at the Kabobfest blog, who have exhibited signs of suffering from a cybersphere version of Tourette’s syndrome, are also strangely passing up what would seem to be a golden opportunity to repeat their usual accusations about “traitors” and “collaborators.”
I have no doubt that sooner or later a response, and hopefully a calm and thoughtful one, will be forthcoming from some of the committed one-state advocates. But the amount of time it is taking for them to offer any sort of answer to these extremely relevant questions suggests, perhaps, that they are proving difficult to formulate and quite possibly were not anticipated.
But there surely must be a considerable burden of proof on those proposing that the Palestinian national movement abandon its long-standing goal of ending the occupation, which is based on a huge body of international law and reflects a regional and international consensus, in favor of a grand experiment in almost entirely uncharted waters that poses significant risks and offers uncertain benefits. One-state proponents have an obligation to explain how exactly they think they can achieve the extraordinary task of compelling or convincing Israel to effectively dissolve itself.
Unless it offers answers to simple, clear and obvious questions such as these, the one-state rhetoric will be an agenda for accomplishing very little if anything. Rather it will merely be a convenient vehicle for rejecting any and all things Israeli and adopting a position of uncompromising confrontation.
This is not an abstract intellectual exercise. Those seeking to liberate the Palestinian people cannot allow themselves to be beguiled by the narcissistic thrill of “winning” an academic debate on campuses while contributing nothing, even doing harm, to the causes of peace and Palestine.
Hussein Ibish is a senior fellow at the American Task Force on Palestine in Washington, DC. His book is available for free download or purchase on the website of the American Task Force on Palestine (americantaskforce.org). He wrote this commentary for The Daily Star.
Showing posts with label nationalism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label nationalism. Show all posts
Monday, September 7, 2009
Thursday, August 20, 2009
The Palestinian position is important
By Shlomo Avineri
Ha'aretz (Israel)
August 20, 2009
Prof. Shimon Shamir is right ("Ask Mustafa Khalil," August 17) [see below] in stating that, "It is not our concern if Egypt defines itself as Islamic, Arab, African or pharaonic. We recognize Egypt as a political entity..." Based on this premise, Shamir makes the case that we are not to demand that the Palestinians recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people. Yet the analogy is not valid for a number of reasons.
First, Israel has never called into question the existence of the Egyptian political entity. On the other hand, the Palestinians, through their rejection of the UN Partition Plan, refused to recognize the Jewish state and embarked on a war to destroy it. This is, after all, the root of the conflict. Indeed, the Palestinian narrative is based on the rejection of the existence of a Jewish nation state in any part of the territory they call Palestine.
If you declared war against the Jewish state, does not the signing of a peace treaty with that state obligate you to accept it? This does not mean the Palestinians are asked to accept the Zionist narrative, but it is incumbent upon them to alter their narrative, which rules out the existence of a Jewish state.
This is exactly what Israel did at Camp David and Oslo. Under the terms of binding international agreements, Israel has committed itself to recognizing "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab nation." Menachem Begin was the first to do this. For many Zionists, and not just those who were schooled in the ideological camp of Herut, this was difficult. In contrast to what is thought in extreme rightist circles, this is not tantamount to relinquishing the Zionist narrative, it is a willingness to accept the legitimacy of a competing narrative and to seek a compromise.
We only ask of the Palestinians that which we ourselves have done in the past.
As foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, who supported the principle of two nation states for two peoples, always mentioned that this entailed Palestinian recognition of Israel as a state of the Jewish people. Benjamin Netanyahu is not the first to broach the idea. It remains uncertain whether he acted wisely in the manner he gave the issue such prominence, but what shocked many Israelis — not just Likud members — was the blunt and vulgar response given by official Palestinian spokespeople.
In their ferociously negative response, Shamir claims that the Palestinians "fell into the trap that those who demanded recognition of a Jewish state had set for them." Yet apparently there was no fall into any rhetorical trap. Rather, this was an expression of a deep, internal ideological truth that to this day refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the Jewish people's right to self-determination. Because as far as the Palestinians are concerned, the Jews are not a nation, but rather a religious-ethnic group.
Yet the Palestinians must understand that just as Golda Meir claimed that "there is no Palestinian people," the same response applies to their view of the Jewish people. If they define themselves as a nation, then they are a nation.
Shamir is correct in stating that "our existence does not depend on what they say." But their opinion and their position are important. Peace is made between enemies. The Palestinians fought the Jewish state, and if they truly and sincerely wish to forge peace, they must be willing to come to terms with the Jewish state, and to do so explicitly, without stuttering.
Obviously this is not simple, but neither the Partition Plan nor the acceptance of the principle of two states for two peoples is a simple matter for many Jews and Zionists. But this is what is urgently needed.
Ha'aretz (Israel)
August 20, 2009
Prof. Shimon Shamir is right ("Ask Mustafa Khalil," August 17) [see below] in stating that, "It is not our concern if Egypt defines itself as Islamic, Arab, African or pharaonic. We recognize Egypt as a political entity..." Based on this premise, Shamir makes the case that we are not to demand that the Palestinians recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people. Yet the analogy is not valid for a number of reasons.
First, Israel has never called into question the existence of the Egyptian political entity. On the other hand, the Palestinians, through their rejection of the UN Partition Plan, refused to recognize the Jewish state and embarked on a war to destroy it. This is, after all, the root of the conflict. Indeed, the Palestinian narrative is based on the rejection of the existence of a Jewish nation state in any part of the territory they call Palestine.
If you declared war against the Jewish state, does not the signing of a peace treaty with that state obligate you to accept it? This does not mean the Palestinians are asked to accept the Zionist narrative, but it is incumbent upon them to alter their narrative, which rules out the existence of a Jewish state.
This is exactly what Israel did at Camp David and Oslo. Under the terms of binding international agreements, Israel has committed itself to recognizing "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab nation." Menachem Begin was the first to do this. For many Zionists, and not just those who were schooled in the ideological camp of Herut, this was difficult. In contrast to what is thought in extreme rightist circles, this is not tantamount to relinquishing the Zionist narrative, it is a willingness to accept the legitimacy of a competing narrative and to seek a compromise.
We only ask of the Palestinians that which we ourselves have done in the past.
As foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, who supported the principle of two nation states for two peoples, always mentioned that this entailed Palestinian recognition of Israel as a state of the Jewish people. Benjamin Netanyahu is not the first to broach the idea. It remains uncertain whether he acted wisely in the manner he gave the issue such prominence, but what shocked many Israelis — not just Likud members — was the blunt and vulgar response given by official Palestinian spokespeople.
In their ferociously negative response, Shamir claims that the Palestinians "fell into the trap that those who demanded recognition of a Jewish state had set for them." Yet apparently there was no fall into any rhetorical trap. Rather, this was an expression of a deep, internal ideological truth that to this day refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the Jewish people's right to self-determination. Because as far as the Palestinians are concerned, the Jews are not a nation, but rather a religious-ethnic group.
Yet the Palestinians must understand that just as Golda Meir claimed that "there is no Palestinian people," the same response applies to their view of the Jewish people. If they define themselves as a nation, then they are a nation.
Shamir is correct in stating that "our existence does not depend on what they say." But their opinion and their position are important. Peace is made between enemies. The Palestinians fought the Jewish state, and if they truly and sincerely wish to forge peace, they must be willing to come to terms with the Jewish state, and to do so explicitly, without stuttering.
Obviously this is not simple, but neither the Partition Plan nor the acceptance of the principle of two states for two peoples is a simple matter for many Jews and Zionists. But this is what is urgently needed.
Monday, August 17, 2009
Ask Mustafa Khalil
By Shimon Shamir
Ha'aretz (Israel)
August 17, 2009
In Israeli political discourse, the demand that the Arabs, and especially the Palestinians, recognize Israel as a Jewish state or as the state of the Jewish people has been heard more and more recently. The demand is being presented as an ultimatum, ruling out peace agreements with Arabs who reject it. It is a problematic demand.
Defining Israel as Jewish is an ideological decision and a matter for the country's citizens alone to make. In international relations, recognition of states is based on criteria such as sovereignty, independence and control of territory. A state's ideological definition of itself is not a matter for consideration by other countries as long as it doesn't represent an aggressive threat.
It is not our concern, for example, if Egypt defines itself as Islamic, Arab, African or pharaonic. We recognize Egypt as a political entity, but its ideological character is determined only by Egypt's political community. Countries are recognized by other countries without regard to whether they are communist or capitalist, or whether they are national or multinational in character.
Israel made peace with Egypt and Jordan without demanding recognition of the state's Jewish character. There was no opportunity nor was it reasonable to extract such a demand from them. I recall that after the peace treaty with Egypt was signed, Egyptian minister Boutros Boutros-Ghali and prime minister Mustafa Khalil came to Tel Aviv University in 1980 to speak with the faculty about relations in the wake of the signing. Khalil said emotionally: "We want relations of friendship and peace with Israel, but I must say in all candor that when we speak about the Jews, we never conceive [of them] as a national entity. Of course, for you in Israel and in the Zionist movement, there is a different outlook, but that is our viewpoint in Egypt, and I must present it to you honestly." Khalil was a devoted supporter of peace with Israel.
The demand for recognition of the state's Jewishness serves two purposes. On the conceptual level, it provides a lifeline for those who have always argued that the Arabs are not willing to make peace, even though they now face an Arab leadership that expresses consent in principle for peace with Israel. The Arab peace initiative, which proposes normal relations and an end of the conflict and makes Palestinian refugees' right of return subject to Israel's consent, is especially disturbing to people of this school of thought. All of this is in return for steps by Israel, most of them no different from those required, for example, by the Americans. Therefore, imposing an additional "test" supports Arab rejectionist reasoning.
On the functional level, the demand eases pressure to renew negotiations, particularly after the Israeli government was dragged into recognizing the principle of two states subject to a condition the Palestinians clearly cannot accept. Acceptance of the condition would require the Palestinians to convert their national narrative to a Zionist narrative, which much of the world community also does not accept - as opposed to recognizing Israel as an existing state. Our existence does not depend on what they say.
The state's definition has ramifications on subjects such as the Law of Return for Jews and the right of return for Palestinians and relations between the majority and the Arab minority, as well as the state's language and culture. These, however, are practical problems, some of which should be solved through political negotiations or decision making within the Israeli political process.
The Palestinians fell into the trap that those who demanded recognition of a Jewish state had set for them. Instead of responding that it is not their concern how the Israelis define their state (as Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad recently suggested), they coalesced around a position explicitly rejecting the existence of a Jewish state, which is not their right. Their adamant response has created an obstacle to peace that is the counterpart to the demand for recognizing the state as Jewish.
Ha'aretz (Israel)
August 17, 2009
In Israeli political discourse, the demand that the Arabs, and especially the Palestinians, recognize Israel as a Jewish state or as the state of the Jewish people has been heard more and more recently. The demand is being presented as an ultimatum, ruling out peace agreements with Arabs who reject it. It is a problematic demand.
Defining Israel as Jewish is an ideological decision and a matter for the country's citizens alone to make. In international relations, recognition of states is based on criteria such as sovereignty, independence and control of territory. A state's ideological definition of itself is not a matter for consideration by other countries as long as it doesn't represent an aggressive threat.
It is not our concern, for example, if Egypt defines itself as Islamic, Arab, African or pharaonic. We recognize Egypt as a political entity, but its ideological character is determined only by Egypt's political community. Countries are recognized by other countries without regard to whether they are communist or capitalist, or whether they are national or multinational in character.
Israel made peace with Egypt and Jordan without demanding recognition of the state's Jewish character. There was no opportunity nor was it reasonable to extract such a demand from them. I recall that after the peace treaty with Egypt was signed, Egyptian minister Boutros Boutros-Ghali and prime minister Mustafa Khalil came to Tel Aviv University in 1980 to speak with the faculty about relations in the wake of the signing. Khalil said emotionally: "We want relations of friendship and peace with Israel, but I must say in all candor that when we speak about the Jews, we never conceive [of them] as a national entity. Of course, for you in Israel and in the Zionist movement, there is a different outlook, but that is our viewpoint in Egypt, and I must present it to you honestly." Khalil was a devoted supporter of peace with Israel.
The demand for recognition of the state's Jewishness serves two purposes. On the conceptual level, it provides a lifeline for those who have always argued that the Arabs are not willing to make peace, even though they now face an Arab leadership that expresses consent in principle for peace with Israel. The Arab peace initiative, which proposes normal relations and an end of the conflict and makes Palestinian refugees' right of return subject to Israel's consent, is especially disturbing to people of this school of thought. All of this is in return for steps by Israel, most of them no different from those required, for example, by the Americans. Therefore, imposing an additional "test" supports Arab rejectionist reasoning.
On the functional level, the demand eases pressure to renew negotiations, particularly after the Israeli government was dragged into recognizing the principle of two states subject to a condition the Palestinians clearly cannot accept. Acceptance of the condition would require the Palestinians to convert their national narrative to a Zionist narrative, which much of the world community also does not accept - as opposed to recognizing Israel as an existing state. Our existence does not depend on what they say.
The state's definition has ramifications on subjects such as the Law of Return for Jews and the right of return for Palestinians and relations between the majority and the Arab minority, as well as the state's language and culture. These, however, are practical problems, some of which should be solved through political negotiations or decision making within the Israeli political process.
The Palestinians fell into the trap that those who demanded recognition of a Jewish state had set for them. Instead of responding that it is not their concern how the Israelis define their state (as Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad recently suggested), they coalesced around a position explicitly rejecting the existence of a Jewish state, which is not their right. Their adamant response has created an obstacle to peace that is the counterpart to the demand for recognizing the state as Jewish.
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